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ABSTRACT
This Note addresses the relatively recent phenomenon of springing
guaranties, albeit only in the context of their effect on bankruptcy’s
traditional reorganization process. As such, this Note targets
springing guaranties triggered by bankruptcy-related events.
Unfortunately, the threat of liability posed by such springing
guaranties creates perverse incentives for the guarantor. This is
problematic because lenders only employ springing guaranties if the
guarantor is an insider of the borrower who has the capacity to wield
significant decision-making authority. Although directors of a
solvent corporation only owe fiduciary duties to shareholders, this
obligation broadens to encompass creditors, as well as shareholders,
as the corporate entity approaches insolvency. It is incumbent upon
the directors to take a more holistic approach in making decisions so
as to consider the welfare of the corporate entity as a whole, as
opposed to merely the individual stakeholders. Once in bankruptcy,
the debtor in possession (“DIP”) owes these duties to the estate, thus
coming full circle in favor of the holistic approach. In contrast, the
springing guaranty device encourages the insider-guarantor to make
decisions based on an inverted approach. As the company
approaches insolvency and all the signals indicating that it is time to
authorize a bankruptcy align, the existence of the springing guaranty
discourages the guarantor from adopting the holistic approach.
Instead of paying heed to the signals and accordingly adopting the
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785

786

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XX

approach most likely to maximize the value of the corporate entity,
the springing guaranty incentivizes the guarantor to adopt an
individualistic approach that favors the guarantor’s own interests at
the expense of the corporate entity’s interests. This manifests itself
in the guarantor’s delayed authorization of a bankruptcy filing
despite the fact that all objective indicators suggest that the guarantor
should have timely authorized the filing. Eventually, the guarantor is
left with no choice but to authorize the filing. However, at that point,
the delay has taken its toll on the corporate debtor, so its prospects of
undergoing a successful reorganization are substantially diminished.
The springing guaranty device is the culprit behind the guarantor’s
skewed decision-making process and the subsequently diminished
viability of the borrower upon entering bankruptcy. For that reason,
this Note takes the position that in appropriate cases, bankruptcy
courts should invoke their equitable powers to enjoin the
enforcement of detrimental springing guaranties.
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INTRODUCTION
Lenders generally feel that the provisions of Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) favor the borrower-debtor and have the
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potential to cause the lender-creditor to suffer substantial losses.1 For
this reason, lenders will be more likely to include “hindrance
mechanisms” in their loan documents, where the borrower’s corporate
structure limits the assets accessible to the lender upon the borrower’s
default or where, as a whole, the economy is in a state of decline. 2
“Hindrance mechanisms” refer to tactics lenders employ to deter a
struggling company from filing a Chapter 11 petition and thereby
gaining the protections afforded to the debtor under the Code.3
One such “hindrance mechanism” is a personal guaranty,
commonly referred to as a springing guaranty. 4 Lenders require the
inclusion of springing guaranties in the loan documents of certain
corporate borrowers, particularly those that the lenders view as riskier
investments due to their limited liability structure and their involvement
1. See Alfred G. Adams, Jr. & Jason C. Kirkham, The Real Estate Lender’s
Updated Guide to Single Asset Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM.
L.J. 1, 17 (2009) (discussing how borrowers traditionally filed bankruptcy and
threatened a “cramdown” under § 1129(a)(8) as a means to gain leverage over the
lender); see also Joshua L. Eisenson, Exploring the Enforceability of Pre-Petition
Hindrance Mechanisms to Prevent Bankruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 247, 247
(2014) (discussing how lenders combat bankruptcy filings by the borrower through the
imposition of a financial disincentive against filing upon the guarantor).
2. Adams, Jr. & Kirkham, supra note 1, at 1-2 (discussing the need for springing
guaranties in the context of economic downturns and single-asset borrowers); Michael
D. Felding, Preventing Voluntary and Involuntary Bankruptcy Petitions by Limited
Liability Companies, 18 Bankr. Dev. J. 51, 51-52 (discussing the interrelation between
a lender’s use of hindrance mechanisms and a borrower’s LLC corporate structure).
3. Eisenson, supra note 1, at 247.
4. Id. at 262 n. 106 (referring to the terms bad boy guaranty and springing
guaranty as synonyms). The term springing guaranty is closely related to similar
devices that effectuate the same result with slight variations in the manner in which
they do so. See Marshall E. Tracht, Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, 117 BANKING
L.J. 129, 129 (March/April 2000) [hereinafter Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?]
(differentiating between a springing guaranty and an exploding guaranty, while noting
that the effect of both devices is the same). The terms for these similar devices are often
used synonymously with the term springing guaranty and include bad boy guaranty,
exploding guaranty, nonrecourse carve-out, and recourse obligation. See Adams, Jr. &
Kirkham, supra note 1, at 6-7 (using the terms springing, exploding, and non-recourse
carve-out guaranties interchangeably); Lauren Beslow & Travis Eliason, Commercial
Loan Guaranties and Enforcement of Non-Recourse Carve-Out Liability, 20 No. 13
WESTLAW J. BANK & LENDER LIAB. 1, at *1-2 (2014) (distinguishing a springing
guaranty from the similar device of a bad-boy guaranty or non-recourse carve-out
guaranty).
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in the single asset real estate business.5 To avoid potentially devastating
losses should such risk-prone borrowers file for bankruptcy, these
lenders require an insider of the corporate borrower to sign a guaranty
agreement.6 The guaranty agreement obligates the insider-guarantor to
assume full or partial recourse liability under the loan document upon
the borrower’s default.7 The guaranty agreement, via a reference to the
borrower’s loan agreement, enumerates the conditions that trigger the
guarantor’s liability thereunder. 8 Bankruptcy-related events are
commonly included within the “Fatal Four” default events triggering
full recourse liability to a guarantor.9 More specifically, the triggering
condition that requires the guarantor to assume all obligations of the
borrower upon the borrower’s voluntary filing for bankruptcy protection
is arguably the most problematic condition in these loan contracts.10 At
5. See Adams, Jr. & Kirkham, supra note 1, at 2 (connecting the recent increase in
defaults by commercial real estate borrowers to a single type of borrower: special
purpose entities that own a single real estate project).
6. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 129 (“A springing
guaranty is a guaranty of an enterprise’s debt, given by an insider, which will become
effective only upon specified conditions.”).
7. Gary E. Fluhrer, Scott B. Osborne, James H. Wallenstein & Susan G. Talley,
“Nonrecourse Carveout Guaranties in Commercial Loans: Drafting Tips to Avoid
Unintended Liabilities,” ALI CLE Commercial Real Estate Financing: Structuring and
Documenting Transactions in a Reviving Market 1 (June 2014).
8. Id. at 2 (“[T]he guarantied [sic] obligations are the recourse events to the
borrower set forth in the promissory note and incorporated by reference in the carve-out
guaranty.”).
9. Daniel K. Wright, II, Thomas W. Coffey, James H. Schwarz & Paul S. Magy,
Non-Recourse Carve-Outs, “Bad-Boy” Guaranties, and Personal Liability After
Cherryland: Strategies to Resolve Lender and Guarantor Disputes in and Outside of
Bankruptcy, STRAFFORD 15 (Jan. 30, 2014) (defining two of the four main triggering
conditions to be the borrower’s voluntary bankruptcy filing and the borrower’s
involuntary bankruptcy filing caused by collusion with the borrower’s unsecured
creditors).
10. See Adams, Jr. & Kirkham, supra note 1, at 12 (identifying springing
guaranties triggered by bankruptcy filings as the largest impediment to borrower
bankruptcies). Although there are various potential triggering conditions contained in
loan agreements of the nature described herein, the substantive part of this note will
only address cases, wherein the filing of a bankruptcy petition is what triggers recourse
liability against the guarantor. See Parts I.B, II.C & III.C. The jurisdictional parts of this
note are necessarily not as narrow in scope due to the limited number of springing
guaranty cases that address the jurisdictional issue, regardless of what the triggering
condition was that caused the guaranty to “spring” into effect. See infra Parts I.A, II.A,
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least one commentator limits the definition of a springing guaranty to
guaranties triggered by bankruptcy-related events, as opposed to the
traditional triggering events that constitute the borrower’s bad acts.11
Preliminarily, this Note advocates for the bankruptcy court’s
retention of springing guaranty proceedings triggered by bankruptcyrelated events on three jurisdictional grounds.12 First, such proceedings
can only “arise in” the context of a bankruptcy case. 13 Second, these
claims are sufficiently “related to” the underlying bankruptcy case to
support the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. 14 Third, the insiderguarantor could act through the debtor in order to confer upon the
bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the springing guaranty issue.15 This
Note’s primary argument is a proposal to the substantive conflict over
springing guaranties: the bankruptcy court should rely on its equitable

II.B, III.A, III.B. The scope of this note is also limited to filings by corporate debtors
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
11. See Beslow & Eliason, supra note 4, at *1-2 (differentiating a bad boy guaranty
from a springing guaranty based on the triggering condition leading to the borrower’s
default under the loan agreement). The implication is that since bankruptcy filings are
not necessarily bad acts of the borrower, it is inappropriate to include guaranties
triggered by bankruptcy filings within the definition of a bad boy guaranty. Id. at *2.
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012) (defining the jurisdiction of the district courts
over all bankruptcy cases and proceedings); see also id. § 157(a) (permitting the
districts courts to refer all bankruptcy cases or proceedings to the bankruptcy courts).
13. See id. § 1334(b) (providing the district courts with original but not exclusive
jurisdiction over all civil proceedings “arising in” a bankruptcy case); see also id. §
157(a) (permitting the district court to refer all proceedings “arising in” a bankruptcy
case to the bankruptcy court).
14. See id. § 1334(b) (providing the district courts with original but not exclusive
jurisdiction over all civil proceedings “related to” a bankruptcy case); see also id. § 157
(permitting the district court to refer all proceedings “related to” a bankruptcy case to
the bankruptcy court).
15. If, at the time the debtor files its petition, it also files a motion to modify the
automatic stay on behalf of its guarantor, then the springing guaranty issue will “arise
under” § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (barring creditor claims
against the debtor so as to afford the debtor the opportunity to attempt a reorganization
plan free from the financial pressures that drove the debtor into bankruptcy); see also
28 U.S.C. § 1334 (providing the district courts with original but not exclusive
jurisdiction over all proceedings “arising under” the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code); id. § 157 (permitting the district court to refer all proceedings “arising under”
the sections of the Code to the bankruptcy court).
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powers pursuant to § 105 to preclude the enforcement of springing
guaranties.16
Part I introduces the procedural and substantive issues that often
arise in springing guaranty cases. Part II delves into an in-depth analysis
of the appropriate jurisdiction to hear springing guaranty claims, and
then proceeds to address the arguments in favor of and against the
enforceability of springing guaranties. Part III first advocates for the
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over proceedings triggered by
bankruptcy-related events, and then it urges the bankruptcy court’s
invocation of its equitable powers to deem springing guaranties
unenforceable.
I. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE BACKGROUND
Part I of this Note begins by defining the bankruptcy court’s subject
matter jurisdiction for purposes of addressing the jurisdictional issue
that often arises in springing guaranty cases. Then, it discusses what a
springing guaranty is, the problems such a device entails, and the
reasons behind its increasing prevalence in the past few years.
A. THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT
The bankruptcy court is a court of limited jurisdiction created by
federal statute. 17 There are four possible paths through which the
bankruptcy court may retain subject matter jurisdiction over a claim visà-vis the district court.18 Pursuant to § 1334, original jurisdiction over all
bankruptcy cases and proceedings vests in the district court.19 Section
157 permits, but does not require, the district court to refer such
“under,” “arising under,” “arising in,” or “related to” bankruptcy cases
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (giving the bankruptcy courts the power to enter
necessary or appropriate orders to effectuate the provisions of the Code).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334; see also id. § 157 (permitting, while not requiring the
district court to refer cases “under” Title 11 or proceedings “arising under” or “arising
in” Title 11, or “related to” a case under Title 11 to the bankruptcy court).
18. See id. § 1334(a) (providing the district courts with both original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases under title 11); see also id. § 1334(b) (providing the district
courts with “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under
title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11”) (emphasis added).
19. Id. § 1334(a), (b).
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or proceedings to the bankruptcy court, which is now typically done as a
matter of course. 20 Thus, assuming the district court refers such a
proceeding to the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy court can invoke one
or more of its four statutory bases to hear that claim.21 The former three
(i.e. under, arising under, and arising in) constitute “core” proceedings,
whereas the latter (i.e. related to) constitutes “non-core” proceedings.22
The bankruptcy court has full adjudicative power over “core”
proceedings, subject to appellate review.23 In contrast, the bankruptcy
court can merely propose findings of fact and conclusions of law in
“non-core” proceedings, subject to de novo review.24
Section 157(b)(3) provides the bankruptcy court with the authority
to decide whether a proceeding constitutes a “core” or “non-core”
proceeding.25 The Code provides a non-exhaustive list of proceedings
that will per se implicate the bankruptcy court’s “core” jurisdiction.26
Examples from this list include: matters that affect the confirmation of
the debtor’s reorganization plan; matters that affect the administration of
the bankruptcy estate; matters that concern the applicability of the
automatic stay; matters that involve the allowance of claims or the
discharge of debts; matters that implicate the property of the estate; and
matters concerning the avoidance of fraudulent transfers, the validity of
liens, and the use of cash collateral.27 Where a claim is not included on
20.
21.

Id. § 157(a).
Id.; see id. § 1334(a) (providing the district courts with both original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under title 11); see also id. § 1334(b) (providing the
district courts with “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings
arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11”) (emphasis
added).
22. See id. § 157(b) (designating proceedings that arise under the Bankruptcy Code
or arise in a bankruptcy case as “core” proceedings); see also id. § 157(c) (designating
proceedings that are merely related to the underlying bankruptcy case as “non-core”).
23. Id. § 157(b), (c) (dividing “core” proceedings from “non-core” proceedings by
empowering bankruptcy courts to enter final orders or judgments after hearing “noncore” proceedings); see also id. § 158 (defining the types of review to be conducted on
appeal).
24. See id. § 157(c); id. § 158.
25. See id. § 157(b)(3) (providing the bankruptcy judge with the authority to decide
whether a proceeding is a “core” proceeding or a proceeding otherwise related to a
bankruptcy case).
26. Id. § 157(b)(2).
27. Id.
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the list, it may nonetheless be deemed “core” if it arises under Title 11
or if it could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case.28
If the claim alleges a substantive right or cause of action that is a
direct product of the Code, then that claim will be deemed to constitute a
“core” proceeding “arising under” Title 11.29 If the claim brought is the
product of a state statute, then it does not arise under the Code.30 If a
defense to a cause of action set out in the complaint implicates the Code,
then the claim does not confer “arising under” jurisdiction on the
bankruptcy court.31
For the bankruptcy court to have “arising in” jurisdiction, the
dispute would have to involve a claim that could only arise in the
context of a bankruptcy case. 32 “‘[A]dministrative matters’ such as
allowance and disallowance of claims, orders in respect to obtaining
credit, determining the dischargeability of debts, discharges,
confirmation of plans, orders permitting the assumption or rejection of
contracts, are the principle constituents of ‘arising in’ jurisdiction.”33 A
matter that arises in the context of a bankruptcy case cannot be “the
subject of a lawsuit absent the filing of a bankruptcy case.”34
If the proceeding is deemed to be “non-core,” then the bankruptcy
court cannot enter a final judgment or order.35 However, the court may
nonetheless retain “non-core” subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
claim if the claim is “related to” a bankruptcy proceeding.36 The test for
28.
29.
30.

In re Exide Techs., 544 F.3d 196, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2008).
Stoe v. Flaherty, 436 F.3d 209, 217 (3d Cir. 2006).
Id. (holding that the Plaintiff’s claim does not arise under the Bankruptcy Code
because it is predicated on a Pennsylvania state statute, rather than on the Bankruptcy
Code).
31. Id. (distinguishing Constitutional arising under federal question jurisdiction,
which may be implicated by a federal defense to a state law claim from bankruptcy
arising under jurisdiction, which may not be implicated by a federal defense to a state
law claim).
32. Id. at 218.
33. Id. (citing COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 3.01[4][c][iv] at 3–31).
34. Id. at 212-14 (explaining that mandatory abstention only applies in the context
of “non-core” proceedings, as opposed to “core” proceedings).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (2012) (limiting the bankruptcy judge to submitting
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for the district
court to enter the final order or judgment).
36. Id. (“A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a “core” proceeding
but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11.”).
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determining whether a proceeding is related to the bankruptcy case is
“whether the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any
effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” 37 If the
proceeding is deemed to be “related to” the bankruptcy case and a party
to the proceeding already commenced a timely action in state court, the
bankruptcy court must remand the proceeding to the state court under
the doctrine of mandatory abstention.38
B. THE SPRINGING GUARANTY DEVICE AND THE PROBLEMS IT ENTAILS
The problem with the lender’s use of a springing guaranty is the
detrimental effect that such a device has on the debtor’s prospects for a
successful reorganization.39 As one commentator notes, “[b]y imposing
personal liability on a guarantor, which is usually a person in control of
the borrower, bad boy guaranties create a financial disincentive for the
guarantor to cause, or even permit, the borrower to impede the lender’s
collateral enforcement action by filing a bankruptcy petition.”40
37. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted).
Although of minimal relevance for purposes of this Note, it is nevertheless worthwhile
to mention that the Pacor test only applies in the pre-confirmation context, and a
different test applies to assess whether a post-confirmation proceeding is “related to”
bankruptcy. See Stoe v. Flaherty, 436 F.3d 209, 216 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006).
38. 28 U.S.C. §1334(c)(2) (providing “[u]pon timely motion of a party in a
proceeding based upon a State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case
under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, with
respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United
States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing
such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State
forum of appropriate jurisdiction”).
39. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 134 (describing how a
springing guaranty causes the guarantor to delay the borrower’s filing and cost the
borrower more money in the process); see also Thomas C. Homburger & James E.
Goodrich, Structuring Real Estate Loans: Leveraging Nonrecourse Carve-outs,
Springing Guaranties, SPE Provisions and More, STRAFFORD, 24 (July 10, 2014)
[hereinafter Structuring Real Estate Loans] (“Springing recourse guaranties which are
activated due to the borrower’s insolvency can have the chilling effect of causing
borrowers seeking to prevent the occurrence of a foreseeable payment default to wait
until the last possible moment to alert servicers or lenders or seek modification of the
loan, all in the hopes that it won’t be necessary; this delay may exacerbate the
insolvency problem when a default occurs.”).
40. Eisenson, supra note 1, at 247.
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As a result, the guarantor often refuses to authorize the filing of the
petition at the time when the guarantor’s fiduciary duties first obligate
him to do so, thereby subjecting the guarantor to a lawsuit based on
breach of fiduciary duty.41 However, this latter consequence may be the
preferred route for the guarantor after conducting a cost-benefit analysis
between a multi-million dollar lawsuit based on breach of the springing
guaranty and a lawsuit based on breach of fiduciary duty. 42 If the
guarantor does consent to the bankruptcy filing, the initial delay as a
result of the conflict of interest and ensuing disincentives imposed on
the guarantor’s decision-making process by the springing guaranty
reduce the viability of the debtor upon filing and make it less likely the
debtor will undergo a successful reorganization.43 The problems created
by the springing guaranty device are even further exacerbated where the
loan contract does not limit the assets from which the creditor can
collect, but rather permits the debt to be treated as full recourse against
the guarantor.44 This permits the creditor to collect from the guarantor
the entire remaining deficiency between what the debtor owed the
41. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 132 (describing how
the springing guaranty creates a conflict of interest between the guarantor’s personal
best interest and the guarantor’s fiduciary duty to the borrower’s creditors).
42. See David R. Kuney, “Springing Guaranties,” ALI CLE Commercial Real
Estate Financing: Structuring and Documenting Transactions in a Reviving Market,
June 2014, ¶ David Lichtenstein v. Willkie Farr (discussing in Part III the debate over
whether a guarantor owed a fiduciary duty to creditors to timely file for bankruptcy).
But see Lichtenstein v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, 992 N.Y.2d 242, 246 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2014) (“Had Lichtenstein failed to authorize or delayed ESI’s bankruptcy filing, he
would have been faced with uncapped personal liability on the basis of a breach of his
duty to act in good faith.”).
43. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135 (discussing how
springing guaranties prevent firms that would benefit from reorganization from filing
for Chapter 11).
44. In one springing guaranty case, the guaranty agreement failed to cap the
borrower’s recovery from the guarantor at the value of the property. See Blue Hills
Office Park LLC v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 477 F. Supp. 2d 366, 388 (D. Mass.
2007). The value of the collateral underlying the loan was only $2 million, for which
the borrower would be held responsible. Id. However, the District Court enforced the
guaranty agreement according to its terms and permitted the lender to recover the entire
$17.5 million deficiency. See David R. Kuney, supra note 42, ¶ Damages Not Limited
to Actual Harm: Full Recourse VS. Actual Damages. Although Blue Hills did not
involve a bankruptcy-related trigger, this type of analysis applies in all springing
guaranty cases, regardless of the triggering condition. Id.
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creditor pursuant to the loan and what the creditor obtains upon a sale of
the debtor’s assets underlying the loan.45 This deficiency often amounts
to millions of dollars, for which the guarantor can be—and frequently
is—held personally liable.46
In order for the debtor to adhere to its obligations under its
reorganization plan, the debtor often must look to insiders, like the
guarantor, for loans.47 It is not unusual for the debtor’s plan to name the
guarantor as a last-resort for financing.48 For instance, in the bankruptcy
case correlating to the Kobernick springing guaranty case, the plan of
reorganization authorizes Communidad, the debtor therein, to borrow
funds from the guarantor, Mitchell Kobernick, among other insiders, to
the extent necessary for Communidad to fulfill its obligations to
creditors pursuant to the plan and to pay its operating expenses in a
timely manner.49 The existence of the insider-guarantor, as a substitute

45. See Blue Hills Office Park LLC, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (permitting the lender
to collect the deficiency amount of $17.5 million minus the $2 million collateral value
from the guarantor personally).
46. See Exhibit 3, column (c).
47. In determining whether to issue a § 105 injunction for the benefit of nondebtors, courts primarily focus on the monetary contributions of the guarantor to the
debtor’s reorganization. See Michael T. Madison, Jeffry R. Dwyer & Steven W.
Bender, Pursuit of the Guarantor Before Foreclosure of Realty Collateral—Effect of
Mortgagor’s Bankruptcy, 2 LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 15:13, 3 (August 2014)
[hereinafter Pursuit of the Guarantor]. Madison, Dwyer & Bender advise lenders to try
to limit the extent to which a guarantor can subsequently contribute assets to the
debtor’s reorganization in order to preclude a bankruptcy court from barring
enforcement of the lender’s claim against the guarantor. Id. It follows that these
guaranties necessarily will undermine the debtor’s reorganization prospects by
preventing the debtor from looking to the guarantor for financial support in carrying out
the provisions of the debtor’s plan of reorganization. Id.; see infra notes 49-50, 466-67,
512-14 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 49, 469-70 and accompanying text.
49. See Debtor’s First Plan of Reorganization, In re Communidad Kensington Club
I, LLC, 08-BK-32127 (No. 46) (S.D. Tex. Jun. 27, 2008) (“The Reorganized Debtor
shall be authorized to borrow funds from Mitchell Kobernick . . . to the extent
necessary to pay operating expenses and to pay distributions to Creditors, including
monthly payments on the Allowed Class 2 Claim.”); see also Wells Fargo Bank
Minnesota v. Kobernick, C.A. 8-CV-1458, 2009 WL 7808949 (S.D. Tex. May 28,
2009), aff’d sub nom., U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Kobernick, 454 F. App’x 307 (5th Cir.
2011) (identifying Mitchell Kobernick as the guarantor liable pursuant to the springing
guaranty).
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source of financing to the debtor, reassures creditors, and consequently
makes it more likely that each class of creditors will vote to confirm the
debtor’s reorganization plan.50 However, where at the beginning of the
debtor’s bankruptcy case, the guarantor confronts a severe financial
impediment (such as when a springing guaranty is enforced), it is
improbable that the guarantor would permit the debtor’s reorganization
plan to cite his name as an alternative source of financing. 51 Thus,
creditors are left with doubt about whether the debtor can uphold its
obligations to creditors pursuant to the debtor’s proposed plan. 52 This
doubt makes it less likely that those classes of creditors will vote to
confirm the debtor’s plan. 53 As such, the bankruptcy court’s

50. The advice Madison, Dwyer & Bender provide to lenders implicitly suggests
that these types of guaranties reduce the debtor’s likelihood of presenting a confirmable
plan of reorganization. See Pursuit of the Guarantor, supra note 47, at 3 (“Guaranty
agreements that restrict the guarantor’s monetary or nonmonetary assistance to the
debtor’s reorganization are not likely to be enforced.”).
51. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (illustrating the extent of liability
springing guarantors face); see also In re Karta Corp., 342 B.R. 45, 54-57 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision to enjoin the enforcement of nondebtor claims as a necessary prerequisite to the debtor’s being able to fulfill the terms of
its proposed plan).
52. In the case that set forth what is now “the most authoritative formulation of the
[§ 105] test,” the court relied heavily on the financial contributions of the non-debtor
affiliates in issuing a permanent injunction for the benefit of those affiliates. In re
Master Mortg. Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 938 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); see also
Joshua M. Silverstein, Hiding in Plain View: A Neglected Supreme Court Decision
Resolves the Debate over Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 23
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 64 (2006) (providing an in-depth discussion of the “Master
Mortgage test”). In Master Mortgage, the debtor relied on an 80% funding contribution
from non-debtor affiliates in order to reach a settlement with a creditor in the debtor’s
bankruptcy case. Master Mortg., 168 B.R. at 932. Those non-debtor affiliates also had
$3 million in claims against another creditor. Id. In order to successfully negotiate a
settlement with that creditor, the debtor needed its affiliates to agree to release their
claims against that creditor. Id. at 938. The affiliates did release their $3 million in
claims, and the debtor reached a settlement with that creditor. Id. The implication to be
drawn is that, without the cooperation of its non-debtor affiliates, the debtor could not
have reached settlements with certain of its creditors. Id. Presumably, those creditors
then would vote against plain confirmation, preventing the debtor from undergoing a
successful reorganization. Id.
53. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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confirmation of the debtor’s reorganization plan, the key indicator of a
successful reorganization, becomes much less likely.54
II. THE CONFLICT OVER WHETHER TO ENFORCE SPRINGING
GUARANTIES AND WHAT COURT SHOULD BE THE COURT TO ENFORCE
THEM
Part II.A introduces the conflict among courts as to whether state
courts, bankruptcy courts, or district courts are the appropriate
jurisdiction to hear claims involving the triggering of springing guaranty
recourse liability as a result of the borrower’s filing for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection. Part II.B copes with the scarcity of bankruptcy
court opinions and analyzes the springing guaranty issue by drawing
inferences from the bankruptcy court’s response to similarly-situated
debtors who have sought injunctive relief for the purpose of protecting
their non-debtor affiliates. Part II.C introduces the substantive conflict
of whether these springing guaranty provisions should be deemed
enforceable, and if so, on what grounds.
A. THE JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT
Preliminarily, it is important to note that no cases have yet arisen
wherein the debtor explicitly cites § 362 of the Code in asking the
bankruptcy court to enjoin enforcement of the springing guaranty action
pursuant to § 105.55 Although there has never been a springing guaranty
case to cite explicitly to § 362 as the basis for the injunction request,
there has been at least one springing guaranty case wherein the debtor
54. Rosemary E. Williams, Confirmation of Plan of Reorganization by Business
Entity Under Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code, in 94 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D
§ 38 (2007) (citing In re Mangia Pizza Invs., LP, 480 B.R. 669 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
2012)).
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (providing for the automatic stay barring the
post-filing assertion of any and all claims by lenders against the debtor); see also Will
Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135 (discussing the potential invocation
of § 105 to enjoin enforcement against the springing guarantor by reference to the
policies underlying the automatic stay); Michael T. Madison, Jeffry R. Dwyer & Steven
W. Bender, Exploding and Springing Guarantees, 2 LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING §
15:6 (August 2014) [hereinafter Exploding and Springing Guarantees] (“Thus far, the
courts have not considered the application of § 105 injunctions to the springing or
exploding guarantor.”).
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moves for a § 105 injunction in order to carry out the intent of the
automatic stay. 56 There, the debtor explained that enforcement of the
springing guaranty action against its guarantor would render its plan of
reorganization unfeasible.57 The debtor’s plan required the guarantor “to
contribute funds or pledge additional collateral as required to insure that
all plan payments are timely made.” 58 The debtor explained that its
guarantor would be unable to uphold this commitment to fund the
debtor’s plan if the bankruptcy court failed to enjoin the enforcement of
the springing guaranty. 59 However, the bankruptcy court denied the
motion, thereby permitting the state court to retain jurisdiction over the
springing guaranty issue.60 Therefore, there has yet to be a case wherein
a bankruptcy court granted an injunction barring enforcement of the
springing guaranty in order to protect the bankruptcy proceeding.61
56. Debtor’s Complaint for Injunction, In re Mkt. Ctr. E. Retail Prop., Inc., 1:09BK-11696, at 3-4 (No. 69) (Bankr. D.N.M. 2009); see also Credit Alliance Corp. v.
Williams, 851 F.2d 119, 121 (4th Cir. 1988) (analyzing debtor’s motion for § 105
injunction based on the Congressional policies underlying the automatic stay). In
Williams, the Court specifically cites the legislative history of § 362: “the automatic
stay is one of the fundamental protections provided by the bankruptcy laws . . . . It
permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan.” See Williams, 851
F.2d at 121 (citing S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1978)). Thus, if the
debtor’s plan would be rendered unfeasible as a result of enforcement against the nondebtor guarantor, the legislative history of § 362 supports the issuance of an equitable
injunction to bar enforcement of the springing guaranty. Id.
57. Debtor’s Complaint for Injunction at 4 (Doc. No. 69), In re Mkt. Ctr. E. Retail
Prop., Inc., 1:09-BK-11696.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id. at 4.
60. “The [Bankruptcy] Court orally ruled at the preliminary hearing” that it would
not force the lender seeking to enforce the springing guaranty in California State Court
to litigate issues stemming from that guaranty litigation in this bankruptcy case.
Memorandum Opinion & Order on Creditor’s Supplemental Application for Allowance
of Attorney Fees at 3, In re Mkt. Ctr. E. Retail Prop., Inc., 1:09-BK-11696 (No. 192)
(442 B.R. 805, Bankr. D.N.M. Nov. 30, 2010) (denying, without opinion or elaboration,
debtor’s motion for § 105 injunction). “The [Bankruptcy] Court now makes that ruling
in writing.” Id. “[T]he California State Court is competent to decide what if any fees
Mr. Lahave”—the springing guarantor—”ought to have to pay based on the guaranty.”
Id. “Whether Mr. Lahave then chooses to have Debtor reimburse him out of any surplus
remaining after all of the claims against the estate are paid in full, is his decision.” Id. at
4.
61. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (protecting the debtor via the automatic stay of all
post-filing litigation); see also Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135
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Even where a federal court—as opposed to a state court—has the
opportunity to rule on the enforceability of a springing guaranty, it often
declines to do so.62 In Post Investors LLC v. Gribble, the district court
granted the lender’s motion to remand the case to state court.63 The court
held that regardless of whether the bankruptcy court had “related to”
jurisdiction to hear the claim, mandatory abstention applied to require
the court to remand the action.64 Stanley W. Gribble, the guarantor, had
argued that this springing guaranty proceeding was “related to” the
borrower’s pending bankruptcy case. 65 “This action,” he asserted, “is
related to the bankruptcy cases because, if found liable to Plaintiff
herein, the Defendants will have an equitable subrogation claim against
the Borrowers that could materially affect the Borrower’s bankruptcy
estates.”66 Gribble also argued that the proceeding could only “arise in”
the context of the bankruptcy case, which constituted the default of the
borrower, triggering the guarantor’s liability under the loan agreement.67
The district court noted that Gribble did not argue that the proceeding
“arose under” the Code.68 In making its ruling, the court did not fully
address the guarantor’s “related to” argument, but noted that given the
unique circumstances of this bankruptcy case, it was unlikely there

(discussing the potential invocation of § 105 to enjoin enforcement against the
springing guarantor by reference to the policies underlying the automatic stay);
Exploding and Springing Guarantees, supra note 55 (commenting on how “the courts
have not considered the application of § 105 injunctions to the springing or exploding
guarantor”). But see Memorandum Opinion & Order on Creditor’s Supplemental
Application for Allowance of Attorney Fees at 3, In re Mkt. Ctr. E. Retail Prop., Inc.,
1:09-BK-11696 (No. 192) (442 B.R. 805, Bankr. D.N.M. Nov. 30, 2010) (denying,
without opinion or elaboration, the debtor’s motion for § 105 injunction).
62. See Post Investors LLC v. Gribble, 12 CIV. 4479 ALC AJP, 2012 WL
4466619, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012) (holding that mandatory abstention applied
and granting the plaintiff’s motion to remand the springing guaranty proceeding to State
Court); see also In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(granting the plaintiff’s motion to remand the proceeding to State Court based on the
doctrine of mandatory abstention).
63. Gribble, 2012 WL 4466619, at *6.
64. Id. at *4.
65. Id. at *3.
66. Id. at *3; see also 11 U.S.C. § 509 (2012) (providing co-debtors with the ability
to subrogate their claims as a means to gain leverage outside of the bankruptcy).
67. Gribble, 2012 WL 4466619, at *3.
68. Id. at *2.
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could be any conceivable effect on the bankruptcy estate.69 This was a
unique case because the bankruptcy court had already dismissed the
bankruptcy case unless the Borrowers paid the Plaintiff by the specified
deadline.70 Therefore, the district court noted that in light of the fact that
nothing was actually happening in the Borrower’s bankruptcy case
since, for all intents and purposes, it had been dismissed, “this
proceeding would exist outside of the bankruptcy case.”71
In addition, the district court also agreed with both of the lender’s
arguments. 72 First, the lender argued that the guaranty agreement
included a mandatory exclusive forum selection clause that was binding
on the defendant.73 The district court agreed with the lender’s argument
that the clause at issue gave it the exclusive right to choose whether to
commence litigation in state or federal court, and since the lender chose
state court, the case should be remanded.74 Second, the lender argued
that mandatory abstention required the court to remand the case to state
court. 75 As previously mentioned, the district court agreed with the
lender: mandatory abstention applied and warranted remand.76
Similarly, both the bankruptcy court and district court in the
bankruptcy of Extended Stay Inc. debated the issue of whether the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to rule on the enforceability of certain
non-recourse carve-out guaranty agreements. 77 The bankruptcy court
concluded that it did not have “related to” jurisdiction, and on that basis,
granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand. 78 However, on appeal, the
district court disagreed with the bankruptcy court’s decision on whether

69. Id. at *3 (distinguishing this case, which involved a liquidation of the debtor’s
property likely to generate sufficient proceeds to pay off the lender on the guaranty
from a traditional reorganization, where the guarantor’s equitable subrogation claims
against the Borrowers would be more likely to effect the Borrower’s bankruptcy
estates).
70. Id. at *3.
71. Id. at *4.
72. Id. at *3.
73. Id. at *4.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. 49, 52 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in
part, 435 B.R. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
78. Id. at 60.
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it had “related to” jurisdiction over the springing guaranty proceeding.79
Nevertheless, the district court ultimately agreed with the bankruptcy
court, and remanded the case to the state court because of the mandatory
abstention doctrine.80
The bankruptcy court made two findings essential to its conclusion
on the “related to” issue. 81 First, the guaranty agreement included an
express provision against indemnification, so holding the guarantor
liable would not give rise to a claim that the guarantor would then be
able to assert in the borrower’s bankruptcy case.82 Second, the guarantor
mistakenly framed its jurisdictional argument on the basis of a public
policy rationale that held little sway for the bankruptcy court in
analyzing whether it had jurisdiction to hear the claim. 83 More
specifically, the guarantor argued that the agreement was void as a
matter of public policy because it in effect served as a bar on the
debtor’s ability to file for bankruptcy due to the perverse incentives it
imposed on the debtor’s key decision maker—the guarantor. 84 The
guarantor also added that it created a conflict of interest that inhibited
his ability to uphold the fiduciary duties he owed to creditors as the
company approached insolvency. 85 The bankruptcy court found the
public policy arguments unpersuasive: even if the springing nature of
the guarantees disincentivized the guarantor from exercising rights
granted under existing bankruptcy law, the bankruptcy “cases actually
were filed,” and “[the guarantor], as president, chief executive and
chairman did, in fact, authorize such filings.”86
On appeal, the district court acknowledged the errors made by the
guarantor in arguing state law theories to support a bankruptcy court’s
79. In re Extended Stay Inc., 435 B.R. 139, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The
Bankruptcy Court did, however, err in its determination that it lacked ‘related to’
jurisdiction of [the lender’s] claims because they could have no conceivable effect on
Debtors’ estates.”).
80. Id. at 152.
81. In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. at 58-59.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 57.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 59; see also In re Extended Stay Inc., 435 B.R. 139, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(referencing the bankruptcy court’s rejection of the guarantor’s public policy arguments
on the ground that such arguments were “of ‘minimal relevance’ in light of the actual
exercise of the Debtors’ rights”).
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jurisdiction.87 The district court predicated its “related to” analysis on
provisions in the Intercreditor Agreement.88 These provisions gave the
lender the right to seek indemnification from the debtor for expenses
incurred in litigating the springing guaranty issue.89 They also provided
for the adjustment of the rights of creditors in the debtor’s bankruptcy
case in the event that they received compensation outside of the
bankruptcy case.90 Thus, the district court held that the lender’s potential
indemnification claim coupled with the possible effect on distributions
among creditors was sufficient to render the lender’s springing guaranty
proceeding “related to” the debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings. 91 In so
holding, the district court noted that since the estate’s value would likely
be too small to yield actual distributions, it was unlikely that the lender’s
recovery outside of the bankruptcy would affect those distributions.92
Still, the mere possibility that the estate’s value would be high enough to
yield distributions justified the district court’s finding of “related to”
jurisdiction.93 In the end, the district court remanded the case under a
theory of mandatory abstention.94
Although some have read the bankruptcy court’s initial opinion and
parts of the district court’s opinion to say that springing guaranty claims
are not appropriate for the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, this Note
takes the position that a correct reading of this case actually hinges on
the manner in which the guarantor frames his jurisdictional arguments.95
In this case, the guarantor sought to remove the action from state court
to bankruptcy court. 96 However, in doing so, the guarantor failed to
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

In re Extended Stay Inc., 435 B.R. at 150.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
On appeal, the district court acknowledged these errors made by the guarantor
in arguing state law theories to support a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, but ended up
remanding the case anyway under a theory of mandatory abstention. Id.; see David R.
Kuney & Jeffrey E. Bjork; 2011 Emerging Issues 5615, The Springing Guaranty and
Recourse Liability 1, 3-4 (Apr. 28, 2011) (discussing the bankruptcy court’s decision on
its lack of jurisdiction in In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. 49, 57-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009)).
96. In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. 49, 52 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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address why enforcement of this guaranty would in practical terms
impair the debtor’s reorganization prospects.97 It was necessary that the
guarantor emphasize the bankruptcy court’s ability to preclude such a
detrimental effect on the debtor’s reorganization prospects through the
invocation of § 105 of the Code. 98 Section 105 provides bankruptcy
courts with the power to issue a temporary injunction against
enforcement of the springing guaranty in order to implement the
provisions of the Code and the equitable policies those provisions
represent in the context of a Chapter 11 proceeding.99 In essence, the
guarantor needed to explain that even if he would not have an
indemnification claim to assert against the debtor’s estate, he still had an
argument based on the doctrine of equitable subordination, which would
have an equally detrimental effect on the bankruptcy estate.100
Still, there are some cases where a federal district court, rather than
a state court, rules on the enforceability of a springing guaranty
triggered by a bankruptcy-related event.101 It should be noted, however,
that in all but three of these cases, the only reason a federal court ruled
on the issue was that diversity existed between the two parties. 102
Usually, where diversity is the basis for a federal court’s jurisdiction
over the springing guaranty issue, the federal court does not provide a

97. In finding that it did not have “related to” jurisdiction over the springing
guaranty proceeding, the bankruptcy court actually preserved the debtor’s right to later
argue that “the state court action . . . should be stayed under the Bankruptcy Code to the
extent that the Debtors can demonstrate that [the guarantor] plays a critical role in the
reorganization process and that prosecution of the litigation against him is interfering
with or may threaten the success of the reorganization.” Id. at 58-59.
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) (providing the bankruptcy court with the power
to issue necessary or appropriate orders to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code).
99. Id.; see Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135.
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (providing for the doctrine of equitable subordination);
see also supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (explaining why it is highly likely
guarantors will also hold claims as creditors in the debtor’s bankruptcy case and thus be
able to argue that the lender’s claim should be equitably subordinated to their claim in
the debtor’s bankruptcy).
101. See Exhibit 3, column (b) (providing the case cite for any springing guaranty
cases included in table 3 that were decided by a federal court).
102. See Exhibit 3, column (d) (identifying the springing guaranty cases that were
decided by a federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction).
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jurisdictional analysis.103 Nevertheless, in Kobernick, the district court
definitively concludes that the claim does not present a “core” issue.104
As the court held, “[t]his is a basic contract dispute in which a creditor is
trying to recover from guarantors under the terms of a loan agreement.
Several bankruptcy courts have held that actions against third-party
guarantors of the debtor’s debts are not ‘core’ proceedings.”105 However,
the district court left open the question of whether the bankruptcy court
could have exercised “related to” jurisdiction over the claim: “[t]he
parties dispute whether the instant action is sufficiently related to the
Communidad Bankruptcy; however, this Court’s diversity jurisdiction is
uncontested.”106 Thus, the district court primarily relies on the diversity
between the parties to retain the proceeding, but it also considers other
factors, such as judicial economy.107
In an interesting decision, the Northern District of Texas predicated
its subject matter jurisdiction over a springing guaranty proceeding on
the “related to” jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.108 The district court
concluded that the lender’s foreclosure-triggered claim against the
guarantor for the deficiency remaining under the loan was related to the
borrower’s breach of contract and fraud counterclaims filed in the
bankruptcy court. 109 Pursuant to those counterclaims, the borrower
sought to set aside the foreclosure as a fraudulent transfer pursuant to §
547.110 The district court held that because the borrower’s claims against
the lender raised similar factual allegations, the outcomes in both
proceedings could potentially affect the scope and administration of the

103.
104.

Id.
Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Kobernick, C.A. 8-CV-1458, 2009 WL
7808949, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 28, 2009).
105. Id. at *4.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *4-5. The other factors considered by the district court were: “the goals of
promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping and
confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors’ and creditors’ resources, []
expediting the bankruptcy process, [and] . . . whether a jury demand had been filed by
either side.” Id. at *5.
108. LSREF2 Baron, LLC v. Aguilar, 3:12-CV-1242-M, 2013 WL 230381, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2013).
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012) (permitting the trustee, or the DIP in
Chapter 11, to avoid fraudulent transfers in order to recover property of the estate).
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borrower’s bankruptcy estate. 111 Thus, federal jurisdiction over the
springing guaranty proceeding was properly invoked pursuant to § 1334
because the springing guaranty proceeding “related to” the borrower’s
bankruptcy estate. 112 However, since the bankruptcy court for the
Western District of Texas was already presiding over the debtor’s
bankruptcy case, the Northern District of Texas transferred the springing
guaranty proceeding to the Western District of Texas as the more
appropriate venue.113 In doing so, the Northern District court left open
the question of whether the Western District of Texas should refer that
proceeding to its bankruptcy court.114
There are very few cases, where a bankruptcy court—as opposed to
a district court—is the one actually ruling on the springing guaranty
issue.115 In most instances where the district court does refer the case to
its bankruptcy court, it does so pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s “noncore” “related to” jurisdiction, thereby enabling the district court to
retain jurisdiction for purposes of entering the final judgment on the
issue.116
In In re South Side House, LLC, the district court referred the
proceeding to the bankruptcy court.117 On October 12, 2011, the district
court found that the bankruptcy court had “related to” jurisdiction over

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Aguilar, 2013 WL 230381, at *2.
Id.; see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Aguilar, 2013 WL 230381, at *8-9.
Id.
See In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, at *737-39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1997) (holding that because the guaranty agreement only provided for the voluntary
filing of a bankruptcy petition to constitute a default, the involuntary filing does not
constitute a default and therefore does not trigger the guarantor’s liability).
116. Aguilar, 2013 WL 230381, at *8-9 (transferring the case to the Western District
of Texas on venue grounds, while preserving the right of the Western District of Texas
to refer the case to the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District – the court already
presiding over the debtor’s bankruptcy case); see also In re S. Side House, LLC, 470
B.R. 659, 665 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012) (referencing the district court’s referral of the
proceeding at issue to the bankruptcy court “for the issuance of proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law”); Sl Inv. US-Re Holdings 2009-1, Inc. v. Englett, No. 609CV-281-ORL-28DAB, 2009 WL 1659164, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2009) (referring
the springing guaranty proceeding to the Bankruptcy Court on the grounds that the
proceeding was, at a minimum, related to the debtor’s bankruptcy case).
117. In re S. Side House, 470 B.R. at 665.
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the springing guaranty issue.118 Notably, at the time of this decision, the
guarantors played key roles in the debtor’s bankruptcy. 119 Menachem
Stark and Israel Perlmutter, the two guarantors, were the debtor’s sole
equity owners and were the key personnel comprising the debtor in
possession.120 On January 3, 2014, Menachem Stark was murdered.121
As a result, on January 15, 2014, the bankruptcy court held a hearing
and subsequently issued an order appointing a trustee to take over the
role of the debtors-in-possession.122 Stark’s murder did not occur until
after the district court had decided that the bankruptcy court possessed
“related to” jurisdiction over the springing guaranty proceeding.123 If the
district court decided that issue after the appointment of a trustee, it is
uncertain whether the outcome would have been the same.124
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 670.
Id. at 665.
See Debtor’s Statement of Fin. Affairs at Question 21(b), In re S. Side House,
LLC, No. 1-09-43576-ess (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2009), ECF No. 24 (listing
Menachem Stark and Israel Perlmutter as the sole officers and directors of the
corporation, as well as the only stockholders to hold five percent or more of the voting
or equity securities of the company).
121. See Anthony M. Destefano, Trustee Will Oversee Company of Slain Brooklyn
Landlord, NEWSDAY (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/trusteewill-oversee-company-of-slain-brooklyn-landlord-1.6816926 (reporting the abduction
of Stark on the night of January 2 and the discovery of his partially burned corpse the
following day).
122. See id. (“A trustee will handle the troubled real estate company of murdered
Brooklyn landlord Menachem Stark . . . .”).
123. See In re S. Side House, 470 B.R. at 670 (“On October 12, 2011, the District
Court issued a decision and order referring the action to [the Bankruptcy] Court for
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.”); see also Destefano, supra note 121
(reporting the discovery of Stark’s murdered body on January 3, 2014).
124. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (providing for the debtor’s automatic stay); In re S.
Side House, 470 B.R. at 670. In Extended Stay, the bankruptcy court held that the
guarantor made an insufficient showing as to the role he would play throughout the
debtor’s reorganization process, and thus, the springing guaranty proceeding was not
“related to” the debtor’s bankruptcy case. See In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. 49,
58-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part 435 B.R. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). In so
holding, the court noted that its ruling should not be construed to preclude the debtor
from subsequently filing a motion to modify the automatic stay. Id. If the debtor could
show that its guarantor would play a particularly “critical role in the reorganization
process and that prosecution of the litigation against him is interfering with or may
threaten the success of the reorganization,” the bankruptcy court hinted that it would be
willing to modify the stay so as to encompass the non-debtor guarantor within its sphere
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In SL Investment US-Re Holdings 2009-1, Inc. v. Englett, the
district court analyzed the jurisdictional question in a unique manner.125
The district court found that a springing guaranty proceeding is “at a
minimum” “related to” a bankruptcy case because the amount that a
lender collects from the guarantor will reduce the liabilities of the
debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and thusly, there is a conceivable effect on
the bankruptcy estate. 126 Consequently, the district court referred the
proceeding to the bankruptcy court based on the bankruptcy court at
least having “related to” jurisdiction over the matter. 127 This holding
further supports the argument that the two proceedings should be heard
in tandem by the bankruptcy court.128 This is because the bankruptcy

of protection. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (providing for the debtor’s automatic stay); see also
In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. at 58-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, 435
B.R. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The Court does not, by this ruling, limit the rights of the
Debtors to later claim that the state court action brought by Bank of America should be
stayed under the Bankruptcy Code to the extent that the Debtors can demonstrate that
Lichtenstein, in particular, plays a critical role in the reorganization process and that
prosecution of the litigation against him is interfering with or may threaten the success
of the reorganization.”). In South Side, the district court decided the jurisdictional
question at a point in time when both guarantors were vital to the debtor’s
reorganization prospects. In re S. Side House, LLC, 470 B.R. at 670 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2012) (noting that the district court referred the proceeding to the bankruptcy court on
October 12, 2011—over two years prior to the death of one of the guarantors). After
one of those two guarantors died and the other was replaced as the debtor in possession
(“DIP”) by a trustee, it is far less likely that any federal court would retain jurisdiction
over a springing guaranty proceeding based on the potential for the litigation against the
guarantor to threaten the success of the debtor’s reorganization. See LSREF2 Baron,
LLC v. Aguilar, 3:12-CV-1242-M, 2013 WL 230381, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2013)
(citing the potential for the springing guaranty proceeding to affect the scope and
administration of the borrower’s bankruptcy estate as the key justification for its finding
of “related to” jurisdiction); In re S. Side House, LLC, 470 B.R. at 670 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2012) (relying on the district court’s finding of “related to” jurisdiction in
issuing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law).
125. SL Inv. US-Re Holdings 2009-1, Inc. v. Englett, 609-CV-281-ORL-28DAB,
2009 WL 1659164, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2009).
126. Id. at *1; see also Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)
(holding that a proceeding is related to the debtor’s bankruptcy case if its outcome
could conceivably effect the bankruptcy).
127. See In re S. Side House, 470 B.R. at 665.
128. See Martin E. Beeler, Update on Jurisdiction: 2009, 2010 NORTON ANN. SURV.
OF BANKR. L. 36 (2010) (citing the guarantor’s jurisdictional argument in Extended
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court is the court best situated to reorganize the debt in a manner most
likely to provide the debtor with an opportunity to successfully
reorganize.129 In addition, the holding suggests that the inverse nature of
the two sources of liability for the lender could lead to a double recovery
and a subsequent windfall for the lender if the two proceedings are not
consolidated within the bankruptcy court.130 If the lender recovers from
the guarantor in state court and also recovers from the debtor in
bankruptcy court for liability under the same loan document, there is no
mechanism to ensure that the lender will not inadvertently benefit from
a double recovery.131
At least one commentator believes that if the guarantor is held
liable, the guarantor will always assume the place that the lender would
have held as a creditor in the debtor’s bankruptcy case. 132 That
commentator argues that if the guarantor pays the lender on behalf of the
borrower, then the guarantor automatically assumes the position the
lender would have occupied in the borrower’s bankruptcy. 133 This
rationale supports the conclusion that the springing guaranty proceeding
will always conceivably affect the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and thus,
the bankruptcy court will always have “related to” jurisdiction to hear
that claim.134
Stay); see also In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. at 57 (discussing the potential for a
springing guaranty proceeding to sufficiently relate to the debtor’s reorganization).
129. The guarantor in Extended Stay argued that, “the state court action involves an
attempt by Bank of America to circumvent its subordinate position in a complex capital
structure by suing on a $100 million non-recourse carve-out guaranty.” See In re
Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. at 57. Thus, at least in part, the guarantor predicated this
jurisdictional argument on the “highly-structured transaction involving the debtors.”
See Beeler, supra note 128, at Part V.III. The implication is that in order to restructure
the debt effectively the court would have to know the nature of that “highly-structured
transaction involving the debtors.” Id.
130. See In re S. Side House, 470 B.R. at 665.
131. Id.
132. See Eisenson, supra note 1, at 264 (“Once the guarantor pays the full debt
amount, the lender will assign its rights to related claims against the borrower’s estate
in bankruptcy to the guarantor.”).
133. Id.
134. Id.; see also S1 Inv. US-Re Holdings 2009-1, Inc. v. Englett, 609-CV-281ORL-28DAB, 2009 WL 1659164, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2009) (“Because any
damages collected by SL Investment from [the guarantors] would reduce [the
borrower’s] liabilities, the Court finds that the instant suit is, at a minimum, a related
proceeding that conceivably has an effect on the estate being administered.”).
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B. REFRAMING THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE TO RESOLVE THE JURISDICTIONAL
BAR
This Subpart considers how guarantors and other third parties who
are liable for the debtor’s debts have traditionally sought to obtain
protection for their non-debtor affiliates in the bankruptcy court.135 This
Subpart then seeks to transpose the tactics employed in such cases
involving similarly-situated, non-debtor affiliates to the springing
guaranty context.136
One way for the debtor to increase the likelihood of having the
springing guaranty issue heard by the bankruptcy court is to move for an
injunction to extend the protection afforded by the automatic stay to the

135. See In re Otero Mills, Inc., 25 B.R. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982) (justifying the
issuance of a § 105 injunction based on the intent of the guarantors to help fund the
reorganization); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Little Rock v. Pettit, 12 B.R. 147, 149
(E.D. Ark. 1981) (explaining that the close relationship between the debtor and the third
party justified the issuance of a § 105 injunction since enforcement of the action against
the third party “might place pressure on the bankrupt and ultimately affect the proposed
reorganization.”); In re Saxby’s Coffee Worldwide, LLC, 440 B.R. 369, 379 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2009) (differentiating between when a permanent versus a temporary
injunction is justified and when the non-debtor should be required to comply with
certain conditions in exchange for the issuance of that injunction); In re Lyondell
Chem. Co., 402 B.R. 571, 579-80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing the various ways
in which a creditor’s suit can affect the debtor’s reorganization prospects); In re Steve’s
Furniture Warehouse, Inc., 46 B.R. 80, 82 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985) (citing the
subrogation of the guarantor’s rights to those of the creditor “by operation of equity” as
conferring upon the bankruptcy court at least “related to” jurisdiction over the nondebtor third party proceeding, where ultimately, the creditor or the guarantor will hold a
claim against the estate, and thus, there will be an effect on the estate); Pursuit of the
Guarantor, supra note 47, at 1 (discussing the bankruptcy court’s potential invocation
of § 105 to modify the automatic stay “to shield the solvent guarantor from the lender’s
collection efforts); see also Exploding and Springing Guarantees, supra note 55
(discussing the potential applicability of § 105 temporary and permanent injunctions to
the springing or exploding guarantor).
136. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (providing for the automatic stay barring the
post-filing assertion of any and all claims by lenders against the debtor); see also Will
Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135 (discussing the potential invocation
of § 105 to enjoin enforcement against the springing guarantor by reference to the
policies underlying the automatic stay); Exploding and Springing Guarantees, supra
note 55 (“Thus far, the courts have not considered the application of § 105 injunctions
to the springing or exploding guarantor.”).
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debtor’s non-debtor affiliates. 137 However, there have been very few
bankruptcy cases that have addressed the issue where the lender includes
a springing guaranty in the borrower’s loan documents and the borrower
subsequently triggers the guarantor’s personal liability by filing for
bankruptcy. 138 As such, the next best option is to consider how
bankruptcy courts decide whether they can exercise jurisdiction over a §
105 proceeding brought in the debtor’s bankruptcy case, wherein the
debtor seeks the issuance of an injunction to protect a non-debtor third
party.139 It is preferable that the third party be an insider or affiliate of
the debtor, so as to make the context more analogous to that of the
springing guaranty context, where the guarantor is always an insider.140
137. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (conferring upon the bankruptcy court the power to
enter necessary or appropriate orders to effectuate the provisions of the Code); 11
U.S.C. § 362(a) (staying all post-filing attempts by lenders to collect from the debtor).
138. There is one springing guaranty case, where the bankruptcy court did rule on a
§ 105 Motion. See Debtor’s Motion for Injunction, at 1, In re Mkt. Ctr. E. Retail Prop.,
Inc., 1:09-BK-11696-s11 (D.N.M. Aug. 30, 2009), ECF No. 63. However, aside from
In re Market Center East Retail Property, there is a scarcity of case law specifically
involving debtors filing § 105 Motions for the purpose of enjoining their primary
secured lender from enforcing the springing guaranty. See Exploding and Springing
Guarantees, supra note 55, at 2 (“[T]he courts have not considered the application of
Section 105 injunctions to the springing or exploding guarantor.”).
139. See In re Otero Mills, Inc., 25 B.R. at 1020 (justifying the issuance of a § 105
injunction based on the intent of the guarantors to help fund the reorganization); In re
Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. at 582 (discussing the various ways in which a creditor’s
suit can effect the debtor’s reorganization prospects); Pettit, 12 B.R. at 148 (explaining
that the close relationship between the debtor and the third party justified the issuance
of a § 105 injunction since enforcement of the action against the third party “could
place pressure on debtor and ultimately affect proposed reorganization”); In re Steve’s
Furniture Warehouse, Inc., 46 B.R. at 83 (citing the doctrine of equitable subrogation
as conferring upon the bankruptcy court at least “related to” jurisdiction over the nondebtor third party proceeding, where ultimately, the creditor or the guarantor will hold a
claim against the estate, and thus, there will be an effect on the estate); In re Saxby’s
Coffee Worldwide, LLC, 440 B.R. at 379 (differentiating between when a permanent
versus a temporary injunction is justified and when the non-debtor should be required to
comply with certain conditions in exchange for the issuance of that injunction).
140. See In re Linda Vista Cinemas, LLC, CV 10-786-TUC-CKJ, 2011 WL
1743312, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 6, 2011); Pettit, 12 B.R. 147, 147-49; In re Saxby’s
Coffee Worldwide, LLC, 440 B.R. at 379; In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. at 587; In
re Fowler Floor & Wall Covering Co., 93 B.R. 55, 58 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1988)
(discussing the applicability of § 105 to enjoin proceedings brought by creditors against
insider guarantors).
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In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction to protect a
non-debtor third party that does not have the benefit of the automatic
stay, bankruptcy courts looks to four factors: “(1) whether there is a
likelihood of successful reorganization; (2) whether there is an imminent
irreparable harm to the estate in the absence of an injunction; (3)
whether the balance of harms tips in favor of the moving party; and (4)
whether the public interest weighs in favor of an injunction.” 141 In
Lyondell, the bankruptcy court analyzed the “likelihood of successful
reorganization” factor by looking at the debtor’s success up to that point
in the bankruptcy.142 The court measured success in terms of whether the
debtor had thus far completed all of its obligations in the bankruptcy
case. 143 Presumably, this takes into account whether the debtor had
complied with all of its procedural obligations under the Bankruptcy
Rules and the applicable local rules.144 If there is nothing to indicate that
it would be impossible for the debtor to eventually present a confirmable
plan and if the debtor has met all of its obligations up to the point in the
case when the court is deciding whether to issue the non-debtor
injunction, then the debtor has satisfied the ‘likelihood of successful
reorganization’ requirement.145 Thus, the application of this first factor
141.
142.

In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. at 588-89.
Id. at 587-90 (discussing the bankruptcy court’s ability to enter “necessary or
appropriate” orders where the consequence of not doing so would be a multitude of
related proceedings occurring simultaneously in different forums).
143. Id. at 589-90 (finding that so long as the debtors have “been successful in doing
everything they’ve needed to do to date” in their chapter 11 cases, that is sufficient to
establish that their reorganization is likely to succeed.); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1107
(providing for the current management in Chapter 11 to act as the debtor-in-possession
(“DIP”), thereby retaining control over the debtor’s business operation throughout the
entirety of the bankruptcy case). Bankruptcy obligations of the DIP presumably include
continuing to manage the debtor’s business and ensuring the timely filing of all
schedules and other documents required by the bankruptcy court. See 11 U.S.C. §
704(a)(8) (requiring the trustee to furnish periodic reports and summaries of the
business operations of the debtor with the bankruptcy court); see also the United States
Trustee’s Operating Guidelines and Reporting Requirements, at 1 n. 1, available at
http://www.justice.gov/ust/r04/docs/general/dsc/ch11_guidelines.pdf (“11 U.S.C. §
704(a)(8) is made applicable to a chapter 11 debtor by 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(1) and
1107(a).”).
144. See the United States Trustee’s Operating Guidelines and Reporting
Requirements, at 1 n. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/r04/docs/general/
dsc/ch11_guidelines.pdf.
145. In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. at 589.
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seems to be more of a backwards-looking test than a forwards-looking
test.146 The second factor requires the debtor to prove either that it will
suffer an irreparable injury if the action against its non-debtor affiliate
goes forward or that enforcement of the non-debtor proceeding would
impede its reorganization, but the debtor does not need to make a
showing of both. 147 In balancing the harms to the debtor versus the
creditor, the Lyondell court first considered whether enforcement of the
guaranty would cause the related third-party entity or individual to file
for bankruptcy itself.148 The Lyondell court next considered whether the
third party’s absence would impair the debtor’s business operations.149
The court considered whether its enforcement of the guaranty would
deter the third party from subsequently contributing DIP loans to the
debtor’s bankruptcy.150 In measuring the harm to the creditor, the court
focused on the injunction’s temporary duration. 151 Finally, the public
interest factor is about the impact of the bankruptcy court’s equitable
holding on the public’s subsequent perceptions of the enforceability of
guaranty agreements and the potential of having similarly situated
creditors treated unfairly as a result of the holding.152 With respect to the
latter concern, it seems that in the context of springing guaranties, it
would be appropriate to require the lender seeking to enforce the

146. Id. at 590 (“[T]he Debtors have so far been successful in doing everything
they’ve needed to do to date. Whether they will be able to address later issues cannot be
determined in the earliest weeks of a case . . . .”).
147. Id. at 590-91.
148. Id. at 592.
149. Id. at 590-92 (explaining that enforcement against non-debtor affiliates would
cause those affiliates to file for bankruptcy, resulting in a loss of going concern value,
the benefits of integrated operations, and a default under the DIP financing facility).
150. In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. at 592 (explaining how permitting the
creditors to pursue the debtors’ affiliates would lead to a default under the DIP
financing facility).
151. Id. at 594 (“With the injunction lasting only 60 days, the interference with the
‘sanctity’ of guaranties will be minimized, and as importantly or more so, risks of
disparate treatment of creditors will be minimized as well.”).
152. Id. at 593-94 (“[T]he very purpose of guaranties is to protect the party that
asked for the guaranty from the insolvency of the primary obligor, and that any regular
practice permitting the enforcement of guaranties to be blocked or impaired when the
primary obligor went into bankruptcy would frustrate the very purpose for which the
guaranties were secured in the first place.”).
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guaranty to file its claim in the bankruptcy court. 153 Permitting the
lender to file its springing guaranty claim elsewhere directly threatens
the bankruptcy court’s interest in preserving the public’s expectation
that all similarly situated creditors will be treated equally.154 Therefore,
on the basis of these four factors, it seems clear that the bankruptcy
court can exercise jurisdiction over springing guaranty proceedings.155
Barring the enforcement of a springing guaranty leads to a greater
probability of the debtor undergoing a successful reorganization and
precludes the potential harm to the estate that would otherwise ensue
from a delayed filing or the guarantor’s subsequent unwillingness to
provide DIP loans. 156 Despite the absence of case law specific to the
springing guaranty context, the general analysis of bankruptcy courts
that have considered whether to exercise jurisdiction over proceedings
involving stay or injunction requests that preliminarily adhere to the
benefit of a non-debtor guarantor and/or co-debtor is consistent. 157 If
enforcement of the guaranty would hurt the debtor’s reorganization,
deplete estate assets, lead to decreased DIP financing, and/or impair the
Chapter 11 debtor’s continuing business operations, then the bankruptcy
court has at least “related to” jurisdiction over the proceeding.158

153. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2012) (providing for the adequate protection of all
creditors to the debtor’s bankruptcy case); see also In re Saxby’s Coffee Worldwide,
LLC, 440 B.R. 369, 379 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009) (justifying a partial injunction based on
the extent of resources the insiders would have to direct towards litigation in nonbankruptcy courts at the expense of the debtor’s reorganization).
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 361; see also In re Saxby’s Coffee Worldwide, LLC, 440 B.R.
at 379.
155. In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. at 588-89 (providing in-depth discussion of
the major factors bankruptcy courts consider in deciding whether to enjoin the
enforcement of actions against non-debtor insiders).
156. See Exhibit 1, column (e); Exhibit 3, column (c); infra notes 468-70 and
accompanying text.
157. In re Linda Vista Cinemas, LLC, CV 10-786-TUC-CKJ, 2011 WL 1743312, at
*2-4 (D. Ariz. May 6, 2011); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Little Rock v. Pettit, 12
B.R. 147, 148 (E.D. Ark. 1981); In re Saxby’s Coffee Worldwide, LLC, 440 B.R. at 379;
In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. at 588-89; In re Fowler Floor & Wall Covering
Co., 93 B.R. 55, 58 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1988).
158. In re Linda Vista Cinemas, LLC, 2011 WL 1743312 at *2-4; In re Lyondell
Chem. Co., 402 B.R. at 588-89; In re Saxby’s Coffee Worldwide, LLC, 440 B.R. at 379;
In re Fowler Floor & Wall Covering Co, 93 B.R. at 58; Pettit, 12 B.R. at 148.
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In an older case that addressed a bankruptcy remote provision
contained in the corporate bylaws, as opposed to a strict springing
guaranty, the guarantor created a clever solution that enabled him to file
for bankruptcy and avoid liability under the guaranty entirely. 159 The
lender required the debtor entities’ corporate bylaws to contain a
bankruptcy-remote provision.160 Since this provision requires unanimous
consent of all the directors before the debtors have the ability to
authorize the filing of a voluntary petition, the lender’s placement of an
independent director on the debtors’ board effectively barred a
subsequent filing. 161 However, the lender failed to account for the
possibility of an involuntary filing.162 Thus, the debtors solicited others
who had made loans to them to authorize an involuntary filing, thereby
putting the debtors into bankruptcy on the basis of an involuntary
petition.163 As a result, the lender asked the bankruptcy court to dismiss
the petition based on the fact that it was filed in bad faith, but the
bankruptcy court declined. 164 The court held that even if the debtor
indirectly utilized an unconventional means of filing for bankruptcy, the
debtor’s financial condition nevertheless indicated it belonged in
bankruptcy.165 This case presents an interesting hypothetical based on a
similar scenario being transplanted into the springing guaranty
context. 166 It demonstrates a creative way for the guarantor to try to
circumvent being held personally liable pursuant to the guaranty. 167
Nonetheless, such a strategy would only be effective in cases where the
159.
160.
161.
162.

In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 713-14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Id. at 716.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 716 (providing that the bankruptcy remote provision prevented the
debtors from seeking voluntary bankruptcy protection).
163. Id. at 719.
164. Id. at 723.
165. Since the firm could benefit from the reorganization process, one prong of the
two-prong test for collusion was not met, and thus, the court declined to dismiss the
borrower’s petition. Id. at 739; see also id. at 725 (“The standard in this Circuit is that a
bankruptcy petition will be dismissed if both objective futility of the reorganization
process and subjective bad faith in filing the petition are found.”).
166. Id. at 723 (assuming the lender listed the borrower’s voluntary bankruptcy
filing as the only bankruptcy-related triggering condition under the loan agreement).
167. The guarantor could avoid liability under the guaranty agreement by soliciting
creditors to put the borrower into bankruptcy involuntarily, so long as the borrower’s
finances reflected the need for the borrower to be in bankruptcy. See id. at 725.
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guaranty agreement limited the bankruptcy-related triggering condition
to voluntary filings, as opposed to also including involuntary filings as
an event of default.168 In effect, this tactic would, if successful, resolve
the guaranty issue in its entirety and not just the jurisdictional subissue.169
C. THE SUBSTANTIVE CONFLICT OVER ENFORCEMENT OF THE SPRINGING
GUARANTY
1. Arguments in Favor of Enforcement
Although not every jurisdiction has considered the issue of whether
to enforce these springing guaranties or to deem them unenforceable for
equitable, among other, reasons, the majority of those that have
considered this issue have sided with the lender.170 In addition, many of
these courts permit the lender to collect from the guarantor, even where
the loan contract provided for full recourse liability.171 The rationale of
these courts is predominantly grounded in contract law principles,
namely the strict interpretation of the four corners of the contract. 172
168. Id. at 723. But see Wells Fargo Bank v. Daniels, No. C-110209, 2011 WL
6677982, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011) (suggesting that if the guaranty
agreement does not explicitly limit the triggering condition to voluntary filings, as
opposed to simply defining the trigger as any filings, courts will broadly interpret that
language so as to encompass both voluntary and involuntary filings).
169. Assuming the loan agreement only defined voluntary filings as triggers to the
guarantor’s liability, the borrower’s collusion with certain creditors to bring about an
involuntary filing would not even constitute a default under the agreement. See In re
Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. at 714-15 (permitting the guarantor to act in the
borrower’s best interest by putting the borrower into bankruptcy through the
guarantor’s organization of an involuntary filing, while also avoiding a voluntary filing,
which would have subjected the guarantor to personal liability under the guaranty).
170. See Exhibit 3, column (c), (providing a table of springing guaranty cases and
the holdings of those cases in column (c)).
171. See generally Exhibit 3 (providing a table of springing guaranty cases, the
courts that decided those cases, and how those courts held).
172. See Exploding and Springing Guarantees, supra note 55 (presenting the
contract law argument that a provision triggering the full recourse liability of the
guarantor constitutes an unenforceable liquidated damages clause); see also Wells
Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Kobernick, C.A. 8-CV-1458, 2009 WL 7808949, at *7 (S.D.
Tex. May 28, 2009) (finding the Guarantors responsible for recourse liability “under the
unambiguous terms of the contract”); First Nationwide Bank v. Brookhaven Realty
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These courts enforce a contract according to its terms, even where its
terms hold the guarantor liable for amounts far exceeding any damages
directly resulting from the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy.173 Where the
terms of a contractual agreement are clear on its face and the parties
held equal bargaining positions in freely negotiating its terms, courts are
unwilling to look to the parties’ intent or other factors outside of the four
corners of the loan agreement. 174 The problem is that contract law
principles across the fifty states require courts to look first at the
document’s language, and if the language is clear, then courts are not
permitted to proceed to a consideration of other factors outside the
document itself. 175 Similarly, the law in almost every state permits a
court to enforce a clear guaranty according to its terms, regardless of
whether the guaranty is absolute or unconditional, and provides for the
guarantor to waive all defenses he or she otherwise could have asserted
to bar enforcement on the guaranty.176 For the lender to make a prima
facie case for breach of an absolute guaranty, the lender must provide
that (1) the lender and guarantor did in fact sign and enter into an
Assocs., 637 N.Y.S.2d 418, 418 (N.Y. App. Div.) (holding that the parties were bound
by the terms of their contract).
173. See Exhibit 3, column (c) (listing the holdings of springing guaranty cases,
including the amounts for which the guarantor is held liable).
174. Id.
175. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Cotta, No. 11-CV-410, 2012 WL 5335999, at *4
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2012) (strictly applying the elements of a breach of contract claim
to the facts of the case); Nat’l Ass’n v. Singh, No. CIV.A. H-12-0147, 2012 WL
3186036, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2012) (strictly applying the terms of the guaranty
agreement to the facts of the case to establish the guarantor’s liability thereunder).
176. See In re S. Side House, LLC, 470 B.R. 659, 677 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(citations omitted); LBCMT 2007-C3 Sterling Retail, LLC v. Sheppard, 1:12-CV-470,
2013 WL 2151683, at *2-3 (E.D. Va. May 15, 2013); LBCMT 2007-C3 Seminole Trail,
LLC v. Sheppard, 3:12CV00025, 2013 WL 3009319, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 17, 2013);
see also Prestige Capital Corp. v. Michigan Gage & Mfg., LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 837
(E.D. Mich. 2010) (analyzing the standard for establishing a breach of guaranty action
under New Jersey law pursuant to a choice of law provision in the guaranty agreement).
Three bankruptcy-triggered Sixth Circuit cases likewise strictly construe the guaranty
agreements therein according to their terms. 8375 Honeytree Blvd. Holdings, LLC v.
Starman, 11-12431, 2012 WL 683379, at *2-3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2012); 111 Debt
Acquisition LLC v. Six Ventures, Ltd., C2-08-768, 2009 WL 414181, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 18, 2009), aff’d sub nom., 111 Debt Acquisition Holdings, LLC v. Six Ventures
Ltd., 413 F. App’x 824 (6th Cir. 2011); Wells Fargo Bank v. Daniels, No. C-110209,
2011 WL 6677982, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011).
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absolute guaranty, (2) there is still outstanding and overdue debt under
that guaranty, (3) the borrower defaulted on its primary obligation to the
lender, and (4) the guarantor has failed to fulfill his or her duty to pay
that debt.177
In JPMCC 2007-C1 Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Dix, the court held
that since the springing guaranty was a guaranty of payment, it was
appropriate for the lender to sue the guarantor at any point after the
default without reference to when and/or whether the guarantor also
sought payment from the borrower.178 The Dix court explained:
the Guaranty expressly provides that it is a guaranty of payment as
opposed to a guaranty of collection. Pursuant to New York law, a
guaranty of collection only binds the guarantor to pay if all attempts
to obtain payment from the debtor have failed, however, a guaranty
of payment binds the guarantor to pay immediately upon default of
the debtor. Accordingly, since the Borrowers defaulted when they
filed for bankruptcy and Defendant endorsed a guaranty of payment,
the Plaintiff need not attempt to obtain payment or wait to receive
payment from the Borrowers, prior to collecting from the
179
guarantor.

Thus, the court concluded that the lender could enforce the
guaranty against the guarantor.180
The Dix approach makes sense based on the explicit terms of the
loan document and guaranty, but practically speaking, this is not a
debtor that has defaulted. 181 As the term “default” is commonly
understood, a borrower defaults when that borrower fails to fully pay a
loan.182 Here, the borrower is the debtor, and the plaintiff is the lender
177.
178.

See Sheppard, 2013 WL 2151683, at *2.
JPMCC 2007-C1 Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Dix, CV-11-00017-TUC-CKJ,
2013 WL 1340039, at *7 (D. Ariz. Apr. 1, 2013).
179. Id. at *7.
180. Id. at *9.
181. Id.; see also James Schwarz & Linda A. Striefsky, Nuts and Bolts of
Negotiating Nonrecourse Carveouts, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING:
STRUCTURING AND DOCUMENTING TRANSACTIONS IN A REVIVING MARKET 129, 131
(June 2014).
182. See Schwarz & Striefsky, supra note 181, at 131 (explaining the general
concept of default in terms of the rationale behind the making of the loan in the first
place by stating that “whether a loan is secured or not, the lender expects that the
borrower will repay the loan in full; otherwise, the loan would not be made”).
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seeking to enforce the guaranty. 183 In addition, as of the date the
guaranty issue was decided, the bankruptcy court had confirmed the
debtor’s plan of reorganization that provided for the lender’s claims to
be paid in full.184 Therefore, even if a guaranty of payment requires the
guarantor to pay immediately upon the borrower’s default, it is
nonetheless inaccurate to automatically define the borrower’s “default”
as the borrower’s filing for bankruptcy.185 Even if the four corners of the
loan document defined default as the borrower’s filing for bankruptcy,
the borrowers were obligated to make payments until the entire debt was
paid off pursuant to their confirmed plan since they had commenced
making payments to the lender.186 This does not constitute a default in
practice. 187 The distinction between a guaranty of payment and a
guaranty of collection is one that should be drawn by considering
whether there was in fact a default, rather than by looking at whether the
predefined definition of a default has been satisfied.188
183.
184.
185.

Dix, 2013 WL 1340039, at *3.
Id.
Where the debtor continues to pay off its debt to the lender in incremental
payments, it seems nonsensical to deem such a borrower to be in default. See id.
(“[P]ursuant to the Borrower’s plan which was confirmed on December 30, 2011 by the
Bankruptcy Court, the Plaintiff’s claim will be paid in full by the Borrowers.”); see also
Schwartz & Striefsky, supra note 181 (explaining the general concept of default in
terms of the rationale behind the making of the loan in the first place by stating that
“whether a loan is secured or not, the lender expects that the borrower will repay the
loan in full; otherwise, the loan would not be made”). This implies that if the borrower
intends to and plans on repaying the loan in full, the borrower has not defaulted on the
loan. See id. The Michigan legislature explained its intent behind precluding personal
liability arising from carveouts to nonrecourse loans as follows: “[t]he legislature
recognizes that it is inherent in a nonrecourse loan that the lender takes the risk of a
borrower’s insolvency, inability to pay, or lack of adequate capital after the loan is
made and that the parties do not intend that the borrower is personally liable for
payment of a nonrecourse loan if the borrower is insolvent, unable to pay, or lacks
adequate capital after the loan is made.” See Nonrecourse Mortgage Loan Act, 2012
Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 67, ¶ N.M.L.A. § 445.1591 Note (S.B. 992).
186. Dix, 2013 WL 1340039, at *2-3.
187. See Schwarz & Striefsky, supra note 181, at 131.
188. See Dix, 2013 WL 1340039, at *3, *7. The Dix Court deemed the Borrowers to
have “defaulted” on the basis of Section 8.1(a) of the Loan Agreement, which included
the filing of a bankruptcy petition as an event constituting default. Id. at *3, *7
(explaining that, “[under] New York law, a guaranty of collection only binds the
guarantor to pay if all attempts to obtain payment from the debtor have failed, however,
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Thus far, the courts that have considered whether a springing
guaranty constitutes an unenforceable ipso facto clause hold that
springing guaranty provisions do not violate § 365(e) of the Code.189
Unlike an absolute waiver of the protections afforded to a debtor under
the Code, springing guaranty provisions in loan documents do not
“prohibit [the debtor] from resorting to bankruptcy; [they] merely
provide that if [the debtor] took certain actions it would forfeit its
exemption from liability for any deficiency.”190 In holding that there is
no violation of § 365(e), some courts argue that a loan agreement is
neither an executory contract nor an unexpired lease, and thus, § 365(e)
simply does not apply.191 In so holding, these courts explain that the loan
agreement is not an executory contract because an executory contract
requires some degree of performance pursuant to the agreement’s terms
on the part of both the debtor and the guarantor.192 Thus, these courts
conclude that the loan agreement cannot be an executory contract
because the lender already fulfilled the obligations it had pursuant to the
agreement by providing the debtor with the requested funds. 193 Other
courts hold that § 365(e) is inapplicable because it only extends to the
debtor, not the debtor’s guarantor.194

a guaranty of payment binds the guarantor to pay immediately upon default of the
debtor. Accordingly, since the Borrowers defaulted when they filed for bankruptcy and
Defendant endorsed a guaranty of payment, the Plaintiff need not attempt to obtain
payment or wait to receive payment from the Borrowers, prior to collecting from the
guarantor”).
189. First Nationwide Bank v. Brookhaven Realty Assocs., 637 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Monroe Ctr. II Urban Renewal Co. v. Strategic Performance
Fund-II, No. C-52-08, 2010 WL 5343317, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 29,
2010); Dix, 2013 WL 1340039, at *6-7; see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(A) (2012)
(permitting the termination or modification of executory contracts or unexpired leases
conditioned on the insolvency of the debtor).
190. FDIC v. Prince George Corp., 58 F.3d 1041, 1046 (4th Cir. 1995).
191. Dix, 2013 WL 1340039, at *6-7; see also First Nationwide Bank, 637 N.Y.S.2d
at 421 (excluding a mortgage from the definition of an executory contract).
192. See First Nationwide Bank, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
193. Dix, 2013 WL 1340039, at *6 (citing N.L.R.B v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S.
513, 522 n. 6 (1984)).
194. Monroe Ctr. II Urban Renewal Co., 2010 WL 5343317, at *3.
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2. Arguments Against Enforcement
Ironically, commentators often cite the recently enacted legislation
in Michigan and Ohio, the Nonrecourse Mortgage Loan Act (“NMLA”)
and the Legacy Trust Act (“LTA”), respectively, as a potential challenge
for lenders. 195 The NMLA and LTA invalidate carve-out provisions
contained in nonrecourse loan documents that seek to hold the guarantor
liable for the full value of the loan upon the borrower’s default. 196
Although at first glance, the NMLA and LTA appear to invalidate all
springing guaranties, they both carve out an exception for a “[p]ost
closing solvency covenant:” “a covenant not to file a voluntary
bankruptcy or other voluntary insolvency proceeding or not to collude in
an involuntary proceeding.” 197 Since the primary prohibition in the
NMLA and the LTA only applies to nonrecourse carve-outs found in
“[a] post closing solvency covenant,” the Michigan and Ohio legislation
effectively invalidate all springing guaranties other than those triggered
by the borrower’s filing of a bankruptcy petition.198
One of the strongest arguments against the enforcement of these
springing guaranties is grounded in corporate law principles. 199 A
springing guaranty creates a conflict of interest for the guarantor once

195. See Beslow & Eliason, supra note 4, at *5; Exploding and Springing
Guarantees, supra note 55, at 3; Fluhrer et al., supra note 7, at 2 (explaining that the
NMLA applies to all nonrecourse loans on the basis of the Michigan legislature’s belief
that solvency covenants in nonrecourse loans were against public policy and therefore
invalid and unenforceable); see also The Legacy Trust Act (“LTA”), OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 1319.07-.09 (West 2013); Michigan’s Nonrecourse Mortgage Loan Act
(“NMLA”), 2012 Mich. Pub.Act 67, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1591 et seq.
196. See The Legacy Trust Act (“LTA”), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1319.07-.09
(West 2013); Michigan’s Nonrecourse Mortgage Loan Act (“NMLA”), 2012 Mich.
Pub.Act 67, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1591 et seq.
197. NMLA, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1592(2)(d); see also LTA, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1319.07(D).
198. See NMLA, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1592(2)(d); LTA, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1319.07(D).
199. See Eisenson, supra note 1, at 264 (describing the conundrum faced by the
insider subject to a springing guaranty should the firm become insolvent); see also Will
Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 132 (“Perhaps the most obvious
argument against springing and exploding guaranties . . . is that they are intended to
create a conflict between the guarantor’s self-interest and the fiduciary duties owed to
all of the borrower’s creditors as the borrower becomes insolvent.”).
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the borrower becomes insolvent.200 At that point, the guarantor is forced
to choose between filing for bankruptcy, thereby triggering his or her
own personal liability pursuant to the guaranty, or not filing for
bankruptcy, thereby breaching his or her fiduciary duties and subjecting
himself or herself to a potential lawsuit.201 For the guarantor to avoid
breaching his or her fiduciary duties, the guarantor would have to
abstain from voting on the decision whether to file. 202 However, by
abstaining, the guarantor is also in effect acquiescing in the borrower’s
filing and subjecting himself or herself to personal liability. 203 If the
guarantor abstains from voting and the borrower then votes to file, the
guarantor will still be held personally liable under the broad terms of the
guaranty regardless of his or her abstention. 204 Alternatively, if the
guarantor is the borrower’s only insider with the power to authorize the
bankruptcy filing, then the guarantor must file as soon as the borrower’s
balance sheet indicates that it is in the best interest of the company to
enter bankruptcy. 205 The guarantor’s failure to behave in this manner
constitutes a breach of his or her fiduciary duties.206 As a result of the
enormous liability threatened by the guaranty, the guarantor will be
reluctant to authorize the borrower’s filing of a bankruptcy petition and
instead will be induced to take drastic and risky measures to try to save

200. If the insider votes on whether to file, that insider may be held liable for breach
of fiduciary duty. Eisenson, supra note 1, at 265. On the other hand, if the insider
declines to vote, but the firm votes to file anyway, the insider may still be held
personally liable pursuant to the guaranty. Id.
201. Id. at 264-65.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 133 (discussing the
need for one or more disinterested parties to approve or ratify the conflicted director’s
decision on whether or not to file for bankruptcy); see also Lichtenstein v. Willkie Farr
& Gallagher LLP, 992 N.Y.S.2d 242, 246 (N.Y. App. Div. Sept. 18, 2014) (illustrating
the exacerbation of the conflict imposed on the guarantor who is also the Board
Chairman and thus main decision maker of the borrower).
206. Lichtenstein, 992 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (noting that, were the guarantor to refuse to
authorize, or at least delay, a bankruptcy filing, the guarantor would risk liability for
breach of fiduciary duty).
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the company and avoid ever having to file. 207 Consequently, the
springing guaranty creates a disincentive to filing, while simultaneously
inducing the guarantor to breach his or her fiduciary duties.208 Because it
is a tort for a guarantor to breach his or her fiduciary duties, a springing
guaranty is void as a matter of public policy. 209 In the alternative, a
springing guaranty is void as a matter of bankruptcy policy because the
guarantor’s decision to delay the filing ultimately causes the borrower to
lose his or her shot at a meaningful reorganization.210
In deciding whether to enforce a springing guaranty, some courts
have embraced the contract law distinction between a reasonable
damages calculation and an unenforceable penalty.211 A court will find
207. See infra notes 483-501 (providing examples of how the springing guaranty
device leads to the pre-filing depletion of the debtor’s assets); see also Exhibit 3,
column (c) (illustrating the scope of liability springing guarantors face).
208. See Eisenson, supra note 1, at 264 (explaining that whether or not such a
provision should be invalidated depends on whether it is viewed from an ex ante or an
ex post perspective); Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 132.
209. See Lichtenstein, 992 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (noting that, were the guarantor to refuse
to authorize, or at least delay, a bankruptcy filing, the guarantor would risk liability for
breach of fiduciary duty).
210. As the guarantor tries desperately to save the company, the company’s
financial condition continues to deteriorate past the point of viability for reorganization
prospects. If the insider does finally authorize the filing but at a point that is too late, the
company is already in such bad shape that it no longer makes sense to try to rehabilitate
it. See First Nationwide Bank v. Brookhaven Realty Assocs., 637 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996) (explaining that its decision to enforce the springing guaranty would
not undermine any Bankruptcy Code policies because the bankruptcy case had already
been dismissed and the only major creditor was the lender seeking to enforce the
guaranty). If, on the other hand, the springing guaranty issue is being heard at a time
where the debtor’s reorganization prospects are largely irrelevant—for instance, if the
bankruptcy case had already been dismissed—the persuasiveness of this bankruptcy
policy argument will be considerably undermined. Id.
211. See Bank of Am. v. Lahave, No. B237360, 2013 WL 1208423 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 26, 2013) (declining to enforce a penalty that went “beyond compensation into
punishment”); ING Real Estate Fin. LLC v. Park Ave. Hotel Acquisition LLC, 907
N.Y.S.2d 437 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (thoroughly analyzing the guarantor’s penalty
argument, albeit in the context of a different triggering condition other than the
borrower’s bankruptcy filing). But see UBS Commercial Mort. Trust 2007-FL1 v.
Garrison Special Opportunities Fund L.P., 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 51774(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 8, 2011) (analyzing the guarantor’s argument that the guaranty called for an
unenforceable penalty, but ultimately rejecting that argument and enforcing the
guaranty).
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an unenforceable penalty where the full recourse damages specified
under the guaranty are “grossly disproportionate to the probable loss” of
the lender.212 Since the recourse damages called for under the guaranty
far exceed the actual damages suffered by the lender as a result of the
borrower’s bankruptcy filing, the penalty is unenforceable.213 It is the
borrower’s bankruptcy filing that constitutes a breach under the terms of
the loan and guaranty agreements, which therefore subjects the
guarantor to recourse liability.214
3. Synthesis of the Existing Case Law and Legislation
a. The Circuits
As a preliminary matter, the scope of this section is limited to
bankruptcy-related springing guaranty cases.215 A thorough investigation
of those cases reveals that the decision of whether or not to enforce a
bankruptcy-triggered springing guaranty is an issue of first impression
in many circuits. 216 Courts located within the First, Seventh, Eighth,
212. ING Real Estate Fin. LLC, 907 N.Y.S.2d at *5; see also Lahave, 2013 WL
1208423, at *1.
213. See UBS Commercial Mortg. Trust 2007-FL1, No. 652412, slip op. at 4-5.
214. Id.
215. This means that the cases surveyed are only those where the triggering
condition is either a bankruptcy filing or a collateral consequence of that filing. An
example of such a collateral consequence would be the collateral securing the loan and
becoming an asset in the bankruptcy proceeding. Second, the cases presented are from
the relatively recent past with a few exceptions: where this section references the
“existing case law,” it is referencing the state of the law as of today’s date. Thus,
although a few older cases are cited, the intent here is not to provide a historical
overview of the governing case law at different points in time, but rather is limited to
the case law in the circuits as it exists today.
216. See Brian E. Greer, Joel S. Moss & Nicole B. Herther-Spiro, Guaranties in
Bankruptcy: A Primer II, 2014 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. 7 (2004) [hereinafter
Guaranties in Bankruptcy] (“Until the most recent downturn in the real estate market,
the enforceability of such guaranties had generally not been tested in the courts.”). Part
VIII surveys post-2008 springing guaranty cases that have arisen. Id. In passing, Part
VIII mentions cases decided in California, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan,
and New Jersey. Id. at n. 244. It does not include a discussion of any cases arising in
states within the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth circuits. Id. Of those bad boy guaranty
cases from the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, none involved
a bankruptcy-related event as the triggering condition. Id. (citing Wells Fargo Bank,
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Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have no case law that directly involves a
springing guaranty triggered by the borrower’s bankruptcy filing or a
collateral consequence of that filing.217 Although the Eighth Circuit has
not yet addressed the enforceability of springing guaranties, its broad
approach to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court could bode well for
purposes of the jurisdictional issue.218
In the Third Circuit, there are also very few cases directly onpoint. 219 However, there is at least one case where the court found a
N.A. v. Mitchell’s Park, LLC, 2012 WL 4899888 (N.D. Ga. 2012); 51382 Gratiot Ave.
Holdings, LLC v. Chesterfield Dev. Co., 835 F. Supp. 2d 384 (E.D. Mich. 2011); Blue
Hills Office Park LLC v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 477 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Mass.
2007); Heller Fin., Inc. v. Lee, 2002 WL 1888591 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Bank of Am. v.
Freed, 983 N.E.2d 509, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer Street
Office Ltd. v. NRFC NNN Holdings, LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012);
Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Cherryland Mall Ltd., 812 N.W.2d 799 (Mich. Ct. App.
2011); CSFB 2001-CP-4 Princeton Park Corp. Ctr., LLC v. SB Rental I, LLC, 980 A.2d
1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)). This implies that specifically on-point case law
from courts located within those circuits has yet to arise. Id. However, this
comprehensive annual survey overlooks certain springing guaranty cases decided by
courts located within the geographical boundaries of the Third, Sixth and Ninth Circuits
that have involved bankruptcy-triggered bad boy guaranties. Id. But see JPMCC 2007C1 Grasslawn Lodging, 2013 WL 1340039; 8375 Honeytree Blvd. Holdings, LLC v.
Starman, No. 11-12431, 2012 WL 683379 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2012); 111 Debt
Acquisition LLC v. Six Ventures, Ltd., No. C2-08-768, 2009 WL 414181 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 18, 2009), aff’d sub nom., 111 Debt Acquisition Holdings, LLC v. Six Ventures
Ltd., 413 F. App’x 824 (6th Cir. 2011); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Daniels, Nos. C110209, C-110215, 2001 WL 6677982 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011); Lahave,
B237360, 2013 WL 1208423; Monroe Ctr. II Urban Renewal Co. v. Strategic
Performance Fund-II, Inc., aff’d by 2010 WL 5343317 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec.
29, 2010). See also Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 129
(commenting generally on the limited case law specifically addressing the issue of
springing guaranties); Exploding and Springing Guarantees, supra note 55 (noting that
the courts have yet to consider the applicability of § 105 in the springing guaranty
context).
217. See Complaint for Injunction, In re Mkt. Ctr. E. Retail Prop., Inc., No. 0911696-s11 (D.N.M. Sep. 1, 2009), ECF No. 69.
218. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Little Rock v. Pettit, 12 B.R. 147, 148
(E.D. Ark. 1981) (explaining that the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction under the new
Bankruptcy Code has been greatly expanded).
219. See Prestige Capital Corp. v. Michigan Gage & Mfg., LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d
837, 839 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (taking note of the lender’s failure to cite to New Jersey
law in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment based on breach of a personal
guaranty agreement). In Prestige, a Michigan district court sitting in diversity applied
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springing guaranty to be enforceable. 220 In Monroe, two New Jersey
state courts confronted the issue of whether to enforce a springing
guaranty.221 The trial court enforced the springing guaranty based on a
strict application of contract law principles.222 On appeal, the appellate
division affirmed. 223 In so holding, the appellate division considered
whether § 365(e)’s prohibition of ipso facto clauses applied to a nondebtor guarantor.224 The appellate division agreed with the trial court’s
interpretation of § 365(e) as only invalidating executory contracts or
unexpired leases of the debtor.225 On that basis, the appellate division
held that the borrower’s bankruptcy filing does not protect the guarantor
from personal liability because the guarantor is not the debtor.226 As the
guarantor on the loan, the carve-out agreement constitutes “‘an
independent obligation’ of [the guarantor] which ‘happens to have been
triggered’ by [the borrower’s] default and resort to bankruptcy.” 227
Therefore, the appellate division relied on two separate holdings in
concluding that § 365(e) did not apply.228 First, the court held that the
carve-out agreement was not an ipso facto clause because its
enforcement was not contingent on the borrower’s bankruptcy filing.229
Second, the court held that the applicability of § 365(e) is limited to
contracts or leases directly involving the debtor and not the debtor’s
guarantor.230 However, the appellate division did recognize and accept
the trial court’s implicit limitation on the scope of its holding.231 The
trial court noted that its holding might have been different had the
guarantor presented evidence that the lender would be fully protected by
New Jersey law pursuant to the choice-of-law provision in the parties’ guaranty
agreement. Id.
220. Monroe Ctr. II Urban Renewal Co. LLC v. Strategic Performance Fund-II, Inc.,
2010 WL 5343317 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 29, 2010).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at *3.
224. Id. at *2.
225. Id. at *3.
226. Id.
227. Id. (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.
Mass. 2003), aff’d by, 417 F.3d 193 (1st Cir. 2005)).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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the collateral securing its loan, and thus, enforcement of the carve-out
agreement against the guarantor personally would merely result in a
windfall to the lender.232 Still, if the Monroe case offers insight into the
future, it is probable that the Third Circuit will continue to favor the
enforcement of springing guaranties.233
At least to a certain extent, there is an internal split within both the
Second and Ninth Circuits.234 In the Ninth Circuit, there is on-point case
law, but it provides very little guidance on how courts within this circuit

232.
233.
234.

Id. (distinguishing In re Rose, 29 B.R. 272 (D.N.J. 1982)).
See id.
The large majority of bankruptcy-triggered springing guaranty cases from the
Second Circuit hold in favor of the lender. See UBS Commercial Mortg. Trust 2007FL1 v. Garrison Special Opportunities Fund L.P., No. 652412, slip op. at 7 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2011) (enforcing springing guaranty pursuant to its terms); see also Bank of Am. v.
Lightstone Holdings, LLC, No. 601853, slip op. at 1, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011)
(permitting lender to collect $100 million liability from guarantor); In re S. Side House,
LLC, 470 B.R. 659, 659 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012) (proposing district court enter final
judgment enforcing the guaranty); Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Rouleau, 46 A.3d
905, 912 (Vt. 2012) (enforcing springing guaranty triggered by borrower’s bankruptcy
filing); GCCFC 2006-GG7 Westheimer Mall, LLC v. Okun, No. 07 CIV. 10394
(NRB), 2008 WL 3891257, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008) (permitting lender to collect
from the guarantor, despite the fact that lender also held proofs-of-claims in the
borrower’s bankruptcy case); First Nationwide Bank v. Brookhaven Realty Assocs.,
223 A.D.2d 618, 620, 621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (rejecting the debtor and guarantor’s
§ 365(e) argument and enforcing the springing guaranty). However, there is at least one
exception. See In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1997) (permitting the guarantor to authorize both the bankruptcy filing, while also
avoiding being held liable under the terms of the guaranty). In addition, the willingness
of at least one Second Circuit springing guaranty case, albeit not triggered by a
bankruptcy-related event, to limit the lender’s recovery lends support to the potential
for a Second Circuit springing guaranty case to hold in favor of the guarantor in the
future. See ING Real Estate Fin. LLC v. Park Ave. Hotel Acquisition LLC, No. 601860,
slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (declining to enforce a penalty far in excess of the
expected actual loss to the lender). It is even more difficult to predict the outcome of a
bankruptcy-triggered springing guaranty case in the Ninth Circuit. See JPMCC 2007-C1
Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Dix, No. CV-11-00017-TUC-CKJ, 2013 WL 1340039, at
*9 (D. Ariz. Apr. 1, 2013) (enforcing the springing guaranty pursuant to its terms). But
see Bank of Am. v. Lahave, No. B237360, 2013 WL 1208423, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 26, 2013) (declining to enforce a penalty that went “beyond compensation into
punishment”).
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will hold in the future.235 The Second Circuit is more consistent than the
Ninth Circuit in its enforcement of springing guaranties.236 As compared
to the other circuits, a relatively high number of bankruptcy-related
springing guaranty cases have arisen in the Second Circuit.237 Although
the Second Circuit has held for the guarantor in some non-bankruptcy
related springing guaranty cases, all but one of the Second Circuit’s
bankruptcy-triggered springing guaranty cases hold against the
guarantor.238
The Second Circuit is not alone: in every other circuit that has
addressed this issue, a majority of courts have enforced the springing
guaranty against the guarantor. 239 Courts located in the Fourth, 240
235. See Dix, 2013 WL 1340039, at *9 (enforcing the springing guaranty). But see
Lahave, 2013 WL 1208423, at *7 (voiding the springing guaranty).
236. In re S. Side House, LLC, 470 B.R. 659, 687-88; Rouleau, 46 A.3d 905, 912;
UBS Commercial Mortg. Trust 2007-FL1, No. 601853; Lightstone Holdings, No.
601853; Okun, 2008 WL 3891257, at *4; First Nationwide Bank, 223 A.D.2d at 637
(enforcing the springing guaranties).
237. In re S. Side House, LLC, 470 B.R. 659, 687-88; Rouleau, 46 A.3d 905, 912;
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-FL1, No. 652412; Lightstone Holdings, No.
601853; Okun, 2008 WL 3891257, at *4; First Nationwide Bank, 223 A.D.2d at 637; In
re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, at 738-39.
238. In re Kingston Square Associates, 214 B.R. 713, at 738-39 (holding in favor of
the guarantor). But see In re S. Side House, LLC, 470 B.R. 659, 687-88; Rouleau, 46
A.3d 905, 912; UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-FL1, No. 652412; Lightstone
Holdings, No. 601853; Okun, 2008 WL 3891257, at *4; First Nationwide Bank, 223
A.D.2d at 637 (holding against the guarantor).
239. See LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, LLC v. Sheppard, No. CIV. JKB-12-3056,
2014 WL 1388409 (D. Md. Apr. 9, 2014); see also FDIC v. Prince George Corp., 58
F.3d 1041, 1046 (4th Cir. 1995) (enforcing the springing guaranty in the Fourth
Circuit); LBUBS 2004-C8 Derek Drive, LLC v. Gerbino, No. 2:13-CV-2264, 2014 WL
2446362 (W.D. La. May 30, 2014); LBCMT 2007-C3 Seminole Trail, LLC v.
Sheppard, No. 3:12CV00025, 2013 WL 3009319 (W.D. Va. June 17, 2013); LBCMT
2007-C3 Sterling Retail, LLC v. Sheppard, No. 1:12-CV-470, 2013 WL 2151683 (E.D.
Va. May 15, 2013); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Cotta, No. 11-CV-410, 2012 WL
5335999 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2012); Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Singh, No.
CIV.A. H-12-0147, 2012 WL 3186036 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2012); 8375 Honeytree Blvd.
Holdings, LLC v. Starman, No. 11-12431, 2012 WL 683379 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2012);
Wells Fargo Bank v. Daniels, Nos. C-110209, C-110215, 2001 WL 6677982 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 21, 2011) (enforcing the springing guaranty in the Sixth Circuit); Wells
Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Kobernick, No. C.A. 8-CV-1458, 2009 WL 7808949 (S.D.
Tex. May 28, 2009), aff’d sub nom., U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Kobernick, 454 F.
App’x 307 (5th Cir. 2011) (enforcing the springing guaranty in the Fifth Circuit); 111
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Fifth,241 and Sixth242 Circuits have enforced springing guaranties more
often than not. In the Sixth Circuit, it is not just the courts dictating the
enforceability of springing guaranties; rather, the legislatures of two of
the four states that are within the Sixth Circuit have enacted legislation
addressing the issue. 243 Both Michigan and Ohio passed legislation
largely curtailing the enforceability of springing guaranties.244 Michigan
passed the NMLA, and Ohio passed the LTA, respectively.245 However,
both the NMLA and the LTA are inapplicable in the event the
guarantor’s recourse liability is triggered as a result of the borrower’s
filing of a voluntary petition or the borrower’s indirect filing—through
collusion with creditors—of an involuntary petition for bankruptcy.246
This is because both pieces of legislation only invalidate nonrecourse
carve-outs that are based on the solvency of the borrower and explicitly
exclude covenants against bankruptcy filings from the definition of a

Debt Acquisition LLC v. Six Ventures, Ltd., No. C2-08-768, 2009 WL 414181 (S.D.
Ohio Feb. 18, 2009), aff’d sub nom., 111 Debt Acquisition Holdings, LLC v. Six
Ventures Ltd., 413 F. App’x 824 (6th Cir. 2011).
240. See Prince George Corp., 58 F.3d at 1046; LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike,
LLC, 2014 WL 1388409; LBCMT 2007-C3 Seminole Trail, LLC, 2013 WL 3009319;
LBCMT 2007-C3 Sterling Retail, LLC, 2013 WL 2151683 (enforcing the springing
guaranty in the Fourth Circuit).
241. See, e.g., Gerbino, 2014 WL 2446362; Cotta, 2012 WL 5335999; Singh, 2012
WL 3186036; Kobernick, 2009 WL 7808949, aff’d sub nom., Kobernick, 454 F. App’x
307 (enforcing the springing guaranty in the Fifth Circuit).
242. See, e.g., 111 Debt Acquisition LLC, 2009 WL 414181, aff’d sub nom., 111
Debt Acquisition Holdings, LLC, 413 F. App’x 824; Starman, 2012 WL 683379;
Daniels, 2001 WL 6677982 (enforcing the springing guaranty in the Sixth Circuit).
243. The legislatures of two states within the Sixth Circuit invalidated all springing
guaranties with the exception of those triggered by bankruptcy-related events. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. tit. XIII, § 1319.07 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1592(d)
(2012) (carving out an exception for bankruptcy-triggered springing guaranties in Ohio
and Michigan).
244. LTA, H.B. 479, 129 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012) (curtailing the
enforceability of springing guaranties in Ohio); NMLA, 2012 Pub. Acts 67, MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 445.1591 et seq. (2012) (curtailing the enforceability of springing
guaranties in Michigan).
245. LTA, H.B. 479, 129 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012); NMLA, 2012 Pub.
Acts 67, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1591 et seq.)
246. See, e.g., 111 Debt Acquisition LLC, 2009 WL 414181, aff’d sub nom., 111
Debt Acquisition Holdings, LLC, 413 F. App’x 824; Starman, 2012 WL 683379;
Daniels, 2001 WL 6677982 (enforcing the springing guaranty in the Sixth Circuit).
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post-closing solvency covenant.247 The logic behind this exclusion was
probably that since corporate debtors filing for bankruptcy protection
under Chapter 11 are not per se insolvent, the legislation should not
apply to bar the enforcement of springing guaranties triggered by the
borrower’s filing for bankruptcy, as opposed to those triggered by the
borrower’s insolvency.248 However, in light of the close interconnection
247. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. XIII, § 1319.07 (West 2013) (carving out an
exception for bankruptcy-triggered springing guaranties in Ohio and Michigan); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 445.1592(d) (2012) (carving out an exception for bankruptcy-triggered
springing guaranties in Ohio and Michigan); see also Borman, LLC v. 18718 Borman,
LLC, No. 12-15567, 2014 WL 943181 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2014) (taking note of this
exception in dicta).
248. See Structuring Real Estate Loans, supra note 41, at 27 (recognizing that this
argument implicitly assumes guarantors and borrowers filing for bankruptcy are not
actually insolvent, thereby creating a “very real dilemma” for borrowers and guarantors
who file at a time when they are actually insolvent); see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. tit.
XIII, § 1319.07 (West 2013); Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.1592(d) (2012) (carving out an
exception for bankruptcy-triggered springing guaranties in Ohio and Michigan).
Homburger and Goodrich explain that a borrower is solvent if the value of the property
subject to the lender’s lien is greater than the balance owed by the borrower on the loan.
See Structuring Real Estate Loans, supra note 39, at 18. Under Homburger and
Goodrich’s definition of “solvent,” the typical guarantors in springing guaranty cases
will almost never qualify. Id.; see generally Exhibit 1. However, because of the
exclusion carved out for bankruptcy filings, the NMLA and LTA will not apply to bar
the enforcement of springing guaranties even where the borrower is insolvent. See
NMLA, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1592(2)(d) (2012); LTA, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1319.07(D) (West 2013). As was seen in the Lichtenstein case, this leaves the guarantor
in a no-win situation:

[the guarantor] was either going to be liable to (i) the lender under
the springing guaranty for authorizing the filing of bankruptcy
petition or (ii) each of the borrower’s other creditors for breach of
fiduciary duty in failing to authorize the bankruptcy filing since the
borrower was insolvent at the time and owed a fiduciary duty to the
creditors.
See Structuring Real Estate Loans, supra note 39, at 15 (citing Lichtenstein vs. Willkie
Farr & Gallagher LLP, 2013 WL 1783571 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 2013)). Thus, in
practice, the deterrent effect of the bankruptcy-triggered springing guaranty virtually
has put a halt to strategic filings by solvent borrowers to prevent a lender from
foreclosing on its property. See id. Instead, the only insiders who still file in the face of
their own personal liability pursuant to the guaranty are those with fiduciary duties to
uphold as a result of the insolvency of the borrower. See id.
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between those two happenstances, it seems counterintuitive to draw a
bright line rule that limits the applicability of the Michigan and Ohio
legislation to only some of the triggering conditions, especially in light
of the public policy justifications behind the enactment of the NMLA
and LTA.249 Both the Michigan and Ohio legislatures provided the same
rationale for the enactment of the NMLA and LTA, respectively:
[t]he legislature[s] recognize[] that it is inherent in a nonrecourse
loan that the lender takes the risk of a borrower’s insolvency,
inability to pay, or lack of adequate capital after the loan is made and
that the parties do not intend that the borrower is personally liable
for payment of a nonrecourse loan if the borrower is insolvent,
unable to pay, or lacks adequate capital after the loan is made. The
legislature[s] recognize[] that the use of a post closing solvency
covenant as a nonrecourse carveout, or an interpretation of any
provision in a loan document that results in a determination that a
post closing solvency covenant is a nonrecourse carveout, is
inconsistent with this act and the nature of a nonrecourse loan; is an
unfair and deceptive business practice and against public policy; and
250
should not be enforced.

Based on this rationale, it is hard to see why neither the Michigan
legislature nor the Ohio legislature felt that it was inherent in a
nonrecourse loan that the lender takes the risk of a borrower’s filing for
bankruptcy or that a determination that a bankruptcy filing constitutes a
nonrecourse carve-out was equally inconsistent with the nature of a
nonrecourse loan and against public policy.251 This is especially true in
249. LTA, H.B. 479, 129 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012); NMLA, 2012 Pub.
Acts 67, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1591 et seq.; NMLA, 2012 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A.
67, ¶ N.M.L.A. § 445.1591 Note (S.B. 992); Real Estate—Trusts and Trustees—Rules
and Regulations, 2012 Ohio Laws File 201, ¶ Section 5 (Sub. H.B. 479).
250. NMLA, 2012 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 67, ¶ N.M.L.A. § 445.1591 Note (S.B.
992); Real Estate—Trusts and Trustees—Rules and Regulations, 2012 Ohio Laws File
201, ¶ Section 5 (Sub. H.B. 479).
251. See supra note 250; see also LTA, H.B. 479, 129 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 2012), OHIO REV. CODE § 1319.07(D); NMLA, 2012 Pub. Acts 67, MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 445.1592(2)(d) (excepting bankruptcy-triggered springing guaranties from the
definition of a post-closing solvency covenant). It seems that it would be more
consistent with the intent of the legislation to provide for bankruptcy-triggered
springing guaranties to be invalidated if at the time of filing, the amount due under the
loan is greater than the value of the property securing the loan. See supra note 241 and
accompanying text.
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light of the conflict of interest such a nonrecourse carve-out creates for
the guarantor in deciding whether or not to file for bankruptcy.252 As a
company approaches insolvency, the guarantor’s fiduciary duties to the
company’s creditors and equity holders obligate the guarantor to file,
but if the guarantor does file, he or she will be subject to recourse
liability under the terms of the guaranty.253 In essence, the inclusion in
nonrecourse loans of covenants against bankruptcy filings creates a loselose situation for the guarantor. 254 That situation results in the
borrower’s delayed bankruptcy filing and a financially unsustainable
debtor.255 As a result, it is hard to believe that public policy could in
some way support the permissibility of these covenants against
bankruptcy filings. 256 For that reason, the Michigan and Ohio
legislatures may eventually want to reconsider their exclusion of
covenants against bankruptcy filings from the definition of a “post
closing solvency covenant.”257
As a result of the exclusion for bankruptcy filings carved out of
both the NMLA and LTA, the triggering condition will often be of the
utmost relevance in the Sixth Circuit.258 Where the triggering condition
is the filing of a bankruptcy petition, we can assume that this circuit will
continue to permit enforcement of the springing guaranty.259 However, it
is less clear what the outcome will be if the triggering condition is a
collateral consequence of the bankruptcy filing, i.e. the collateral
securing the lender’s lien becomes an asset in the bankruptcy case.260
252.
253.

See Structuring Real Estate Loans, supra note 39, at 15.
Id.; see also Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 132 n.19
(explaining who the debtor’s management owes fiduciary duties to as the debtor
approaches insolvency).
254. Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 132.
255. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text (justifying the legislation in
Ohio and Michigan on public policy grounds, but declining to also define nonrecourse
loans triggered by bankruptcy-related carve-outs as against public policy).
257. LTA, H.B. 479, 129 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012), OHIO REV. CODE §
1319.07(D); NMLA, 2012 Pub. Acts 67, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1592(2)(d).
258. LTA, H.B. 479, 129 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012), OHIO REV. CODE §
1319.07(D); NMLA, 2012 Pub. Acts 67, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1592(2)(d).
259. LTA, H.B. 479, 129 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012), OHIO REV. CODE §
1319.07(D); NMLA, 2012 Pub. Acts 67, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1592(2)(d).
260. See LBCMT 2007-C3 Sterling Retail, LLC v. Sheppard, 1:12-CV-470, 2013
WL 2151683 (E.D. Va. May 15, 2013); Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Kobernick,
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The statutory wording excluding “a covenant not to file a voluntary
bankruptcy or other voluntary insolvency proceeding” leaves room for
the guarantor to argue that where the triggering condition is not
explicitly the borrower’s filing of a petition in bankruptcy, but rather the
lender’s collateral becoming an asset in that bankruptcy, the guaranty
should not be enforced against the guarantor.261 If courts agreed with
this argument, the legislation would result in a nonsensical outcome: it
would incentivize lenders to describe the trigger as the borrower’s filing
of a petition for bankruptcy.262 Such an incentive could result in an even
greater deterrence of subsequent bankruptcy filings through the
encouragement of filing-related language in the guaranty agreement.263
As of now, no cases have arisen in either Michigan or Ohio to answer
the question of whether a springing guaranty triggered by the lender’s
collateral becoming an asset in bankruptcy is enforceable.264 If it is not
C.A. 8-CV-1458, 2009 WL 7808949 (S.D. Tex. May 28, 2009), aff’d sub nom., U.S.
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Kobernick, 454 F. App’x 307 (5th Cir. 2011) (addressing
springing guaranties triggered by the lender’s collateral becoming an asset in a
subsequent bankruptcy proceeding).
261. OHIO REV. ANN. CODE tit. XIII, § 1319.07 (2013); 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 67 §
445.1592(2)(d).
262. OHIO REV. ANN. CODE tit. XIII, § 1319.07 (2013); 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 67 §
445.1592(2)(d).
263. OHIO REV. ANN. CODE tit. XIII, § 1319.07 (2013); 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 67 §
445.1592(2)(d).
264. See Charles R. Gibbs et al., Securitized Commercial Loans in Bankruptcy,
MORTGAGE AND ASSET BACKED SECURITIES LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 7:23 (October
2014) (“[I]t remains to be seen whether a court ruling on the enforceability of a carveout guarantee, that is triggered by the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, will uphold
the carve-out guarantee as valid.”); see also Borman, LLC v. 18718 Borman, LLC, No.
12-15567, 2014 WL 943181 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2014) (granting summary judgment
to the guarantor). In Borman, the court held that Michigan’s NMLA barred enforcement
of the lender’s claim for a deficiency judgment against the guarantor. Borman, 2014
WL 943181, at *13. In so holding, the Court explained that the NMLA’s definition of a
post closing solvency covenant applied to provisions, where the triggering condition
was the borrower’s failure to pay its debts. Id. Since the borrower’s failure to pay was
the condition allegedly triggering the guarantor’s liability therein, the court concluded
that the NMLA precluded its enforcement of the springing guaranty agreement. Id. The
court noted in passing that were the triggering condition instead a covenant not to file
for bankruptcy, the guarantor could still be held liable because the NMLA would not
apply. Id. The court does not attempt to predict the enforceability of provisions
excluded from the NMLA explicit discussion in § 4.2(j), such as the lender’s collateral
becoming an asset in bankruptcy. Id.
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enforceable, lenders who otherwise would have described the trigger in
that manner will instead describe the trigger as the borrower’s filing.265
This enables lenders to achieve their intended effect—the deterrence of
subsequent bankruptcy filings—while also preserving their right to
enforce the guaranty agreement against the guarantor.266
In other circuits, where the triggering condition relates to
bankruptcy, the actual language used to describe that trigger becomes
largely irrelevant.267 Both the Fourth Circuit’s Sterling Retail case and
the Fifth Circuit’s Kobernick case provide useful examples of how
triggers other than the actual filing of a petition can still achieve the
same outcome. 268 In those cases, the trigger was not the actual
bankruptcy filing. 269 Instead, the guarantor’s liability was triggered
when the collateral securing the lender’s loan became an asset in the
borrower’s bankruptcy case. 270 Regardless, the effect is the same. 271
Since all of the debtor’s property is transferred to the bankruptcy estate
265. OHIO REV. ANN. CODE tit. XIII, § 1319.07 (2013); 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 67 §
445.1592(2)(d); see also Borman, 2014 WL 943181, at *13 (noting that the NMLA is
inapplicable to covenants not to file for bankruptcy).
266. See Borman, 2014 WL 943181, at *13 (noting in dicta that where the triggering
condition is a covenant not to file for bankruptcy, the NMLA will not preclude the
guarantor’s liability for breaching that covenant); see also Exploding and Springing
Guarantees, supra note 55, at 1 (explaining that the lender is seeking to discourage the
occurrence of some undesirable effect, e.g. the filing of bankruptcy).
267. The majority of these courts nonetheless enforce the springing guaranty
regardless of whether the trigger is the borrower’s filing for bankruptcy or the lender’s
collateral becoming an asset in the borrower’s bankruptcy case. See Exhibit 3, columns
(c), (e).
268. LBCMT 2007-C3 Sterling Retail, LLC v. Sheppard, 1:12-CV-470, 2013 WL
2151683, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 15, 2013); Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Kobernick,
C.A. 8-CV-1458, 2009 WL 7808949, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 28, 2009), aff’d sub nom.,
U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Kobernick, 454 F. App’x 307 (5th Cir. 2011).
269. Sheppard, 2013 WL 2151683, at *2 (discussing the lender’s argument that the
guarantors “are personally liable for the entire debt if the property or any part thereof
becomes as asset in a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding”); Kobernick, 2009 WL
7808949, at *4 (addressing the lender’s argument that the guarantor has recourse
liability because the guarantor filed the borrower’s bankruptcy listing the lender’s
property as the borrower’s sole asset, thereby violating the terms of the note).
270. See Sheppard, 2013 WL 2151683, at *2; Kobernick, 2009 WL 7808949, at *4
(addressing springing guaranties triggered by the lender’s collateral becoming an asset
in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding).
271. Sheppard, 2013 WL 2151683, at *2; Kobernick, 2009 WL 7808949, at *4.
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upon commencement of the bankruptcy case, the collateral’s becoming
an asset in the bankruptcy case is coextensive with the borrower’s filing
of the bankruptcy petition. 272 It is irrelevant whether the guaranty
agreement provides that a default occurs in the event of the borrower’s
actual filing or in the event of the collateral becoming a bankruptcy
asset.273 Both achieve the same ultimate goal of the lender—to deter the
borrower from ever undergoing bankruptcy.274
In sum, as the law exists today, the large majority of jurisdictions
uphold the validity of enforcing these springing guaranties. 275 State
courts frequently issue decisions, which are almost always grounded in a
strict application of contract law principles, to enforce springing
guaranties.276 Most of these courts still hold the same way regardless of
the exorbitant liability provided for in the guaranty agreement. 277 For
instance, the New York Supreme Court held one guarantor personally
liable for $100 million pursuant to a “bad boy” guaranty agreement.278
However, the dearth of case law with respect to this particular issue
means that it is still unclear whether or not courts will continue to
272. Sheppard, 2013 WL 2151683, at *2; Kobernick, 2009 WL 7808949, at *4; see
also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012) (defining the debtor’s property to include all of the
debtor’s property at the time of the filing of the petition).
273. See Charles R. Gibbs et al., supra note 263; see also Borman, LLC v. 18718
Borman, LLC, No. 12-15567, 2014 WL 943181, at *13 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2014).
274. See Guaranties in Bankruptcy, supra note 216, at 21 (explaining how springing
guaranties allow lenders to discourage borrowers and their equity holders from filing
for bankruptcy).
275. See Exhibit 3, column (c) (illustrating that most courts considering the
springing guaranty issue enforce the guaranty agreement pursuant to its terms).
276. See Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Rouleau, 46 A.3d 905, 908 (Vt. 2012)
(“Personal guaranties are contracts governed by general principles of contract law.”);
see also UBS Commercial Mortg. Trust 2007-FL1 v. Garrison Special Opportunities
Fund L.P., 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 51774(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 8, 2011) (limiting the role
of the court to upholding freely entered into contractual arrangements pursuant to
legislative enactments and common law precedents); Bank of Am. v. Lightstone
Holdings, 938 N.Y.S.2d 225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011); First Nationwide Bank v.
Brookhaven Realty Assocs., 637 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Monroe Ctr. II
Urban Renewal Co., LLC v. Strategic Performance Fund-II, No. C-52-08, 2010 WL
5343317, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 29, 2010); Wells Fargo Bank v. Daniels,
No. C-110209, 2011 WL 6677982 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011) (enforcing the
springing guaranty based on a strict application of contract law principles).
277. See Exhibit 3, column (c).
278. Lightstone Holdings, 938 N.Y.S.2d at *1, *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011).
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enforce these guaranties in the future. 279 If a recent ruling by an
appellate court in California applying New Mexico law provides any
guidance to courts within the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, then these courts
may be more inclined to invalidate springing guaranties triggered by
bankruptcy-related events. 280 Many of these guaranty agreements
provide for recourse liability upon the borrower’s default. 281 This, in
turn, enables the lender to immediately sue the guarantor for any
outstanding amount due under the loan, including any deficiency that
would not be covered by the collateral’s value.282 However, in Bank of
America v. Lahave, the trial court only permitted the lender to recover
from the guarantor five percent of what was still owed under the loan.283
The court of appeals held that even that small percentage should not
have been enforced.284 Given the limited case law dealing with springing
guaranties triggered by bankruptcy filings, the willingness of any court
to define a five percent late fee as a penalty does not bode well for
future lenders.285 Over the years, the springing guaranty device has also
been the subject of increasing pushback by commentators, who in large
part argue against the enforcement of this device based on the policy
reasons underlying the Code.286 Still, the majority of courts rely on the
279. See Eisenson, supra note 1, at 263 (noting that the limited number of courts
that have considered whether full recourse liability constituted an unenforceable penalty
have held that full recourse damages is enforceable based on contract law).
280. Bank of Am. v. Lahave, No. B237360, 2013 WL 1208423, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 26, 2013).
281. See Guaranties in Bankruptcy, supra note 216 (“‘Bad boy’ or springing
guaranties allow lenders to continue to offer ‘optically’ non-recourse loans while
discouraging borrowers and their equity holders from taking certain actions (e.g., filing
for bankruptcy) by enumerating events that will (i) trigger recourse on the primary
obligation and (ii) cause the guaranty to ‘spring’ into life, making the guarantor fully
liable for the underlying debt.”).
282. See id. at 21, 23; see also Adams, Jr. & Kirkham, supra note 1, at 301.
283. Lahave, 2013 WL 1208423, at *2.
284. The California Court of Appeals reasoned: “a Late Fee consisting of 5 percent
of the balance of a note constitutes a penalty unenforceable as a matter of public policy
under New Mexico law against Guarantors, notwithstanding their purported waiver of
any invalidity, illegality, or unenforceability of the note.” Id. at *4.
285. Id. at *1 (“We are asked to determine whether a late fee consisting of 5 percent
of the balance of a note constitutes a penalty. . . . . We conclude . . . the late fee
constitutes a penalty . . . and therefore is unenforceable.”).
286. See Marshall E. Tracht, Insider Guaranties in Bankruptcy: A Framework for
Analysis, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 554 (2000) (encouraging the bankruptcy court to
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four corners of loan documents in enforcing these springing
guaranties.287
b. The Factors
Therefore, the following are the most pertinent factors a bankruptcy
court should consider in determining whether to enjoin a springing
guaranty pursuant to § 105: (1) evidence of the insider’s pre-filing delay
leading to financial deterioration of the corporate debtor in the months
preceding the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy; (2) viability—the debtor’s
prospect of undergoing a successful reorganization; (3) the number of
other creditors in the debtor’s bankruptcy case in a position to be
harmed by the enforcement of the guaranty for the benefit of a single
creditor; (4) the timing of the bankruptcy case vis-à-vis the springing
guaranty proceeding—i.e. whether the bankruptcy case has already been
dismissed or converted to Chapter 7; (5) whether it is a state, district, or
bankruptcy court presiding over the springing guaranty proceeding; and
(6) the specific language of the guaranty defining the forum in which
subsequent issues are to be resolved.288 Hopefully, an increasing number
of bankruptcy courts will preside over springing guaranty proceedings in
the future. 289 This would enable the development of a more coherent

rely on the policies underlying § 362 and § 365(e) of the Code to protect a viable
debtor’s prospects of undergoing a successful reorganization); Exploding and Springing
Guarantees, supra note 55 (discussing the potential invocation of the equitable
subordination provision of the Code to subordinate the lender’s claim in the borrower’s
bankruptcy case); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (providing for the debtor’s automatic
stay); id. § 365(e) (invalidating ipso facto clauses contingent upon the solvency of the
debtor); id. § 510(c) (permitting the subordination or disallowance of the claim of an
overreaching lender or a lender exerting excessive control in the bankruptcy case to the
detriment of the debtor).
287. See Exhibit 3, column (c) (illustrating the cases in which the court enforced the
springing guaranty pursuant to the terms of the guaranty agreement).
288. See Exhibit 1. In compiling these factors, I relied on my case study that
constitutes the basis for Exhibits 1 and 2. Id.; see also Exhibit 2. I compared the court’s
analysis in each of those springing guaranty cases to discern whether any patterns arose.
See Exhibit 1. These are the factors that were most consistently referenced in analyzing
the springing guaranty issue. Id.
289. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 131 (noting the
absence of bankruptcy court opinions involving springing guaranty cases susceptible to
strong bankruptcy policy arguments).
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framework for determining what fact-patterns justify the granting of
injunctive relief.290
III. SOLUTION TO THE JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT, SUBSTANTIVE
REFRAMING AS A SOLUTION, AND SOLUTION TO THE SUBSTANTIVE
CONFLICT
This Part proposes solutions to the jurisdictional and substantive
issues raised in Parts I and II. Part III.A proposes a solution as to the
procedural conflict: a bankruptcy court may exercise jurisdiction either
on the ground that bankruptcy-triggered springing guaranty proceedings
can only “arise in” the context of a bankruptcy case or on the ground
that these proceedings are sufficiently “related to” the bankruptcy case.
Part III.B considers potential ways for a guarantor who holds a
controlling stake in the corporate debtor to act through the debtor in
order to confer jurisdiction over the springing guaranty issue on a
bankruptcy court. Part III.C proposes a solution as to the substantive
conflict: the bankruptcy court should rely on their equitable powers
pursuant to § 105 to preclude the enforcement of springing guaranties.
A. JURISDICTIONAL SOLUTIONS: “CORE,” “ARISING IN” JURISDICTION AND
“NON-CORE,” “RELATED TO” JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court can exercise “arising in” jurisdiction over the
springing guaranty proceeding. 291 A proceeding that “arises in” the
debtor’s bankruptcy case falls within the bankruptcy court’s “core”
jurisdiction. 292 For a bankruptcy court to rely upon its “arising in”
jurisdiction, the dispute must involve a claim that could only “arise in”
the context of a bankruptcy case.293 Therefore, a matter that “arises in”

290.
291.

Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (providing the district court with original but not
exclusive jurisdiction over all civil proceedings “arising in” a bankruptcy case); see
also id. § 157(a) (permitting the district court to refer all proceedings “arising in” a
bankruptcy case to the bankruptcy court).
292. See id. § 157(b) (designating proceedings that “arise in” a bankruptcy case as
“core” proceedings).
293. See Stoe v. Flaherty, 436 F.3d 209, 218 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that claims
that “arise in” a bankruptcy case are claims that—by their very nature—could arise only
in the context of a bankruptcy case).
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the context of a bankruptcy case cannot be “the subject of a lawsuit
absent the filing of a bankruptcy case.”294 Thus, a springing guaranty
proceeding, which arises as a result of the borrower’s filing a
bankruptcy petition, can never be the subject of a lawsuit absent the
filing of a bankruptcy case. 295 If the triggering event (e.g., filing a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition or any of the collateral consequences of
a bankruptcy filing) never occurs, there will be no liability under the
springing guaranty.296 Consequently, the issue of whether to enforce that
guaranty would never become the subject of a lawsuit. 297 Therefore,
where the guarantor’s personal liability only arises as a result of the
debtor’s bankruptcy filing, any attempt by the lender to enforce that
liability of the guarantor necessarily “arises in” the context of the
underlying bankruptcy case.298 The entire basis for the lender’s suit to
enforce the guaranty is predicated on the guarantor’s breach of the terms
of the guaranty agreement by authorizing the debtor’s filing of a petition
in the bankruptcy court.299 The guarantor’s liability consequently “arises
in” the debtor’s bankruptcy case.300 Indeed, without the bankruptcy case,
the guarantor would not be liable in the first place.301
If a proceeding is “related to” the debtor’s bankruptcy case, the
bankruptcy court may exercise “non-core” jurisdiction over that
proceeding.302 The test to determine whether a proceeding is “related to”
the debtor’s bankruptcy case is whether the outcome of that proceeding
could conceivably affect the administration of the debtor’s estate in
bankruptcy. 303 Here, the outcome of a springing guaranty proceeding

294.
295.

Id. (quotations omitted).
See Exploding and Springing Guarantees, supra note 55, at 1 (explaining that
“the guarantor’s liability springs into existence only upon . . . the filing of bankruptcy”).
296. See Eisenson, supra note 1, at 262, 262 n. 106 (describing bad boy guaranties,
a synonym for springing guaranties, as “a personal guaranty that is contingent upon
bankruptcy filings”).
297. See Exploding and Springing Guarantees, supra note 55, at 1.
298. Id.
299. Id. (“[T]he guarantor’s liability springs into existence only upon . . . the filing
of bankruptcy.”).
300. Id.
301. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984).
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will affect the administration of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. 304
Assuming the springing guaranty is enforced, the guarantor will either
rely upon insurance provided by the debtor, exercise a right of
indemnification against the debtor, or assert a contribution or
subrogation claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy case.305 To pay off any and
all of those claims, funds must be paid out of the debtor’s estate to the
detriment of other creditors in the bankruptcy.306 If the presiding court
found the springing guaranty to be unenforceable, the lender would be
forced to assert its claim in the borrower’s bankruptcy case. 307 This
would permit the bankruptcy court to retain its usual discretion to
restructure the terms of the loan so as to facilitate the debtor’s
reorganization.308 Any unsecured deficiency would almost certainly be
eliminated, and there would be no prior judgment entered in state court
as to the amount due and owed under the loan.309

304. See, e.g., SL Inv. US-Re Holdings 2009-1, Inc. v. Englett, No. 609-CV-281ORL-28DAB, 2009 WL 1659164, 127-28 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2009). For a discussion
of the court’s treatment of the springing guaranty proceeding in Englett, see supra notes
126-131 and accompanying text.
305. See, e.g., In re Quigley Co., 676 F.3d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining when
the guarantor would have a right of indemnification against the debtor, thereby
conferring related to jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court); see A.H. Robins Co. v.
Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1001–02 (4th Cir. 1986) (indicating that the bankruptcy court
has jurisdiction over proceedings that will trigger a claim by the guarantor under an
insurance policy owned by the debtor); Guaranties in Bankruptcy, supra note 216
(noting that, generally, the guarantor may exercise its right of reimbursement,
contribution, or subrogation in the debtor’s bankruptcy case); see also 11 U.S.C. § 509
(2012) (providing for the subrogation of certain claims of co-debtors); id. § 502
(providing guarantor with the right to assert a claim for reimbursement or contribution).
306. See Englett, 2009 WL 1659164, at *1 (noting that the amount collected from
the guarantor in state court will reduce the amount owed by the debtor to the lender and
thus conceivably will have an affect on the liability of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate).
307. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135 (illustrating why
the bankruptcy court should retain jurisdiction over springing guaranty proceedings and
how that court should invoke its § 105 equitable powers to enjoin its enforcement).
308. See id. at 134 (explaining the manner in which the springing guaranty removes
much of the debtor’s traditional ability to renegotiate loan terms).
309. See generally Adams, Jr. & Kirkham, supra note 1 (providing an in-depth
analysis of how and why lenders seek to avoid the risk associated with a borrower’s
commencement of a Chapter 11 case).
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B. EXPLORING GUARANTOR’S ABILITY TO CONFER “ARISING UNDER”
JURISDICTION EXCLUSIVELY ON A BANKRUPTCY COURT AND TO
ELIMINATE THE JURISDICTIONAL BAR POSED BY THE DOCTRINE OF
MANDATORY ABSTENTION
A guarantor can manipulate the procedural laws governing
springing guaranty proceedings to secure both protection from lenders
seeking to collect on the debt and exclusive jurisdiction for a bankruptcy
court. 310 By orchestrating the simultaneous filing of a Chapter 11
petition with a motion to modify the automatic stay, the guarantor,
acting through the debtor, can eliminate the existing threats to the
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over a springing guaranty proceeding.311
Section 362 of the Code provides for an automatic stay enjoining
creditors from either commencing or continuing any attempts to recover
a debt upon a debtor’s filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.312 Because a
guarantor’s motion to modify an automatic stay “arises under” the Code,
that motion is a “core” proceeding under § 157.313 Thus, if a guarantor,
acting through the debtor, and a debtor concurrently submit their
respective filings, the bankruptcy court will have “core” jurisdiction
over the springing guaranty proceeding and remain insulated from the
threat of remand under the doctrine of mandatory abstention.314
Accordingly, this Subpart explains how a guarantor can ensure that
a bankruptcy court will continue to preside over the springing guaranty
issue by: (1) framing the argument as grounded in § 362 of the Code,
and (2) ensuring that the lender is precluded from initiating a state court
proceeding prior to the initiation of the springing guaranty proceeding in
the bankruptcy court. 315 The statutorily-defined doctrine of mandatory
abstention places the burden on the party invoking the doctrine to prove

310. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (creating the automatic stay barring post-filing attempts
to collect from the debtor).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (b)(2)(G) (“Core proceedings include, but are not
limited to—(G) motions to . . . modify the automatic stay[.]”); see also supra note 136
and accompanying text.
314. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (b)(2)(G); see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
315. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G) (identifying a proceeding to modify the
automatic stay as a “core” proceeding).
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that under the present circumstances, the court must abstain. 316 The
moving party must prove the following six factors:
(1) the motion to abstain was timely; (2) the action is based on a
state law claim; (3) the action is “related to” but not “arising in” a
bankruptcy case or “arising under” the Bankruptcy Code; (4) Section
1334 provides the sole basis for federal jurisdiction; (5) an action is
commenced in state court; [and] (6) that action can be “timely
317
adjudicated” in state court.

For a court to apply the jurisdictional bar of mandatory abstention,
all of the enumerated factors must be present.318 Section 1334(c)(2) sets
forth specific requirements that a lender must satisfy to succeed on a
motion to invoke the doctrine. 319 At the time the lender brings the
mandatory abstention motion before the Bankruptcy Court, the lender
must have already commenced an action in state court.320 Therefore, if
the debtor raises the issue that is to become the subject of the mandatory
abstention proceeding in the bankruptcy court before the lender has
initiated an action concerning that proceeding in state court, then the
lender is precluded from relying upon the doctrine of mandatory
abstention. 321 Therefore, this six-pronged test affords a guarantor the
chance to ensure a proceeding will fall exclusively within the
jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court.322
It is possible for a guarantor to circumvent the jurisdictional bar of
mandatory abstention.323 Where a proceeding “arises under” the Code
and an action in state court has not commenced, the bankruptcy court is
not required to abstain from hearing that proceeding. 324 Thus, a
316. Id.; see Stoe v. Flaherty, 436 F.3d 209, 219 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that
the party moving for mandatory abstention “had the burden of proving his right to
mandatory abstention”).
317. In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 628 F. Supp. 2d 432, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
318. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (setting forth the mandatory abstention doctrine).
319. Id.
320. See id. § 1334(c)(2) (imposing the requirement that the district court abstain
from hearing a proceeding only where the moving party has already filed an action in
state court concerning the subject of that proceeding).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See id.
324. Id.
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guarantor can preempt any subsequent finding of mandatory abstention
by coordinating with the debtor to file simultaneously the guarantor’s
motion to modify the automatic stay and the debtor’s Chapter 11
petition. 325 In effect, the debtor’s filing would render it impossible to
satisfy the third and fifth factors required under the statute. 326 The
debtor’s filing would forestall demonstration of the third factor because
mandatory abstention only applies to “non-core” proceedings, and a
motion to modify the automatic stay is a “core” proceeding under §
157.327 Similarly, the debtor’s filing would prevent satisfaction of the
fifth requirement because it becomes impossible for the lender to
commence an action in state court when the guarantor files a motion to
modify the automatic stay on the same day the debtor files its
bankruptcy petition.328
325. Id. One can assume that the guarantor who is the individual with the authority
to authorize or decline to authorize the debtor’s bankruptcy filing can equally exercise
this same authority over the debtor to also file a motion to modify the automatic stay on
the guarantor’s behalf. See Eisenson, supra note 1, at 263 (“By imposing personal
liability on a guarantor, which is usually a person in control of the borrower, bad boy
guaranties create a financial disincentive for the guarantor to cause, or even permit, the
borrower to impede the lender’s collateral enforcement action by filing a bankruptcy
petition.”); see also Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 136 (“[A]
bankruptcy-contingent guaranty is not, at its core, an obligation of a third party or a
contract of financial assurance; it is a bonding device used to control the business
decisions of the debtor, with financial liability imposed on the principals as a penalty
for breach.”).
326. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G) (classifying stay-related motions as “core”
proceedings); see also Exhibit 1, column (e) (illustrating that a proceeding to enforce a
bankruptcy-triggered guaranty must be filed subsequent to the debtor’s filing for
bankruptcy).
327. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (defining “core” proceedings to be proceedings that
“arise under” title 11 or “arise in” a case under title 11); see also id. § 157(b)(2)(G)
(classifying stay-related motions as “core” proceedings).
328. Because the guarantor is keenly aware that the filing of the debtor’s bankruptcy
petition is the condition triggering the guarantor’s own liability, it is in the best interest
of the guarantor to file both the motion to modify the automatic stay and the debtor’s
bankruptcy petition on the same day. See Eisenson, supra note 1, at 263 (discussing the
disincentives a springing guaranty imposes on the guarantor in deciding whether to
authorize the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, implicitly suggesting that the guarantor is
keenly aware of the effect a bankruptcy filing will have on his or her own liability
under the guaranty). By doing this, the guarantor may not even realize that he or she is
securing an added benefit: the motion to modify the automatic stay raises the springing
guaranty issue before the bankruptcy court at the same time that the lender learns of the
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Because it is the debtor’s filing of a Chapter 11 petition that
triggers the guarantor’s liability, the lender will never have a cause of
action against the guarantor until after the bankruptcy petition has been
filed. 329 If the debtor files the guarantor’s motion to modify the
automatic stay at the same time that the debtor files for bankruptcy, it
will be impossible for the lender to file a state court action before the
guarantor has submitted the motion. 330 Thus, a guarantor may take
advantage of the strict procedural requirements under the doctrine of
mandatory abstention and defeat the jurisdictional bar by filing the
motion to modify the automatic stay and the bankruptcy petition
simultaneously. This will ensure that the guarantor’s springing guaranty
filing “arises under” the Bankruptcy Code.331
In light of the guarantor’s and debtor’s ability to control the
jurisdiction in which the bankruptcy proceeding will take place, the only
question left unanswered is whether the debtor will agree to file the

debtor’s bankruptcy filing and thus the potential to sue the guarantor. See supra notes
317-21 and accompanying text. One can assume that the lender first learns of the
guarantor’s liability on the date of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing and thus the provision
of notice to all interested parties to the bankruptcy, including the lender. See Exhibit 1,
column (e). Therefore, the springing guaranty issue is before the bankruptcy court at a
time when the guarantor could not have commenced an action in state court, and
therefore the guarantor will be unable to meet the requirements for mandatory
abstention. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2).
329. See Exploding and Springing Guarantees, supra note 55, at 1 (defining a
springing guaranty as a guaranty where “the guarantor’s liability springs into existence
only upon the occurrence of some undesirable event . . . (e.g., the filing of
bankruptcy)”); see also Exhibit 1, column (e) (illustrating that in 11 our of the 12 cases
from my case study, the filing of the springing guaranty case occurred subsequent to the
debtor’s filing for bankruptcy). The only exception would be where the guarantor
becomes liable on the guaranty pursuant to a different enumerated triggering condition
unrelated to the subsequent bankruptcy filing. See 111 Debt Acquisition LLC v. Six
Ventures, Ltd., No. C2-08-768, 2009 WL 414181 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2009), aff’d sub
nom., 111 Debt Acquisition Holdings, LLC v. Six Ventures Ltd., 413 F. App’x 824 (6th
Cir. 2011).
330. See Exploding and Springing Guarantees, supra note 55, at 1. By employing
this tactic, a lender’s motion for mandatory abstention will never succeed because the
lender will never be able to demonstrate the requirement of the fifth factor that the
action be commenced in state court. See, e.g., In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 628 F. Supp.
2d 432, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see supra notes 298-99, 313-14 and accompanying text.
331. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G).
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motion to modify the automatic stay on the guarantor’s behalf. 332
Generally, where a loan agreement contains a springing guaranty, the
lender ensures that the guarantor has a position of authority within the
borrower’s company and can exercise his or her authority to bar any
subsequent bankruptcy filings. 333 Thus, it is safe to assume that the
guarantor who decides whether to authorize a borrower to file for
bankruptcy could issue an order to file a motion to modify the automatic
stay.334
Data collected from twelve springing guaranty cases indicates that
a guarantor has the ability to influence a debtor’s decision to file a
motion on the guarantor’s behalf.335 These cases illuminate three factors
332. See infra notes 333-35 and accompanying text. See also Exhibit 1 (citing the
twelve springing guaranty cases that provide the basis for the conclusions reached in
Exhibit 2); Exhibit 2 (supporting the conclusion that a springing guarantor has the
ability to influence a debtor’s decision to file a motion to modify the automatic stay). In
agreeing to file the guarantor’s motion to modify the automatic stay, the debtor also
assumes responsibility to cover the cost of filing that motion. See Judicial Conference
Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Bankruptcy Court Miscellaneous Fees, 19
(Dec. 2014) (issued by the Judicial Conference pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930), available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/FormsAndFees/Fees/BankruptcyCourtMiscellaneousFee
Schedule.aspx. Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that the hours expended by the
debtor’s attorneys in drafting and litigating the motion to modify the automatic stay will
call for additional attorney’s fees. Id. However, it seems logical that if the debtor was
not willing to pay the filing fee, the guarantor would reimburse the debtor the amount
of the cost. Id.
333. See Eisenson, supra note 1, at 263 (“By imposing personal liability on a
guarantor, which is usually a person in control of the borrower, bad boy guaranties
create a financial disincentive for the guarantor to cause, or even permit, the borrower
to impede the lender’s collateral enforcement action by filing a bankruptcy petition.”);
see also Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 136 (“[A] bankruptcycontingent guaranty is not, at its core, an obligation of a third party or a contract of
financial assurance; it is a bonding device used to control the business decisions of the
debtor, with financial liability imposed on the principals as a penalty for breach.”).
334. It is safe to assume that the principal in control of the business decisions of the
debtor has equal control over the decision to file a petition and the decision to file a
motion in the debtor’s bankruptcy case. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb, supra
note 4, at 136; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362 (providing for the debtor’s automatic stay); 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G) (conferring core jurisdiction over a motion to modify the
automatic stay).
335. See Exhibit 1; Exhibit 2. I chose the cases for this case study for several
reasons. I wanted a sample that would be representative of the characteristics of the
corporate debtor in most springing guaranty cases. The large majority of springing
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underlying this influence and a debtor’s willingness to assume
responsibility for filing the guarantor’s motion. 336 The extent of a
guaranty cases involve corporate debtors that share the same trademark characteristics
that make them the type of companies that lenders will be most likely to require to
include a springing guaranty as part of their loan agreement. These trademark
characteristics are: the corporate form these companies choose is usually a Limited
Liability Company (“LLC”) or a Limited Liability Partnership (“LLP”); they often are
single asset real estate cases with only one major secured creditor holding a lien on the
property; and they usually are private, as opposed to public, companies. Therefore, this
note centers on a twelve-case subset of springing guaranty cases primarily involving
borrowers with these characteristics. In addition, I also looked for more recent
springing guaranty cases in choosing which cases to include in the case study. The
purpose of this was to ascertain how courts view springing guaranties today. However,
even if a case fit within the other criterion, I only chose a case for the study if the
triggering condition was a bankruptcy-related event (e.g. the debtor’s filing a petition in
bankruptcy or the lender’s collateral becoming an asset in bankruptcy). In conjunction
with that, I only chose springing guaranty cases that were concurrent with the debtor’s
bankruptcy case (e.g. the debtor’s simultaneous bankruptcy case had not been dismissed
prior to the lender’s initiation of the springing guaranty proceeding). My intention in
undertaking this case study was to study the relationship between a springing guarantor
and the corporate debtor and analyze whether—on the basis of that relationship—the
springing guarantor could act through the debtor to file a motion to modify the
automatic stay pursuant to § 105 of the Code. The table found in Exhibit 1 is the
citations providing the evidence that led me to draw the conclusions I reach on the basis
of the answers delineated in Exhibit 2. It should be noted here that Exhibit 3 bears no
relation to this case study. See Exhibit 1.
336. Exhibit 1 provides a table of the twelve springing guaranty cases that informed
this Note’s conclusion that springing guarantors will generally be able to persuade
debtors to file motions on their behalf. The far left-hand column of the table found in
Exhibit 1 includes a case designation for each of the cases. This designation is
determined by the guarantor’s last name and is included as a shorthand term aimed at
facilitating recall of the case names. Each case listing is then comprised of five
columns, labeled (a) through (d) from left to right. Column (a) consists of a citation to
the bankruptcy docket for the borrower’s bankruptcy case. Column (b) consists of a
citation to a judgment either determining whether to enforce the springing guaranty or
identifying the court with ultimate jurisdiction to decide that issue. Column (c) is a
citation to the voluntary petition filed at the outset of the debtor’s bankruptcy case. The
bullet points in this category are the “Name of Debtor” and “Nature of Business”
transcribed from the debtor’s petition. The debtor’s name is there to illustrate that most
springing guarantor debtors adopt some variant of a limited liability corporate form.
The debtor’s business is there to illustrate that most springing guarantor debtors are
single asset real estate companies. Column (d) is a citation to another document filed in
the debtor’s bankruptcy case: the summary of schedules. The summary of schedules
reflects the debtor’s financial position as of the time the debtor filed for bankruptcy.
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guarantor’s control relies on a determination of (A) whether the
guarantor(s) acted as the DIP in the debtor’s bankruptcy case; (B)
whether the guarantor signs as the corporate debtor on the petition; and
(C) the role of the guarantor in the debtor’s entity.337 The import of (B)
is that a Chapter 11 petition designates the debtor signing thereunder as
the individual “authorized to file this petition on behalf of the debtor.”338
The import of (C) is that guarantors holding greater ownership interests
and higher managerial positions in the corporate debtor are presumed to
be able to exercise relatively more control.339
If the guarantor acted as the DIP, signed the petition, retained close
to 100% equity ownership of the debtor entity, and held some
managerial office within the debtor’s corporate structure, then the
dataset included in Exhibit 1 assumes that the guarantor had the capacity
to exercise a relatively greater degree of control over the debtor.340 Nine
of the twelve cases reveal that the guarantor can exercise substantial
control over the debtor’s decisions.341 Three of the twelve cases initially
appear to be exceptions: UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust v. Garrison
Special Opportunities Fund L.P, 342 GCCFC 2006-GG7 Westheimer
Mall, LLC v. Okun, 343 and Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. v.
Kobernick, C.A.344 Unlike the other cases, the guarantor in Garrison was
337. In analyzing what actor(s) holds decision-making authority over the debtor
entity, corporate law governs. The basic principle is that whoever holds the largest
single block of shares in the company controls the decisions of the company. Thus, the
owner of the company ultimately decides whether to file for bankruptcy and what
motions to make once in bankruptcy. Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 79 n. 118 (1992) (referencing
management’s control over the decision of whether or not to file for bankruptcy, as well
as the leverage management possesses once in bankruptcy).
338. See Exhibit 1, column (c) (citing to the twelve voluntary petitions filed in the
case study conducted herein).
339. For each of the cases, Exhibit 2 states the answers to (A), (B), and (C).
340. See Exhibit 1.
341. See Exhibit 2.
342. UBS Commercial Mortg. Trust v. Garrison Special Opportunities Fund L.P.,
No. 652412/2010, 2011 WL 4552404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 8, 2011); see infra note 345
and accompanying text.
343. GCCFC 2006-GG7 Westheimer Mall, LLC v. Okun, No. 07 CIV. 10394
(NRB), 2008 WL 3891257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008); see infra note 348 and
accompanying text.
344. Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Kobernick, C.A. No. 8-CV-1458, 2009 WL
7808949 (S.D. Tex. May 28, 2009), aff’d sub nom., U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v.
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not an individual, but rather a fund: Garrison Special Opportunities
Fund LP (“Garrison”).345 Garrison would have had a more difficult time
filing its motion to modify the automatic stay because Garrison was not
the only owner of the corporate debtor but rather one of several owners
and therefore held a correspondingly lower percentage of the overall
ownership.346
In Okun, the guarantor, Edward Okun, only held a 1% equity stake
in the corporate debtor.347 Thus, as guarantor, Okun could be outvoted
on the decision of whether to file a motion to modify the automatic stay
on his behalf.348 Nevertheless, there was no question that a bankruptcy
court would have jurisdiction to preside over Okun. First, Okun
controlled the other related borrower entities, which held a 99% equity
interest in the corporate debtor.349 Second, Okun was a co-debtor in the

Kobernick, 454 F. App’x 307 (5th Cir. 2011); see infra notes 350-54 and accompanying
text.
345. Garrison Special Opportunities Fund L.P., 2011 WL 4552404, at *1.
346. See Debtor’s Corp. Ownership Statement, In re Penzance Cascades N., LLC,
No. 10-16643 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2010), ECF No. 1 (listing the seven equity
owners of the debtor and their percentage of equity interests held in the debtor,
respectively, including Garrison Special Opportunities Fund LP with 61.16% of indirect
ownership interests in the Debtor).
347. See Debtor’s Amended Petition, In re IPofA W. Oaks Mall, LP, No. 07-33649KRH, 2007 WL 3223295 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2007), ECF No. 17 (listing Edward
H. Okun as the manager of the debtor’s general partner); see also Debtor’s Statement of
Fin. Affairs at Question 21, In re IPofA W. Oaks Mall, LP, No. 07-33649-KRH, 2007
WL 3223295 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2007), ECF No. 106 (providing that the entities
with equity interests in the debtor are a general partner with 1% interest and a limited
partner with 99% interest).
348. See Debtor’s Amended Petition, In re IPofA W. Oaks Mall, LP, No. 07-33649KRH, 2007 WL 3223295 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2007), ECF No. 17; see also
Debtor’s Statement of Fin. Affairs at Question 21, In re IPofA W. Oaks Mall, LP, No.
07-33649-KRH, 2007 WL 3223295 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2007), ECF No. 106.
349. In this springing guaranty suit, the district court defined the borrower entities to
include IpofA West Oaks Mall, LP, IpofA West Oaks Master LeaseCo, LP and IpofA
West Oaks Mall LeaseCo, LP. GCCFC 2006-GG7 Westheimer Mall, LLC v. Okun, No.
07 CIV. 10394(NRB), 2008 WL 3891257, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008). The court
then stated that the guarantor, Edward Okun, owned or controlled all three of the
borrower entities. Id.; see also Complaint at 2, In re IPofA W. Oaks Mall, LP, No. 0733649-KRH, 2007 WL 3223295 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2007) (attaching schedules
of Okun’s interest in all three of the debtor entities as Exhibit A). This allowed Okun to
control decisions over the corporate debtor even though his control was not derivative
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borrower’s bankruptcy case.350 Okun’s status as a debtor meant that his
claim arose in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, giving a
bankruptcy court proper jurisdiction without relying on the corporate
debtor to file a motion to modify the automatic stay on Okun’s behalf.351
Thus, where the guarantor is a co-debtor with the borrower, the
guarantor should propose a reorganization plan seeking to enjoin the
enforcement of the springing guaranty pursuant to § 105.352
The third exception is the guarantor in Kobernick, who appeared to
exercise less control over the corporate debtor, Communidad
Kensington Club I, LLC (“Communidad”). 353 There were three
controlling managers of Communidad, but only one of the three—
Mitchell Kobernick—faced potential liability as the borrower’s
guarantor because once Communidad becomes a debtor, the guarantor is
automatically liable. 354 Thus, the other two managers would have no
incentive to protect Kobernick at their own expense. 355 Nevertheless,
Communidad’s first proposed plan of reorganization included an attempt
to secure a temporary injunction against the lender’s suit to enforce the

of his status as guarantor. See Complaint at 2, In re IPofA W. Oaks Mall, LP, No. 0733649-KRH, 2007 WL 3223295 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2007).
350. Docket at 2, In re IPofA W. Oaks Mall, LP, No. 07-33649-KRH, 2007 WL
3223295 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2007) (listing under “Debtor Information” the
names of the debtor parties to the case and including Edward H. Okun as a debtor).
351. Id.; see also Beslow & Eliason, supra note 4, at *4 (“[T]he automatic-stay
protections of Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code . . . do not bar a lender from
pursuing a third-party guarantor unless that guarantor has also filed for bankruptcy
protection.”).
352. Docket at 2, In re IPofA W. Oaks Mall, LP, No. 07-33649-KRH, 2007 WL
3223295 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2007); see 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) (giving the
bankruptcy courts the power to enter necessary or appropriate orders to effectuate the
provisions of the Code).
353. See Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Kobernick, C.A. 8-cv-1458, 2009 WL
7808949, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 28, 2009), aff’d sub nom., U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v.
Kobernick, 454 F. App’x 307 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization
§ 4.05 at 13, In re Communidad Kensington Club I, LLC, No. 08-32127-H5-11 (Bankr.
S. D. Tex. Jun. 27, 2008), ECF No. 46.
354. Kobernick, 2009 WL 7808949, at *2 (explaining that in order for the borrower,
Communidad, to be put into bankruptcy, all three of its managers needed to vote
unanimously to authorize the filing).
355. Id.
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springing guaranty. 356 This is indicative of Kobernick’s ability to
influence the actions of the corporate debtor and supports the inference
that Kobernick could have caused Communidad to file a motion to
modify the automatic stay on his behalf.357
The aforementioned case study reveals that most of the guarantors
could have caused the debtors to file the motion to modify the automatic
stay simultaneously with the petition.358
C. INVOCATION OF § 105 TO BAR ENFORCEMENT OF A SPRINGING
GUARANTY
1. The Bankruptcy Code Provisions and their Policies May Support the
Use of § 105 to Bar Enforcement of Springing Guaranties
Assuming the bankruptcy court can retain jurisdiction over the
springing guaranty issue, this Note argues in favor of the court’s
issuance of a § 105 injunction to bar the enforcement of springing
guaranties.359 Section 105(a) provides: “[t]he court may issue any order,
356. See Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization § 4.05 at 13, In re Communidad
Kensington Club I, LLC, No. 08-32127-H5-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jun. 27, 2008), ECF.
No. 46 (“Upon Confirmation of the Plan, the Class 2 Creditor will be temporarily
enjoined, pursuant to Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, from proceeding against . . .
Mitchell Kobernick.”).
357. Id.
358. See Exhibit 2 (illustrating the degree of control each guarantor held over the
corporate debtor). In one of the twelve cases, the debtor—Market Center East Retail
Property, Inc—did in fact file a § 105 Motion to protect its non-debtor guarantor. See
Debtor’s Motion for Injunction, In re Mkt. Ctr. E. Retail Prop., Inc., 1:09-BK-11696,
ECF No. 63; see Bank of Am. v. Lahave, No. B237360, 2013 WL 1208423 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 26, 2013). However, at the time that debtor filed its motion, the lender had
already commenced an action to enforce the springing guaranty in state court. See
Debtor’s Motion for Injunction, In re Mkt. Ctr E. Retail Prop., Inc., 1:09-BK-11696,
ECF No. 63; see also Lahave, 2013 WL 1208423. Although this meant that the
guarantor would not be able to rely on a procedural technicality to defeat a mandatory
abstention motion outright, the key takeaway is that the debtor filed this motion for the
benefit of its guarantor, Danny Lahave. See Debtor’s Motion for Injunction, In re Mkt.
Ctr E. Retail Prop., Inc., 1:09-BK-11696, ECF No. 63; see also Lahave, 2013 WL
1208423. This adds further support for the conclusion of the case study—e.g., debtors
in springing guaranty cases will be willing to file motions to modify the automatic stay
on behalf of their guarantors. See Exhibit 1; Exhibit 2.
359. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012); supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title[.]” 360 Thus, in order to invoke § 105, the
bankruptcy court must rely on another provision of the Code to justify
the invocation of its equitable powers. 361 The bankruptcy court could
rely on any of the following provisions to justify enjoining the
enforcement of a springing guaranty pursuant to § 105: 11 U.S.C. §§
361, 362, 365(e), 510(c), 541, 1107. Each of these provisions provides
the bankruptcy court with a means to invoke § 105 in furtherance of the
key policies behind Chapter 11: (1) to facilitate the debtor’s fresh start;
and (2) to protect all creditors by fairly distributing the debtor’s estate
pursuant to the absolute priority rule.362
First, a bankruptcy court may invoke § 105 in order to provide
adequate protection to the other creditors in the bankruptcy case. 363
Enforcement of a springing guaranty by a state court outside of the
debtor’s bankruptcy case could impair the legitimate third-party interests
of creditors within the debtor’s bankruptcy case.364 Because the general
practice of courts addressing this issue has been to permit lenders to
enforce their prepetition rights under these guarantees, these lenders get
more than they would receive as ordinary creditors in the debtor’s
bankruptcy.365 This in turn undermines a key purpose of the bankruptcy
360.
361.

11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
Id.; see also First Nationwide Bank v. Brookhaven Realty Assocs., 637
N.Y.S.2d 418, 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (declining to intervene to protect the
guarantor where “the policies of providing a debtor with a fresh start and an opportunity
to reorganize its finances are not present”).
362. See generally Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135
(discussing the possibility of invoking § 105 in the springing guaranty context as a
means to effectuating the bankruptcy policies underlying the Code).
363. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (establishing when the bankruptcy court must provide a
creditor with adequate protection and what such protection constitutes).
364. See Adams, Jr. & Kirkham, supra note 1, at 12 (acknowledging that “[i]nsider
springing guaranties are probably the largest impediment to borrower bankruptcies”).
365. See LBUBS 2004-C8 Derek Drive, LLC v. Gerbino, No. 2:13-CV-2264, 2014
WL 2446362 (W.D. La. May 30, 2014); LBCMT 2007-C3 Seminole Trail, LLC v.
Sheppard, No. 3:12CV00025, 2013 WL 3009319 (W.D. Va. June 17, 2013); LBCMT
2007-C3 Sterling Retail, LLC v. Sheppard, No. 1:12-CV-470, 2013 WL 2151683 (E.D.
Va. May 15, 2013); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Cotta, No. 11-CV-410, 2012 WL
5335999 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2012); Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Singh, No. H-120147, 2012 WL 3186036 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2012); UBS Commercial Mortg. Trust
2007-FL1 v. Garrison Special Opportunities Fund L.P., No. 652412/2010, 2011 WL
4552404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 8, 2011); Bank of Am. v. Lightstone Holdings, LLC, 938
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process: to distribute the assets of the debtor’s estate fairly vis-à-vis all
creditors, thereby ensuring adequate protection of each creditor’s
interests. 366 For these reasons, the enforcement of these springing
guaranties undermines many of the “core” purposes underlying Chapter
11.367
Second, where a suit against the guarantor is in effect a suit against
the debtor, the court could equitably enjoin all proceedings against the
non-debtor guarantor in order to give meaning to the debtor’s automatic
stay.368 In enacting § 362, Congress sought to defer all claims that would
upset the operation of the bankruptcy case.369 This Congressional intent
would be frustrated if a court permitted a suit against the guarantor that
was in effect a suit against the debtor to proceed.370 Therefore, where
enforcement of the springing guaranty would harm the reorganization
prospects of a viable debtor, the purpose underlying § 362 supports the
invocation of § 105 to enjoin temporarily enforcement of the guaranty

N.Y.S.2d 225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011); Monroe Ctr. II Urban Renewal Co., LLC v.
Strategic Performance Fund-II, No. C-52-08, 2010 WL 5343317, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Dec. 29, 2010); Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Kobernick, No. 8-CV-1458,
2009 WL 7808949 (S.D. Tex. May 28, 2009), aff’d sub nom., U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v.
Kobernick, 454 F. App’x 307 (5th Cir. 2011); GCCFC 2006-GG7 Westheimer Mall,
LLC v. Okun, No. 07 CIV. 10394 (NRB), 2008 WL 3891257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,
2008); First Nationwide Bank v. Brookhaven Realty Assocs., 637 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996) (permitting lenders to seek a deficiency judgment from the guarantor).
366. See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
367. See Eisenson, supra note 1, at 264 (discussing the incentive against filing
created by the springing guaranty and the potentially negative impact such a
disincentive can have on the debtor’s reorganization prospects).
368. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012); see also Silverstein, supra note 52, at 126
(explaining that a bankruptcy court may stay litigation brought against a non-debtor if
the suit would distract the non-debtor to an extent likely to impair the debtor’s
reorganization process because the reorganization effort requires the non-debtor’s
undivided attention).
369. See 11 U.S.C. § 362; see also Marshall E. Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy
Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice, and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 301, 313 (1997)
[hereinafter Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers] (explaining that the purpose of the
automatic stay is to preserve “the firm’s ability to conduct an orderly liquidation or
reorganization-central goals of bankruptcy law”).
370. See Beslow & Eliason, supra note 4, at *5 (describing the “sham guaranty”
defense under state law, whereby the court will dismiss the guaranty case if the
borrower and guarantor are the same individuals).
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against the non-debtor guarantor.371 One can even argue that the broader
bankruptcy policies of providing the debtor with a fresh start and giving
the debtor an opportunity to reorganize its finances support the issuance
of a permanent injunction in the springing guaranty context.372
Third, a court could invoke § 105 to permit the debtor to reject
burdensome contractual obligations, such as those that disincentivize the
debtor’s reorganization prospects.373 Section 365(e) permits the DIP to
assume or reject any executory contracts or unexpired leases, subject to
the bankruptcy court’s approval.374 Ordinarily, courts have limited the
applicability of § 365(e) in one of two manners: (1) by only applying it
to bar executory contracts and unexpired leases, but not guaranties; or
(2) by not letting it invalidate the guaranty vis-à-vis the guarantor if the
guaranty is conditioned on the bankruptcy of a person or entity other
than the guarantor, for example, if it is conditioned on the debtor’s
bankruptcy. 375 However, at least one commentator has argued that a
court could justify issuance of a temporary injunction to protect a non371. See Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers, supra note 369, at 313 (explaining that
the automatic stay is put in place to ensure that the corporate debtor has the opportunity
to successfully reorganize).
372. One commentator argues that a springing guaranty is not, by its nature, an
obligation of a third party, but rather, an obligation of the debtor itself because of the
manner in which it functions in practice. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra
note 4, at 135 (arguing that the inappropriate incentives created by a bankruptcycontingent guaranty support the issuance of a permanent injunction protecting the
guarantor as part of the debtor’s confirmed plan of reorganization). “A bankruptcycontingent guaranty . . . is a bonding device used to control the business decisions of the
debtor, with liability imposed on the principals as a penalty for breach.” Id.
373. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (invalidating ipso facto clauses contingent upon the
solvency of the debtor).
374. See id. § 365(a) (authorizing the trustee to assume or reject any executory
contracts or unexpired leases); see also id. § 1107(a) (conferring upon a debtor in
possession in Chapter 11 all of the rights, powers and duties of a trustee). An executory
contract is a contract where both sides to the contractual agreement have not completed
their obligations thereunder, and thus, the debtor can opt to disaffirm any continuing
obligations it may have by rejecting the contract. See id. § 365(a), Revision Notes and
Legislative Reports, at 1978 Acts (defining an executory contract to include a “contract
[] on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides”).
375. See Monroe Ctr II Urban Renewal Co. LLC, C-000052-08, aff’d by Monroe
Ctr. II Urban Renewal Co., LLC v. Strategic Performance Fund-II, No. C-52-08, 2010
WL 5343317, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 29, 2010) (addressing both
arguments and finding in favor of the lender on both arguments).
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debtor guarantor on the grounds that the court was effectuating the
purposes underlying § 365(e) of the Code.376 The intended purpose of §
365(e) is to permit the DIP to reject a contractual obligation that is
burdensome to the bankruptcy estate and likely to impair the debtor’s
rehabilitation. 377 Thus, the DIP should be permitted to reject a
bankruptcy-contingent guaranty because such a guaranty constitutes “a
contract against a third party [that] has the effect of creating additional
leverage over the debtor upon the filing of the bankruptcy case[.]”378
Fourth, where lenders behave inequitably vis-à-vis other creditors,
the court could issue a § 105 injunction to bar the enforcement of an
action that would leave that lender with an unfair advantage relative to
the position of the other creditors. 379 Section 510(c) permits the
bankruptcy court to reorder a creditor’s claims.380 For instance, the court
could penalize a creditor who engaged in inequitable conduct by
subordinating that creditor’s claims to claims of one or more other
creditors.381 The court could even go one step further by ordering the
transfer of that creditor’s subordinated claim to the estate. 382 This
transfer in effect permits a bankruptcy court to disallow a creditor’s

376.
377.

See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135.
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 365, 92 Stat. 2549,
S. REP. 95-989, 59 (justifying the need for § 365(e) of the Code on the ground that ipso
facto or bankruptcy clauses frequently hamper the debtor’s rehabilitation efforts).
378. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135 (describing such a
contract as falling within the intended functions of § 365(e)).
379. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1); see also Exploding and Springing Guarantees,
supra note 55, at 2 (discussing the potential invocation of the equitable subordination
provision of the Code to subordinate the lender’s claim in the borrower’s bankruptcy
case).
380. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1); see also Exploding and Springing Guarantees,
supra note 55, at 2 (permitting the bankruptcy court to punish a lender who acts in a
manner detrimental to the debtor or other creditors in the bankruptcy case by
subordinating the lender’s claim to the claims of those other claimants).
381. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (permitting a court, after notice and a hearing, to
“subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of
another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another
allowed interest”).
382. See id. §510(c)(2) (permitting a court, after notice and a hearing, to “order that
any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the estate”).

2015]

THE INVOCATION OF § 105 TO BAR THE
ENFORCEMENT OF SPRINGING GUARANTIES

855

claim in its entirety.383 The policy rationale behind § 510(c) is readily
applicable to the springing guaranty context.384 The springing guaranty
deters the insider-guarantor from authorizing the borrower’s bankruptcy
filing to the detriment of all creditors other than the creditor holding the
guaranty.385 This type of unfair advantage adhering to the benefit of a
single creditor is exactly the type of wrong Congress sought to redress in
providing the bankruptcy court with the power to reorder priorities
pursuant to § 510(c).386
Fifth, it is appropriate for the court to issue an injunction to protect
the assets of the bankruptcy estate.387 Section 541 of the Code defines
property of the estate as all legal or equitable interests of the debtor as of
the commencement of the case.388 One can argue that enforcement of the
guaranty and the guarantor’s subsequent claim for indemnification from
the debtor can impair the debtor’s reorganization.389 The indemnification
money would be withdrawn from the debtor’s estate, thereby reducing
the money available to other creditors.390 If the guarantor is a co-debtor
or the debtor is a co-guarantor, enforcement of the springing guaranty
will affect the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.391
383. Id.; see also Exploding and Springing Guarantees, supra note 55, at 2
(“Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code . . . permits the subordination or disallowance
of a lender’s claim in appropriate circumstances.”).
384. See Exploding and Springing Guarantees, supra note 55, at 2.
385. See id. at 2 (citing John C. Murray, Exploding and Springing Guarantees, 441
PLI/REAL 301, 308 (May/June 1999)) (“[T]he [§ 510(c)] argument []is that the filing of
bankruptcy might have been delayed (perhaps an involuntary bankruptcy ultimately
was initiated) to the detriment of the creditors due to the deterrent influence of the
exploding or springing guaranty on the borrower’s decision makers.”).
386. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 510(c); supra note 286 and accompanying text.
387. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (defining what constitutes the property of the debtor’s
bankruptcy estate).
388. Id.
389. See In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. 49, 57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in
part 435 B.R. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (identifying the potential for a guarantor’s
indemnification claim to affect the property available for distribution to the other
creditors of the debtor).
390. Id.
391. There is at least one springing guaranty case, where the guarantor was also a
named debtor in the borrower’s bankruptcy case. GCCFC 2006-GG7 Westheimer Mall,
LLC v. Okun, No. 07 CIV. 10394 (NRB), 2008 WL 3891257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,
2008). There is also at least one springing guaranty case, where both the corporate
borrower and the individual insider of the borrower were named guarantors under the
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The validity of an indemnification claim is contingent on whether
the guaranty agreement included an express right of indemnification, an
implicit right of indemnification, or a provision against
indemnification.392 If the loan agreement contains an express provision
to indemnify, the debtor will ultimately have to pay the guarantor,
causing that money to be withdrawn from the bankruptcy estate. 393
Courts have held that where there is an express indemnification
agreement between the debtor and the guarantor, the bankruptcy court
has jurisdiction over the proceeding because its outcome unquestionably
will affect the debtor’s estate in its bankruptcy case. 394 If the loan
agreement is silent as to whether or not the debtor has an obligation to
indemnify the guarantors, a presumption exists in favor of an implied
right of indemnity. 395 Thus, where a loan agreement is silent, there
should be a presumption that the indemnification money will be
withdrawn from the bankruptcy estate.396 Although this is the governing
substantive law, some courts nonetheless assume that in the absence of
an express indemnification provision, there is not a sufficient basis to
confer “related to” jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court.397 However, the
guaranty agreement. Guaranty Agreement, Bank of Am., N.A. v. Lightstone Holdings,
LLC, No. 601853/09, 2011 WL 4357491 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 14, 2011), ECF No.11.
392. See Glen Banks, Contribution and Indemnity, 28 N.Y. PRAC., CONTRACT L.
§ 25:22 (arguing that there is no implied obligation on the part of the debtor to
indemnify the guarantor if the parties have explicitly provided otherwise in the guaranty
agreement).
393. See In re Brentano’s, Inc., 27 B.R. 90, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (explaining
how the outcome of the guaranty agreement relates to the subsequent assertion of an
indemnification claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy case and consequent determines the
fate of the debtor’s reorganization effort).
394. Id. (finding that the bankruptcy court could exercise “related to” jurisdiction
over the non-debtor guaranty proceeding because of the express indemnification
agreement between the debtor and the guarantor).
395. See Banks, supra note 392 (“When a party agrees to become a guarantor at the
behest of the principal obligor, there is an implied obligation on the part of the obligor
to indemnify the guarantor for whatever performance it needs to render under the
guaranty.”).
396. Id.
397. See In re Quigley Co., 676 F.3d 45, 54 (2d Cir. 2012) (distinguishing between
a common law right of indemnification, where the non-debtor would have to bring a
wholly separate proceeding outside of the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding to recover,
and a non-debtor’s claim pursuant to a shared insurance policy, where the non-debtor
can assert that claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy case against the estate).
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bankruptcy court would have jurisdiction if the guarantor is covered by
an insurance policy paid for by the debtor. 398 If the corporate debtor
maintained an insurance policy for its employees, the guarantor would
be covered thereunder. 399 On the other hand, if the loan agreement
expressly provides that the guarantor has no right to seek indemnity
from the debtor, then that money will not be withdrawn from the
estate.400 This makes it more difficult to argue in favor of the bankruptcy
court’s “related to” jurisdiction over the springing guaranty
proceeding.401 Even where the guaranty agreement includes a provision
against indemnification, the enforcement of the springing guaranty
would still threaten the estate’s assets if the guarantor asserts an
equitable subordination claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy case.402
The bankruptcy court can also invoke its equitable powers if the
time and cost associated with the guaranty proceeding would impair the
guarantor’s ability to manage the debtor’s business or bankruptcy case
effectively. 403 For instance, in the bankruptcy of Extended Stay, Inc.
(“ESI”), ESI filed a Motion to Extend Exclusivity Periods for filing a
plan of reorganization. 404 In support of its motion, ESI detailed the
correlation between the magnitude and complexity of its bankruptcy
398. See id. at 55 (citing A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1001–02 (4th
Cir. 1986)) (explaining that where the non-debtor third-party and debtor share an
insurance policy, that insurance policy nonetheless is considered property of the
debtor’s estate, and thus, the third-party may assert an insurance claim against the estate
to recover the litigation costs that third-party is forced to expend in defending against
the guaranty litigation or worse, to recover the full amount that third-party must pay if
held liable).
399. See Piccinin, 788 F.2d at 1001-02 (“[A]ctions ‘related to’ the bankruptcy
proceedings against . . . officers or employees of the debtor who may be entitled to
indemnification under such policy or who qualify as additional insureds [] under the
policy are to be stayed under section 362(a)(3).”).
400. See Banks, supra note 392.
401. Id.
402. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2012) (providing for the equitable subordination of the
claim held by a creditor who acts in an inappropriate manner to gain an unfair
advantage over other creditors).
403. See id. § 1107 (providing for the current management in Chapter 11 to act as
the DIP, thereby retaining control over the debtor’s business operation throughout the
entirety of the bankruptcy case).
404. Debtor’s Motion to Extend Exclusivity Periods, In re Extended Stay, Inc., 418
B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part 435 B.R. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), ECF No.
289.
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case and the resulting burden imposed on its managers.405 ESI was one
of several entities within the Extended Stay family of hotels that all
simultaneously filed for bankruptcy.406 Since the same entity managing
ESI also managed the other members of the Extended Stay hotel
network, the sheer number of debtors greatly exacerbated the toll on
management in terms of both time and energy.407
In Chapter 11, the debtor’s old management continues as the DIP, a
role that a trustee would otherwise play in Chapter 7.408 Thus, the DIP is
responsible for compiling all requisite information regarding the
debtor’s financial condition and timely filing that information in the
form of schedules and reports.409 Where, as in the ESI case, the same
management has to complete these obligations for more than one debtor,
the resulting burdens can be overwhelming.410 The DIP must account for
the indebtedness of each individual debtor.411 The greater the amount of
that indebtedness, the greater the burden imposed on the DIP.412 Greater
debt levels require the DIP to account for the claims of creditors with
diversified interests and to try to align all of those interests in an effort

405.
406.

Id. at 8-9 (Provisions 16-17).
Id. at 2 (providing that Extended Stay Inc. and its debtor affiliates each
commenced a voluntary bankruptcy case on June 15, 2009).
407. Id. at 3 (Provision 7) (“All Extended Stay hotels are managed by [HVM].”).
408. Section 323 is part of Chapter 3, a generally applicable chapter of the
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 323. Section 323 makes the trustee the
representative of the estate. See id. § 323(a); see also S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 37 (1978). However, in a Chapter 11 case, the debtor in possession becomes
the representative of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a); see also S. REP. No. 95-989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1978).
409. Debtor’s Motion to Extend Exclusivity Periods at 8 (Provision 16), In re
Extended Stay, Inc., 418 B.R. 49, 57, ECF No. 289 (“Undoubtedly, the filing of
voluminous Schedules and 2015.3 Reports requires considerable time and devotion of
resources of the Debtors’ management and their professionals, particularly given the
number of Debtors in these cases.”).
410. Id. (“Management’s first priority has been to focus on the daily operations of
the Debtors’ hotel business, leaving little time to focus on plan preparation and
negotiation.”).
411. Id. at 8-9 (Provision 17) (detailing the different forms of debt owed by each
debtor).
412. Id. at 7-8 (Provision 15) (identifying the size and complexity of the debtors’
chapter 11 case as the most common basis relied upon by courts in granting a debtor’s
motion to extend its exclusivity periods).
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to confirm a plan of reorganization.413 Thus, an increase in the number
of parties asserting claims in the debtor’s bankruptcy case correlates
with a greater likelihood of conflicting interests and a correspondingly
diminished likelihood of the DIP developing a Chapter 11 plan within
the debtor’s exclusive periods.414 The DIP in the ESI bankruptcy cited
the number of debtors, creditors, and the $7.4 billion it owed in debt as
sufficient grounds to justify the DIP’s request for an extension of ESI’s
exclusivity periods.415 Since the primary player acting as the DIP is the
guarantor, these factors are all indicative of the burden the debtor’s
bankruptcy imposes upon the guarantor in terms of time and money.416
In the springing guaranty case triggered by ESI’s filing for
bankruptcy, the guarantor was David Lichtenstein, one of ESI’s
managers and the 100% equity owner. 417 During the relevant period,
Lichtenstein was the “President, CEO, and Chairman of ESI.” 418
Lichtenstein was also the owner of HVM Manager, an entity with the
absolute right to manage and direct the operations of a separate entity,
HVM LLC (“HVM”). 419 HVM, in turn, is an affiliate of ESI that is
responsible for the management of ESI and for the payment of ESI’s

413. Id. at 9-10 (Provisions 18-19) (discussing how “numerous parties potentially
having interests in the plan of reorganization and effectively having a seat at the
negotiating table” have complicated the debtors’ efforts to promote global plan
negotiations).
414. Id.
415. Id. at 8-9 (Provision 17).
416. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2012) (explaining that the guarantor is the debtor’s
management who continues to run the business operations of the debtor throughout the
duration of the debtor’s bankruptcy as the DIP).
417. Bank of Am. v. Lightstone Holdings, LLC, 938 N.Y.S.2d 225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2011); see also Complaint at 5 (Provision 22), Lichtenstein v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher
LLP, 992 N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), ECF No. 1 (“Mr. Lichtenstein and
representatives of Lichtenstein-related entities comprised a majority of the members of
the board of directors of ESI. Thus, the ultimate decision whether ESI was going to file
for bankruptcy rested on Lichtenstein.”).
418. See Complaint at 4 (Provision 16), Lichtenstein, 992 N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2014), ECF No. 1.
419. Disclosure Statement for the Debtors’ First Amended Plan of Reorganization
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankr. Code, In re Extended Stay, Inc., 418 B.R. 49, ECF No.
796.
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post-petition expenses.420 Importantly, ESI’s first plan of reorganization
defined the HVM Manager Owner as David Lichtenstein, otherwise
known as the debtor’s insider-guarantor.421 Thus, much of the financial
obligations and managerial responsibilities attributed to HVM in the
debtor’s Motion to Extend Exclusivity Periods can be attributed to
Lichtenstein in his individual capacity.422 ESI describes the role of HVM
as the manager of the debtor’s business operations in the following
manner:
HVM, on behalf of Extended Stay, pays all property level expenses
of the hotels, contracts with service providers and purchases all
goods and materials utilized in the operation of the business. HVM
employs approximately 9,200 employees in connection with the
423
operation of the hotels at any given point in time.

ESI, HVM, and the Extended Stay family of hotels are responsible
for operating over 680 hotels.424 ESI’s bankruptcy forced the debtors and
HVM to expend a substantial amount of time and energy toward
ensuring the smooth operation of the debtor’s business while in
bankruptcy. 425 ESI explained in its exclusivity extension request that
managing the daily operations of the debtors’ hotel business consumed
much of its management’s time, “leaving little time to focus on plan
preparation and negotiation.”426 In sum, Lichtenstein was the individual
controlling HVM.427 HVM was the entity tasked with managing ESI.428
420. Statement of Fin. Affairs for Extended Stay Inc., In re Extended Stay, Inc., 418
B.R. 49, ECF No. 454. HVM’s responsibility is to manage all of the Extended Stay
hotels. Id. However, the Extended Stay companies do not own HVM. Id.
421. Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankr. Code, In re
Extended Stay, Inc., 418 B.R. 49, ECF No. 769.
422. See supra text accompanying notes 405-17.
423. Debtor’s Motion to Extend Exclusivity Periods, In re Extended Stay, Inc., 418
B.R. 49, ECF No. 289.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Disclosure Statement for the Debtors’ First Amended Plan of Reorganization
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankr. Code, In re Extended Stay, Inc., 418 B.R. 49, ECF No.
796.
428. Statement of Fin. Affairs for Extended Stay Inc., In re Extended Stay, Inc., 418
B.R. 49, ECF No. 454. HVM’s responsibility is to manage all of the Extended Stay
hotels. Id. However, the Extended Stay companies do not own HVM. Id.
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Therefore, Lichtenstein – through HVM – had to cope with the burdens
tangential to ESI’s decision to enter Chapter 11. 429 These burdens
included: navigating the debtor’s complex capital structure, responding
to information requests submitted by a myriad of parties, balancing the
conflicting interests of those parties, consolidating debtor-related
litigations commenced in distinct jurisdictions, and conducting
investigations of appointed personnel, such as examiners and special
servicers.430
Consequently, Lichtenstein and other insider-guarantors were
forced to cope with the ordinary obligations associated with the debtor’s
filing and to exhaust substantial resources in an effort to avoid being
held personally liable pursuant to the springing guaranty. 431 The
imposition of these simultaneous burdens on the guarantor necessarily
detracted from the guarantor’s ability to focus on the debtor’s
bankruptcy, which in turn had a detrimental effect on the debtor’s
bankruptcy case.432
2. Why a Bankruptcy Court is Justified in Invoking its Equitable Powers
Pursuant to § 105
a. Temporary v. Permanent Injunctions
As a preliminary matter, when a party moves for the issuance of a §
105 injunction, a bankruptcy court can respond in several ways
including: declining to issue the injunction, issuing a temporary
injunction, or issuing a permanent injunction.433 Temporary injunctions
are effective up until the point at which the debtor’s plan has been
confirmed in the bankruptcy. 434 Permanent injunctions require the
429. Debtor’s Motion to Extend Exclusivity Periods, In re Extended Stay, Inc., 418
B.R. 49, ECF No. 289.
430. Id.
431. See Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankr. Code, In
re Extended Stay, Inc., 418 B.R. 49, ECF No. 769 (explaining that David Lichtenstein is
the owner of HVM Manager LLC, which manages HVM LLC, which in turn manages
the daily operations of the debtor).
432. Id.; see also Adams, Jr. & Kirkham, supra note 1 (describing the burdensome
responsibilities of the DIP in the debtor’s bankruptcy case).
433. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135.
434. Id.
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proponent of such an injunction to make a showing of exceptional
circumstances. 435 Some bankruptcy courts will not even entertain the
possibility of a permanent injunction because they read § 524 to place an
outright bar on the issuance of a permanent injunction. 436 Other
bankruptcy courts are willing to overlook § 524 in exceptional cases, but
these courts nonetheless classify a permanent injunction as an
extraordinary form of relief.437
b. Section 105 Temporary Injunctions
i. The Five-Factor Test: When to Issue an Injunction Pursuant to § 105
The disincentives created by the springing guaranty lead to delayed
filing and harm to the debtor’s viable reorganization, and thus,
bankruptcy courts are justified in invoking their equitable powers to
enjoin enforcement of such guaranties. 438 Bankruptcy courts are split
over whether they can invoke their § 105 equitable powers to confirm a
reorganization plan providing for the release of certain non-debtor
liabilities pursuant to the plan.439 In addition, the circuits that do permit
non-debtor releases apply different tests in assessing whether the facts of
a given case are sufficient to warrant the invocation of § 105. 440
Nevertheless, there are five factors that courts are most likely to rely
upon in making their determination.441

435.
436.
437.
438.

Id. at 136.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 135-36.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining the connection between
the springing guaranty device, the debtor’s delayed bankruptcy filing, and the harm to
the debtor’s reorganization prospects that results from the delay); see also 11 U.S.C. §
105 (2012); supra note 16 and accompanying text.
439. Silverstein, supra note 52, at 44.
440. Id. at 64 (“While pro-release courts generally agree upon the source of their
authority to issue non-debtor releases, they differ in critical respects over the
circumstances in which such authority may be exercised.”).
441. Id. at 64-66.
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1. Identity of Interests
First, “there must be an identity of interest between the debtor and
the third party” such that a suit against the non-debtor in effect
constitutes a suit against the debtor. 442 The most common basis for
finding the existence of an identity of interest is where enforcement
against the non-debtor results in the non-debtor holding a contribution,
indemnification, or equitable subrogation claim against the debtor.443 In
general, courts find an identity of interest to exist where the suit against
the non-debtor will ultimately lead to the depletion of the estate’s
assets.444 Thus, in the springing guaranty context, the application of this
factor should extend to the pre-filing context, as well as the post-filing
context.445 The inclusion of a springing guaranty in the borrower’s loan
documents inevitably will result in the pre-filing depletion of assets that
would otherwise have been included in the debtor’s estate. 446 The
springing guaranty causes the guarantor to delay the debtor’s filing for
bankruptcy in the hopes that by taking desperate measures, such as
trying to sell off assets, the guarantor can avoid having to file. 447
However, this strategy rarely succeeds.448 Instead, the guarantor’s delay
tactic depletes the company’s assets from the time the guarantor first
should have filed until the time the guarantor actually does file.449 Thus,
at the time the guarantor files, the company’s financial condition is
severely impaired as a result of the perverse incentives the springing
guaranty creates for the guarantor in deciding whether to file. 450
Additionally, it is highly probable that a previously entered state court

442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

Id.
Id. at 65.
Silverstein, supra note 52, at 65.
Id. at 64-65.
See infra notes 486-503 and accompanying text.
See Guaranties in Bankruptcy, supra note 216 (discussing the factors courts
consider to justify the issuance of a § 105(a) injunction).
448. Id.
449. See In re Extended Stay, Inc., 418 B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in
part 435 B.R. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (indicating that in the six months prior to ESI’s
bankruptcy filing, its total assets dropped from $7.1 billion to $13 million).
450. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
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order already liquidated the lender’s claim.451 This would occur if the
lender pursues its springing guaranty action in state court, and the state
court then enters a judgment against the guarantor. 452 This scenario
potentially precludes the bankruptcy court from restructuring the
lender’s debt so as to benefit the bankruptcy estate, the debtor, and all
the creditors.453 To achieve such a restructuring, the bankruptcy court
would need to preclude the lender from recovering the fully accelerated
amount of the loan. 454 However, the state court presiding over the
springing guaranty proceeding likely already permitted the lender to
enforce the loan up to its entire accelerated amount.455 Thus, the state
court’s enforcement of the springing guaranty ends up removing the
bankruptcy court’s usual discretion to restructure the terms of the loan in
a manner that facilitates, rather than hinders, the debtor’s
reorganization.456
2. Contribute “Substantial” Assets
Second, “the third party must contribute ‘substantial’ assets to the
reorganization”—i.e. contribute “large sums of money to the estate for
distribution to creditors and/or [] release [] claims the non-debtor
possesses against the debtor.” 457 As a result of the close interrelation
between the guarantor and the debtor in springing guaranty cases, it is
almost inevitable the guarantor will hold a contribution, indemnification,
or subrogation claim against the debtor.458 The close connection between
451. See Exhibit 3, columns (a), (c) (providing examples of state courts that entered
judgment in favor of the lender in the amount specified under the terms of the springing
guaranty).
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. See Exhibit 3, columns (a), (c).
457. Silverstein, supra note 52, at 65.
458. See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos (In re Quigley Co.),
676 F.3d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2849 (U.S. 2013) (identifying
situations where the guarantor holds an indemnification claim against the debtor); see
A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1001–02 (4th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the
guarantor’s right to exercise an insurance claim pursuant to an insurance policy owned
by the debtor); Guaranties in Bankruptcy, supra note 216, at 1 (“Generally... the
guarantor may rely on its common law rights of subrogation, contribution and
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the springing guarantor and the debtor makes it much harder for the
debtor to decline to reimburse its managing insider for the entire amount
the insider paid as the debtor’s guarantor. 459 In this type of personal
relationship, the desire of the debtor to pay back its guarantor is likely to
exist, regardless of the bankruptcy court’s holding with respect to the
enforceability of the guarantor’s claim against the debtor.460 In addition,
because the guarantor controls the borrower, it is probable that the
guarantor and the borrower will reach an agreement without a court
order.461 In this scenario, a guarantor with knowledge of the law may
reimbursement to seek payment from the principal obligor for any amounts the
guarantor pays under a guaranty.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 509 (2012) (providing for the
subrogation of certain claims of co-debtors); id. § 502 (providing guarantor with the
right to assert a claim for reimbursement or contribution).
459. See Exhibit 2 (illustrating the close relationship between corporate debtors and
their springing guarantors).
460. Id. For example, in the bankruptcy of Extended Stay Inc., the debtor asked the
bankruptcy court to approve of an order creating a $5 million litigation trust to be paid
from the assets of the debtor for the sole benefit of its guarantor, David Lichtenstein, in
defending against the springing guaranty proceedings. See Debtors’ Motion for Order
(A) (i) Authorizing Use of Cash Collateral, (ii) Granting Adequate Protection, And (iii)
Modifying the Automatic Stay and (B) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankr.
Rule 4001 at 41 (Provision 11), In re Extended Stay, Inc., 418 B.R. 49 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part 435 B.R. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), ECF No. 8 (“[The
Debtors’ Cash Collateral] Budget shall make provision for a litigation reserve in the
amount of $5 million [] to be provided to David Lichtenstein for use in defending
claims arising out of his authorizing the filing of these Chapter 11 Cases that may be
brought against him under certain Guaranties.”). Responding to this request, one
creditor argued that “[a]ny liability that David Lichtenstein may have under the
guaranty should not be funded from assets of the Debtors themselves. Payments in
respect of this obligation should not be pork-barreled into a motion for the use of cash
collateral.” Objection of Five Mile Capital II SPE ESH LLC to Debtors’ Motion for
Order (A)(i) Authorizing Use of Cash Collateral, (ii) Granting Adequate Protection and
(iii) Modifying the Automatic Stay, and (B) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant to
Bankr. Rule 4001 at 3, provision (4)(a), In re Extended Stay, Inc., 418 B.R. 49, ECF
No. 27.
461. In the Okun bankruptcy case, the lender filed a motion referencing this type of
out-of-court workout between the debtor entities and the guarantors. GCCFC 2006GG7 Westheimer Mall, LLC Complaint, E. The Agreement, In re IPofA W. Oaks Mall,
LP, 3:07-BK-33649 (No. 29) (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2007). The lender argues that
the intent of the arrangement was to benefit the guarantors to the detriment of the other
creditors in the bankruptcy case. Id. After explaining to the Bankruptcy Court why the
workout undermined the priority rule, the lender pointedly remarks that “[n]o request
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choose to release his or her contribution, indemnification, or subrogation
claims against the debtor.462 By releasing those claims, the guarantor can
satisfy this second factor.463
3. Essential to the Reorganization
Third,
the release must be “essential to the reorganization. Without the
release, there is little likelihood of success.” To illustrate, in the
absence of a release, non-debtors may refuse to contribute assets to
the estate that are necessary for the debtor’s reorganization. Without
the payments, the debtor will be forced to liquidate, which means
that creditors will likely recover much less, if they recover at all, and
464
the debtor will not be able to resume its business.

The guarantor is the central insider of the debtor.465 If the guarantor
is facing the threat of personal liability for millions of dollars at the
outset of the debtor’s bankruptcy case, the guarantor will be forced to
divert attention from his or her duties as the DIP.466 The guarantor will
have no choice but to redirect his or her attention to defending against
the litigation the guarantor faces individually.467 Where the guaranty is
enforced, the financial devastation that ensues will make it highly
unlikely that the guarantor will be in a position to contribute the
financing needed to support a confirmable plan of reorganization.468 For
example, in the bankruptcy of Market Center East Retail, Inc., the
debtor’s first proposed plan of reorganization provided that to the extent
any deficiency remains, “the debtor’s equity owner, Danny Lahave, will
contribute such additional funds, or pledge such additional collateral as
may be required to obtain loans, to provide for full and timely payment
has been made to [the Bankruptcy] Court for authorization to enter into and/or approval
of the Agreement.” Id.
462. Id.
463. Silverstein, supra note 52, at 65.
464. Id.
465. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
466. Debtor’s Motion to Extend Exclusivity Periods, In re Extended Stay, Inc., 418
B.R. 49, ECF No. 289.
467. Id.
468. See Exhibit 3, column (c) (providing a list of courts that held guarantors liable
for millions of dollars pursuant to a springing guaranty).
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of all claims allowed under the plan.”469 There, Danny Lahave was also
the guarantor under the springing guaranty agreement.470
4. Agreement by Substantial Majority of Creditors
Fourth, “a substantial majority of the creditors agree to [the
release], specifically, the impacted class, or classes has
‘overwhelmingly’ voted to accept the proposed plan treatment.”471 This
analysis is very difficult to apply in the context of smaller, private
companies with often only one key piece of property and one major
secured creditor who holds the guaranty.472
5. Payment of Claims Held by Impacted Class
Fifth, “the plan provides for ‘payment of all, or substantially all, of
the claims of the class or classes affected by the’ non-debtor release.”473
Ironically, in many of these cases, the secured lender holding the
guaranty does not even bother to file a proof of claim in the borrower’s
bankruptcy case because of the potential to sue based on the guarantor’s
recourse liability. 474 This undermines the non-recourse nature of a
secured loan, insomuch as the lender should have to first file a claim in
the bankruptcy case up to the value of the property.475 In addition, in
those cases where the debtor is able to propose a plan prior to the
469. See Debtor’s First Plan of Reorganization at Article VII, In re Mkt. Ctr. E.
Retail Prop., Inc., 1:09-BK-11696 (Bankr. D.N.M. June 17, 2009), ECF No. 23; see
also Bank of Am. v. Lahave, No. B237360, 2013 WL 1208423 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26,
2013) (discussing the enforceability of a late fee in connection with the lender’s
springing guaranty case against Danny Lahave, the guarantor).
470. See Debtor’s First Plan of Reorganization at Article VII, In re Mkt. Ctr., 1:09BK-11696; see also Lahave, 2013 WL 1208423.
471. Silverstein, supra note 52, at 65 (citing In re Master Mortg. Inv. Fund, Inc.,
168 B.R. 930 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994)).
472. Lenders are most likely to include springing guaranty provisions in the loan
documents of this type of creditor. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
473. Silverstein, supra note 52, at 66.
474. But see GCCFC 2006-GG7 Westheimer Mall, LLC v. Okun, No. 07 CIV.
10394 (NRB), 2008 WL 3891257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008) (obtaining deficiency
judgment against the guarantor, despite also having filed a proof of claim in the
debtor’s bankruptcy case).
475. See supra text accompany notes 44-45.

868

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XX

lender’s lawsuit to enforce the guaranty, the debtor’s plan does provide
for full payment to that secured lender, albeit over a more extended
period of time.476 Despite this provision, courts continue to permit the
lender to sue the guarantor in the hopes of receiving their payment
pursuant to the loan in a timelier manner.477
ii. The Five-Factor Test: Application in the Springing Guaranty Context
The very nature of a springing guaranty renders it highly probable
that the debtor will be able to satisfy all five factors, with the only
potential exception being the fifth factor. 478 The springing guaranty
device is a means by which lenders target a specific class of
borrowers. 479 Usually, these borrowers are smaller companies with a
single or small number of controlling stakeholders.480 Lenders require
those few individuals in control to be the springing guarantor because
those are the same people who would ordinarily decide, on the
borrower’s behalf, whether to authorize a bankruptcy filing. 481 By
implication, then, the intent of the lender in requiring a springing
guaranty in the loan documents is to create a mechanism by which to
deter the guarantor from subsequently authorizing the borrower’s
filing.482 Thus, if one takes into account the impact on the bankruptcy of
476. See JPMCC 2007-C1 Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Dix, No. CV-11-00017TUC-CKJ, 2013 WL 1340039, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 1, 2013) (“[P]ursuant to the
Borrower’s plan . . . the Plaintiff’s claim will be paid in full by the Borrowers.”).
477. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
478. See Silverstein, supra note 52, at 64-66 (describing the test applied by a
majority of pro-release courts). The fifth factor is the factor requiring the impacted class
of creditors to vote overwhelmingly in favor of the debtor’s reorganization plan. Id. at
66.
479. Tracht identifies the prevalence of springing guaranties in three contexts. See
Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 130. “First, they may be used in
financing for closely-held businesses, where a single or small number of shareholders,
members, or partners own and control the borrower. Second, they are used in
commercial real estate lending. Third, they are increasingly common as an adjunct to
creating “bankruptcy remote entities in securitized financing transactions.” Id.
480. Id.
481. See Eisenson, supra note 1, at 263 (“By imposing personal liability on a
guarantor, which is usually a person in control of the borrower, bad boy guaranties
create a financial disincentive for the guarantor to cause, or even permit, the borrower
to impede the lender’s collateral enforcement action by filing a bankruptcy petition.”).
482. See id.
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the guarantor’s pre-filing decisions, the following appropriately applies
the factors.483
1. Application: Identity of Interest
First, there is an identity of interest between the debtor and the
guarantor because the guarantor’s actions during the pre-filing period
lead to a direct depletion of the debtor’s assets, which upon filing
constitute the property of the estate.484 For example, ESI included in its
filings its total assets in December 2008 and its total assets as of May
31, 2009, immediately preceding ESI’s filing on June 15, 2009.485 This
information indicated that in the six months prior to filing, ESI’s total
assets dropped from approximately $7.1 billion to $13 million. 486 In
effect, this reduced the debtor’s estate from $7.1 billion to $13
million. 487 In turn, this would reduce what creditors would ultimately
recover in ESI’s bankruptcy. 488 In this particular case, the insiderguarantor was well aware that if he authorized the borrower’s
483.
484.
485.

See Silverstein, supra note 52, at 64-65.
Id. at 64.
Declaration of Joseph Teichman Pursuant to Rule 1007-2 of the Local Bankr.
Rules for the S. Dist. of New York in Support of First-Day Motions and Applications ¶
7 at 3, In re Extended Stay, Inc., No. 09-13764 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2009)
(noting that ESI’s consolidated assets as of December 31, 2008 were 7.1 billion);
Schedules of Assets and Liabs. for Extended Stay Inc. at 3); see also Schedules of
Assets and Liabilities, at 3, In re Extended Stay Inc., 1:09-BK-13764 (2009), ECF Doc.
No. 314 (noting that asset presentation is as of May 31, 2009); Summary of Schedules,
at 12, In re Extended Stay Inc., 1:09-BK-13764 (2009), ECF Doc. No. 314 (listing
ESI’s total assets as $12,904,854.76).
486. Declaration of Joseph Teichman Pursuant to Rule 1007-2 of the Local Bankr.
Rules for the S. Dist. of New York in Support of First-Day Motions and Applications ¶
7 at 3, In re Extended Stay, Inc., No. 09-13764 (noting that ESI’s consolidated assets as
of December 31, 2008 were 7.1 billion); Summary of Schedules, In re Extended Stay
Inc., No. 09-13764 (listing ESI’s total assets as $12,904,854.76).
487. Declaration of Joseph Teichman Pursuant to Rule 1007-2 of the Local Bankr.
Rules for the S. Dist. of New York in Support of First-Day Motions and Applications ¶
7 at 3, In re Extended Stay, Inc., No. 09-13764; Summary of Schedules, In re Extended
Stay Inc., No. 09-13764.
488. Declaration of Joseph Teichman Pursuant to Rule 1007-2 of the Local Bankr.
Rules for the S. District of New York in Support of First-Day Motions and Applications
¶ 7 at 3, In re Extended Stay, Inc., No. 09-13764; Summary of Schedules, In re
Extended Stay Inc., No. 09-13764.
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bankruptcy filing, he would also subject himself to up to $100 million in
recourse liability.489 Therefore, this drastic decline in the value of ESI’s
assets was likely the result of the insider-guarantor’s selling off ESI’s
assets in a desperate attempt to save the company and avoid being held
personally liable pursuant to the springing guaranty. 490 Were this the
case, the conclusion to be drawn would be that the insider delayed filing
beyond the point at which he first should have filed, and when he finally
did authorize the filing, the company’s reorganization prospects were
substantially lower than they otherwise would have been.491
When a company’s debt increases on its balance sheet, this may
indicate that the insider is taking out more debt to try to save the
company.492 In a bankruptcy case that led to personal liability for the
corporate debtor’s insider-guarantor under the springing guaranty, the
debtor’s filings with the bankruptcy court indicated that its primary
liability was a mortgage in the amount of $1,600,000.493 Notably, this
liability was incurred within ninety days of the corporate debtor’s filing
on December 29, 2011.494 As of that filing date, the corporate debtor
recorded its total liabilities as $1,636,046.495 Thus, the close proximity
of the date the insider took out the property’s mortgage with the date the
insider ultimately authorized the bankruptcy filing suggests that the
insider was trying to save the company. 496 Presumably, the insider
believed taking out the mortgage would enable him to avoid filing and
triggering his personal liability as the guarantor.497 This seems to have

489. Complaint at 3 (Provision 14), Lichtenstein v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP,
992 N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), ECF No. 1 (“The Guarantees provided for
$100,000,000 personal liability against Mr. Lichtenstein and Lightstone Holdings to the
Lenders in the event of particular “bad boy” acts, including the voluntary filing of a
bankruptcy petition by ESI.”).
490. See id.
491. See id.
492. Summary of Schedules at 3, In re G. Singh Enters., LLC, No. 11-40889
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2011).
493. Id. at 12.
494. Id. at 20.
495. Id. at 4.
496. Id. at 12, 20 (showing that the mortgage is the largest liability in the debtor’s
bankruptcy case).
497. Summary of Schedules at 12, 20, In re G. Singh Enters., LLC, No. 11-40889
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2011).
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been a final effort by the guarantor that failed, thereby forcing the
guarantor to file anyway.498
Similarly, the springing guaranty in another bankruptcy case
effectively incentivized the debtor’s majority owner to delay filing.499
There, the debtor’s total assets mysteriously declined from $9,054,169 at
the end of 2010 to $5,360,813.54 as of December 19, 2011, the date of
the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.500 Again, it is probable that the insider
was trying to sell off corporate assets in order to keep the company
running, albeit even if on a smaller scale.501 Faced with the threat of
considerable personal liability upon filing, these springing guarantors
resort to alternative remedies to try to avoid filing a bankruptcy
petition. 502 The aforementioned examples help to illustrate the
detrimental effect a springing guaranty can have on the borrower’s
subsequent Chapter 11 viability.503
2. Application: Contribute “Substantial” Assets
Second, the guarantor’s willingness to contribute substantial assets
to the reorganization would, for the most part, not be contingent upon
the pre-filing decisions of the guarantor. 504 However, in taking out
additional debt as part of the guarantor’s efforts to save the company,
498.
499.

Id. at 3.
See Summary of Schedules, In re Cotta Prop. Mgmt., LLC, No. 11-20706
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2012). Tax Return (Form 1065), In re Cotta, No. 11-20706
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2011), ECF 1-1 (stating total assets in 2010 were just over $9
million).
500. Summary of Schedules, In re Cotta, No. 11-20706 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 9,
2012).
501. See id.
502. See Adams, Jr. & Kirkham, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing the manner in which
these guaranties deter borrowers from filing for bankruptcy and incentivize guarantors
to put their personal interests ahead of the interests of the rest of their partners, the firm
itself, and its creditors).
503. See Pursuit of the Guarantor, supra note 47 (discussing reasons justifying a
court’s issuance of a § 105 injunction in similar situations where the debtor seeks to
protect its non-debtor guarantor); see also Guaranties in Bankruptcy, supra note 216
(discussing the limited case law that does exist on the enforceability of springing
guaranties). As a result of the limited case law that is specifically on-point to the
springing guaranty context, it is necessary to consider the factors courts apply in similar
guaranty cases in determining whether to issue a §105 injunction. Id.
504. See Guaranties in Bankruptcy, supra note 216, at 65.
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the guarantor likely makes loans to the debtor in his or her individual
capacity, through another company controlled by the guarantor, or a
combination of the two.505 This means the non-debtor—whether it be the
guarantor or the guarantor’s other company—would then hold claims
against the debtor’s estate.506 Thus, if the guarantor individually released
those claims or caused his other corporate entity to do so, he would be
deemed to be contributing “substantial assets to the reorganization,”
thereby satisfying factor two of the five-factor test.507
3. Application: Essential to the Reorganization
Third, the inherent nature of a springing guaranty reduces the
likelihood of the debtor undergoing a successful reorganization.508 A per
se rule prohibiting enforcement of these springing guaranties or treating
the lender’s claim as disallowed pursuant to § 510(c) would likely
illustrate why such a release is essential to the debtor’s reorganization.509
Without the guarantor’s financially ruinous behavior in the months
leading up to the bankruptcy filing, the debtor’s finances would not
position the company to end up in Chapter 7 after a few months, as is
often the case.510 Instead, those finances would reflect a viable company
that filed for bankruptcy at the right time, and thereby avoided the
detrimental effect of the erratic decisions of a desperate guarantor.
The springing guaranty not only negatively impacts the debtor’s
financial resources before the debtor has even filed, but also has a
negative impact during the bankruptcy case. 511 Because springing
guaranties are only effective if the guarantor is in a position to dictate
whether the borrower will ultimately file a bankruptcy petition, the

505. Id.; see also Schedules of Assets & Liabs. (Schedule F) at n.1, In re Extended
Stay, Inc., 1:09-BK-13764 (No. 314) (noting that sixteen days prior to the borrower’s
petition filing, the amount owed to HVM, an entity controlled by the guarantor, was
approximately $36 million).
506. See Guaranties in Bankruptcy, supra note 215; see also Schedules of Assets &
Liabs. (Schedule F) at n.1, In re Extended Stay, Inc., 1:09-BK-13764 (No. 314).
507. Silverstein, supra note 52, at 65.
508. Id.
509. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2012) (providing for the equitable
subordination of an overreaching lender’s claim).
510. See infra accompany text notes 512, 525.
511. See infra accompany text notes 562-65.
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guarantor almost always holds a controlling stake in the borrower. 512
Thus, it is this guarantor who stands to lose if the borrower must convert
to Chapter 7 and liquidate. 513 Therefore, it is in the guarantor’s best
interest to ensure the debtor can present a confirmable Chapter 11
plan. 514 In order to achieve plan confirmation, the guarantor must
reassure creditors that the debtor can meet its obligations pursuant to the
plan by promising to provide the debtor with substantial loans if
necessary.515 Further, the guarantor is most likely the debtor’s source of
pre-filing loans. 516 Therefore, the guarantor will hold claims in the
debtor’s bankruptcy case that the guarantor may need to forfeit in order
to enable the debtor to achieve plan confirmation.517 Consequently, the
guarantor will both contribute substantial finances in the form of loans
to the estate and release claims the guarantor holds against the estate.518
4. Application: Agreement by Substantial Majority of Creditors
The fourth factor would not depend on the guarantor’s pre-filing
decisions. 519 Instead, it is the factor most dependent upon how many
other creditors are in the debtor’s bankruptcy case, what class they
belong to, and what their respective claims are. 520 This will be the
512. See Eisenson, supra note 1, at 263 (equating a springing guarantor with a
person in control of the borrower).
513. Id. As a controlling stakeholder, the guarantor will lose the value of his or her
investment in the borrower if the borrower must liquidate, as opposed to successfully
reorganizing, exiting Chapter 11, and operating profitably. See Exploding and
Springing Guarantees, supra note 55, at 1 (explaining that the springing guarantor is
usually the person in control of the debtor).
514. See id.
515. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
516. See Debtor’s Motion Pursuant to § 1121(d) of the Bankr. Code Requesting
Extension of Exclusive Periods for the Filing of a Chapter 11 Plan and Solicitation of
Acceptances Thereof, In re Extended Stay Inc., No. 09-13764 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept.
15, 2009) (noting that HVM, the corporate entity controlled by the guarantor and
managing the debtor, held several claims for outstanding debts in the debtor’s
bankruptcy case).
517. See id.
518. See Adams, Jr. & Kirkham, supra note 1, at 12-13 (discussing both the risk of
liability of insiders on springing guaranties, as well as the burdens imposed on the
debtor in possession in Chapter 11).
519. Silverstein, supra note 52, at 65-66.
520. Id.
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hardest factor for the debtor to establish because – as applied in the
springing guaranty context – it will be examining whether the impacted
class of creditors (e.g. the lender holding the springing guaranty) votes
overwhelmingly in favor of the debtor’s reorganization plan.521
5. Application: Payment of Claims Held by Impacted Class
Finally, there is a specific type of borrower that leads lenders to
include springing guaranties in the loan documents.522 Lenders do not
want borrowers with certain characteristics—predominantly single asset
real estate companies that have assumed some variation of a limited
liability corporate form—to file for bankruptcy because of the threat
such a filing poses to the lender.523 Thus, the large majority of springing
guaranty cases involves corporate debtors that share these same
trademark characteristics, subjecting them to an increased likelihood
that a lender will require their loan agreement to include a springing
guaranty provision. 524 Of the twelve case studies, eleven ultimately
resulted in an insider of the corporate debtor being held personally liable
pursuant to a springing guaranty.525 Of the twelve corporate debtors in
those cases, ten assumed some variation of a limited liability corporate
form, whether it was an LLC, LTD, or LP.526 Similarly, nine out of the
twelve checked the box for “Single Asset Real Estate” as the nature of
their business on their bankruptcy petitions and correspondingly listed
521.
522.
523.

See id. at 64-66.
Id.
See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at *130 (describing the
three contexts, where lenders are most likely to require a bankruptcy-contingent
guaranty); see also Adams, Jr. & Kirkham, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing the connection
between single asset real estate entities and the tendency to include springing guaranties
in their commercial real estate loan documents); Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression
and the Limited Liability Company: Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 883 (2005) (explaining that most closely held businesses
are structured as LLCs).
524. See supra note 523 and accompanying text.
525. See Exhibit 1 (listing the twelve cases utilized in the case study); see also
Exhibit 3, column (c) (stating the holding in those twelve springing guaranty
proceedings, among others). But see Bank of Am. v. Lahave, No. B237360, 2013 WL
1208423 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2013) (barring the lender from collecting a five
percent late fee from the guarantor).
526. See Exhibit 1, column (c).
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only one piece of real property on Schedule A; the remaining three
checked “other.”527 All but one debtor indicated that its creditors were
within the one through forty-nine range, indicating that these were
smaller companies with proportionally lesser degrees of debt. 528
However, only one debtor qualified as a small business debtor. 529
Finally, all twelve debtors were private, non-listed companies.530
The conclusion here for purposes of applying factor five is that
lenders include springing guaranty provisions in the loan documents of
small single-asset real estate companies that only have one major
secured creditor in their subsequent bankruptcy cases.531 That creditor
holds the springing guaranty. 532 As such, the debtor’s plan inevitably
will provide for payment to the secured creditor comprising the “class
affected by the non-debtor release” because that creditor is usually the
only secured creditor in the debtor’s bankruptcy case.533
Therefore, the absence of the deterrent effect on the guarantor’s
pre-filing decision-making and the subsequent absence of the profusion
of the guarantor’s unwise pre-filing decisions would lead to the debtor
entering bankruptcy in an improved financial state.534 This in turn makes
it all the more likely that the debtor would have the capacity to present a
plan that could satisfy the fifth factor.535

527.
528.

Id.
Id. But see Voluntary Petition, In re Six Ventures, Ltd., No. 2:08-bk-58468
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 2008) (listing its creditors as within the “50-99” range).
529. See Exhibit 1, column (c). But see In re G. Singh Enters., LLC, No. 11-40889
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2011) (qualifying as a small business debtor).
530. See Bloomberg Terminal. This latter characteristic presents a problem in terms
of finding the company’s pre-filing financial data for the purpose of assessing how the
guarantor’s delay in filing the bankruptcy petition impacts the company’s financial
condition. Id. However, some financial information about the corporate debtor in the
aforementioned cases can be gleaned from the schedules that the corporate debtor is
required to file in a bankruptcy court. See Exhibit 1, column (d) (providing the citation
to the summary of schedules filed by each debtor in the case study in their bankruptcy
case).
531. See Exhibit 1, column (d) (providing the citation to the summary of schedules
filed by each debtor in the case study in their bankruptcy case); Silverstein, supra note
52, at 64-66.
532. See Exhibit 1, columns (b), (d).
533. Silverstein, supra note 52, at 66.
534. Id. at 66.
535. Id.
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c. Section 105 Permanent Injunctions
In order to justify the issuance of a permanent injunction to protect
a non-debtor guarantor, the debtor’s proposed plan must show that the
guarantor will be instrumental in contributing financing or assets to the
debtor throughout the reorganization process.536 In the alternative, the
debtor could show in its plan that the guarantor plays such a key and
unique role in running the debtor’s business that enforcement against the
guarantor would detract from his ability to manage the debtor’s
operations.537 The debtor would then need to show how the guarantor’s
managerial absence would cause a severe impairment to the debtor’s
reorganization process.538 Essentially, the guarantor must be one of the
people injecting money in some form into the debtor during its
reorganization or be one of a very small number of people with the
requisite knowledge to navigate effectively the complexities of the
debtor’s business.539 The latter scenario means that if the guarantor were
absent from the reorganization, there would be no one else or very few
others who could fill the guarantor’s shoes in managing the debtor’s
business.540
Despite the stringent standard bankruptcy courts apply in
determining whether to issue a permanent injunction, there is still a
strong argument for the issuance of a permanent injunction to bar the
enforcement of a springing guaranty. 541 A springing guaranty is not
merely an obligation to a third party, rather, it is a way for a lender
directly to “control the business decisions of the debtor”—for example,
the decision whether or not to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding.542 This
is precisely why the borrower’s controlling insiders are selected to be
the guarantors.543 Lenders assume that these guarantors are in a position
to bar the debtor’s bankruptcy filing because their goal is to bankruptcy-

536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.

See Pursuit of the Guarantor, supra note 47, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Will Exploding Guarantees Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135.
Id.
See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
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proof the loan documents.544 Thus, in an appropriate case, a bankruptcy
court should issue a permanent injunction pursuant to § 105 discharging
the liability under the springing guaranty as part of the debtor’s
confirmed plan of reorganization.545
d. Per Se Rule v. Case-by-Case Approach
The degree of financial harm that befalls the debtor as a result of
the springing guarantor’s pre-filing decisions will vary depending on the
unique facts of each case.546 Thus, an issue that could arise in the future
would be whether a court tasked with determining the enforceability of a
springing guaranty triggered by a bankruptcy filing should apply a per
se rule or a case-by-case approach. 547 Unfortunately, the springing
guaranty context is not one that permits a case-by-case approach. 548
Were that the rule, a guarantor would be unsure of his own potential
liability during the duration of the pre-filing period, and, as such, he
would inevitably employ the strategy of selling off assets and increasing
his debt in an effort to keep the company afloat, and if that fails, he

544. See Adams, Jr. & Kirkham, supra note 1 (explaining that the most important
part of a springing guaranty for a lender facing a potential borrower bankruptcy is that it
triggers the guarantor’s liability for the full amount of the loan if the borrower files for
bankruptcy and thus deters some borrowers from resorting to bankruptcy).
545. Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135.
546. Declaration of Joseph Teichman Pursuant to Rule 1007-2 of the Local Bankr.
Rules for the S. Dist. of New York in Support of First-Day Motions and Applications ¶
7 at 3, In re Extended Stay, Inc., No. 09-13764 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2009)
(noting that ESI’s consolidated assets as of December 31, 2008 were 7.1 billion);
Schedules of Assets and Liabs. for Extended Stay Inc. at 3, In re Extended Stay, Inc.,
No. 09-13764 (noting that asset presentation is as of May 31, 2009); Summary of
Schedules, In re Extended Stay, Inc., No. 09-13764 (listing ESI’s total assets as
$12,904,854.76); Summary of Schedules at 12, In re G. Singh Enters., LLC, No. 1140889, at 4, 12, 20 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2011) (establishing that the debtor’s total
liabilities consisted almost entirely of a mortgage taken out within 90 days of the
debtor’s bankruptcy filing); Summary of Schedules, In re Cotta Prop. Mgmt., LLC, No.
11-20706 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2012) (revealing the almost four million dollar
decrease in the debtor’s total assets in the year prior to the debtor’s filing).
547. See Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers, supra note 369, at 303 (discussing the
enforceability of bankruptcy waivers in general and advocating for a case-by-case
approach, as opposed to a per se rule deeming such waivers to be enforceable).
548. See id. at 313; supra notes 486-503 and accompanying text.
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would authorize the filing.549 However, at that point, the guarantor’s prefiling decisions have already transformed what would have otherwise
been a company ripe to undergo a successful reorganization into a
company tiptoeing the line between Chapter 11 and Chapter 7.550
In light of the aforementioned issues, it is likely that some form of
per se rule would be necessary to resolve the filing disincentive problem
that is created by the springing guaranty.551 Even if it is necessary to
apply a per se rule in the context of springing guaranties, there are still
ways that bankruptcy courts could limit this rule’s application so that it
does not result in the issuance of unwarranted permanent injunctions.552
One way would be to limit the applicability of the per se rule to
temporary injunctions.553 This would allow bankruptcy courts to adopt a
case-by-case approach in subsequently deciding whether to issue a
permanent injunction. 554 In the alternative, a bankruptcy court could
apply the per se rule in the context of both temporary and permanent
injunctions, but limit its applicability to specific types of cases in which
the per se rule would apply.555 For instance, a court could provide that
this per se rule will not apply in cases where the guarantor’s delayed
549.
550.

See supra notes 486-503 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 486-503 and accompany text; Declaration of Joseph Teichman
Pursuant to Rule 1007-2 of the Local Bankr. Rules for the S. Dist. of New York in
Support of First-Day Motions and Applications ¶ 7 at 3, In re Extended Stay, Inc., No.
09-13764 (noting that ESI’s consolidated assets as of December 31, 2008 were 7.1
billion); Schedules of Assets and Liabs. for Extended Stay Inc., at 3 (noting that asset
presentation is as of May 31, 2009); Summary of Schedules, In re Extended Stay Inc.
(listing ESI’s total assets as $12,904,854.76); Summary of Schedules at 12, In re G.
Singh Enters., LLC, No. 11-40889, at 4, 12, 20 (establishing that the debtor’s total
liabilities consisted almost entirely of a mortgage taken out within 90 days of the
debtor’s bankruptcy filing); Summary of Schedules, In re Cotta, No. 11-20706
(revealing the almost four million dollar decrease in the debtor’s total assets in the year
prior to the debtor’s filing).
551. See supra notes 486-503 and accompanying text.
552. See infra notes 553–66 and accompanying text.
553. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135.
554. Id.; see also Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers, supra note 369, at 314 (“And
although a bankruptcy court may not permanently relieve a nondebtor of its liabilities
absent extraordinary circumstances, it is interesting to ponder whether some bankruptcy
judges might view a bankruptcy-triggered guaranty as just such an extraordinary
circumstance.”).
555. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135 (distinguishing
between the issuance of temporary versus permanent injunctions).

2015]

THE INVOCATION OF § 105 TO BAR THE
ENFORCEMENT OF SPRINGING GUARANTIES

879

filing did not affect the outcome of the debtor’s bankruptcy case.556 As
applied, the court would look at the debtor’s financial condition at the
point in time when the guarantor should have first authorized the
bankruptcy filing.557 If, at that time, the debtor still would not have had
any real prospect of undergoing a successful reorganization, then the per
se rule would not apply.558 Therefore, the court would decline to issue an
injunction.559 Another condition on the applicability of the per se rule
could be that the rule would not apply in cases where there were no
other creditors in a position to be harmed by the enforcement of the
springing guaranty.560
Finally, the timing of the lender’s suit vis-à-vis the borrower’s
bankruptcy case could also be relevant.561 For instance, in Dix, were the
556. See Exploding and Springing Guarantees, supra note 55, at 2 (discussing the
deterrent effect of springing guaranties).
557. Id. (explaining the potential for the filing of bankruptcy to be delayed “to the
detriment of the creditors due to the deterrent influence of the exploding or springing
guaranty on the borrower’s decisionmakers”).
558. The doctrine of equitable subordination is invoked where the lender engages in
conduct that results in a detriment to the debtor or the debtor’s creditors. See id. at 2.
This occurs if the guarantor’s delayed filing of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition is to the
detriment of the debtor or the debtor’s creditors. See id. However, if—regardless of the
delay—the debtor is in such poor financial shape that the debtor will not be able to
undergo a successful reorganization anyway, then the delayed filing by the guarantor is
not to the detriment of the debtor or the debtor’s creditors. See id. In this latter scenario,
the bankruptcy policy arguments underlying the issuance of a § 105 injunction for the
purpose of protecting the guarantor to enable that guarantor to effectively oversee the
debtor’s reorganization effort are virtually eliminated. See id.
559. Id.
560. One commentator distinguishes the holdings of the courts in two earlier
springing guaranty cases by noting that in each of those cases, the borrower’s
bankruptcy case had already been dismissed, and thus, there was not a strong
bankruptcy policy argument to be made. Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note
4, at 130-31 (citing FDIC v. Prince George Corp., 58 F.3d 1041 (4th Cir. 1995); First
Nationwide Bank v. Brookhaven Realty Assocs., 637 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996)).
561. See Adams, Jr. & Kirkham, supra note 1 (describing all of the obligations of
the DIP during the debtor’s bankruptcy and the risk of liability of insiders on springing
guaranties). The implication is that it would be unfeasible for the guarantor to try to run
the debtor’s reorganization as DIP, while simultaneously being subjected to tremendous
liability under their guaranty obligations to creditors. Id. This is why the concurrence of
the debtor’s bankruptcy case and the springing guaranty case would provide additional
support for the issuance of a § 105 injunction. Id.
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lenders to bring their guaranty suit at the initiation of the debtor’s
bankruptcy as opposed to after the bankruptcy court had already
confirmed the debtor’s plan of reorganization, it is probable that the
bankruptcy case would have concluded in the same manner as almost
every other springing guaranty case triggered by the corporate debtor’s
bankruptcy filing—dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7.562 The reason
for this is that where the guaranty suit is brought at the start, the
distraction of this suit causes the guarantor to ignore his or her
obligations as the DIP in order to expend time and money defending
against the guaranty suit.563 If the guarantor loses, then the DIP loans
largely disappear.564 Thus, the toll of the guaranty suit on the DIP results
in the DIP failing to perform its obligations in the debtor’s bankruptcy
case: (1) the DIP does not have the time to maximize profit effectively;
562. JPMCC 2007-C1 Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Dix, No. CV-11-00017-TUCCKJ, 2013 WL 1340039, at *7 (D. Ariz. Apr. 1, 2013); see also In re Transwest Resort
Props., Inc., 4:10-BK-37134 (2010) (providing timeline of the major events in the
debtor’s bankruptcy case). In many springing guaranty cases triggered by bankruptcyrelated events, the bankruptcy court never enters an order confirming the debtor’s
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization because the case is dismissed or converted before
confirmation. Motion of the United States Trustee to Convert Case to Chapter 7, In re
Cotta Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 2:11-BK-20706 (No. 80); United States Trustee’s Motion to
Dismiss, In re G. Singh Enters., LLC, No. 11-40889 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2012)
(No. 33); United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss, In re Six Ventures, Ltd., No. 0858468 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Nov. 10, 2008) (No. 127); United States Trustee’s Motion to
Dismiss, In re Monroe Ctr. II Urban Renewal Co., 2:08-BK-32556 (No. 41,). In Cotta,
Singh, and Six Ventures, the bankruptcy courts granted the trustees’ requested motions.
Motion of the United States Trustee to Convert Case to Chapter 7, In re Cotta, 2:11BK-20706 (No. 80); United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss, In re Singh, No. 1140889 (No. 33); United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss, In re Six Ventures, No. 0858468 (No. 127). But see Chapter 7 Trustee’s Final Report, In re Monroe Ctr. II Urban
Renewal Co., 2:08-BK-32556 (No. 171) (mooting the trustee’s motion to dismiss the
case and instead entering a court order converting the case from Chapter 11 to
Chapter 7).
563. See Adams and Kirkham, supra note 2 (discussing the usual burdens imposed
on the debtor in possession in Chapter 11, as well as the role of insider springing
guaranties as “the largest impediment to borrower bankruptcies”).
564. See Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization at Provision 4.04, In re Communidad
Kensington Club I, LLC, No. 08-32127 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 27, 2008) (No. 46);
Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization at Article VII, In re Mkt. Ctr. E. Retail Prop. Inc., No.
09-11696-s11 (Bankr. D.N.M. May 6, 2009) (No. 23) (authorizing the debtor to borrow
funds from the guarantor to the extent necessary to carry out the debtor’s obligations
pursuant to its plan of reorganization).
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(2) the DIP does not provide the bankruptcy attorney with the necessary
information to get the requisite filings in on time, precluding the ability
of all parties to assess the financial condition of the company and
formulate a viable plan of reorganization; and (3) in the event the
guarantor is held liable, the DIP financing largely disappears. 565
However, if the lenders do not file suit for breach of guaranty until after
a bankruptcy court has confirmed the debtor’s plan of reorganization,
the potential harm to the debtor’s bankruptcy case is de minimis because
in effect, that bankruptcy case has already concluded.566 In that context,
the bankruptcy court could cite the status of the bankruptcy case at the
time the lenders filed the springing guaranty lawsuit in support of its
decision to decline to apply the per se rule.567
CONCLUSION
This Note reaches a procedural conclusion and a substantive
conclusion with respect to the treatment of springing guaranties
triggered by bankruptcy-related events.568 Procedurally, it is appropriate
for a bankruptcy court to exercise jurisdiction over these springing
guaranty proceedings. 569 As a result of the interrelatedness between a
lender’s claim against the guarantor and the guarantor’s subsequent
claim against the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, the initial springing

565. See Adams and Kirkham, supra note 2 (discussing the usual burdens imposed
on the debtor in possession in Chapter 11, as well as the role of insider springing
guaranties as “the largest impediment to borrower bankruptcies”); see also supra notes
49-50, 466-67, 512-14 and accompanying text.
566. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb, supra note 4, at 131 (explaining that
where the bankruptcy proceeding is dismissed prior to the initiation of the springing
guaranty suit, the guarantor will be precluded from making the same strong bankruptcy
policy argument that the guarantor could have made had the lender brought suit on the
springing guaranty at the beginning of the debtor’s bankruptcy case) (citing FDIC v.
Prince George Corp., 58 F.3d 1041 (4th Cir. 1995); First Nationwide Bank v.
Brookhaven Realty Assocs., 637 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)).
567. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 131 (explaining that
the bankruptcy policies of “providing the debtor with a fresh state and an opportunity to
reorganize its finances” are largely nonexistent where “the bankruptcy case [is]
dismissed prior to the state law suit seeking to impose personal liability”).
568. See supra Part III.
569. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
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guaranty proceeding is “related to” the debtor’s bankruptcy case. 570
Even if a bankruptcy court could not exercise “related to” jurisdiction
over a springing guaranty proceeding, the proceeding is nonetheless a
“core” proceeding because it necessarily “arises in” the debtor’s
bankruptcy case.571 Absent the debtor’s bankruptcy filing or the lender’s
collateral becoming an asset in the debtor’s bankruptcy, there is no
default under the strict terms of the guaranty agreement. 572
Consequently, a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to preside over
springing guaranty proceedings triggered by bankruptcy-related
events.573
The substantive conclusion is that a bankruptcy court should rely
on its equitable powers pursuant to § 105 to enjoin enforcement of
springing guaranties if the subject guaranty ultimately harms the
debtor.574 Although a number of bankruptcy policies are in conflict with
the lender’s rationale for including a springing guaranty in a loan
agreement, perhaps the strongest policy argument against the
enforcement of these guaranties is grounded in the conflict of interest
that they create.575 A guarantor must choose between what is in his or
her own best interest and what is in the best interests of creditors when
deciding whether to file for bankruptcy. 576 Lenders ensure that the
guarantor who is liable pursuant to these guaranties is the person who is
most likely to decide when and whether the borrower should file for
bankruptcy.577 Thus, a springing guaranty influences the decision-maker
before deciding whether to file for bankruptcy, thereby compromising
not only the interests of other likely parties to the bankruptcy but also
the bankruptcy itself. 578 The springing guaranty compels the insider570.
571.
572.
573.
574.

28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012); id. § 157.
Id. § 1334; id. § 157. For further discussion, see supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
See supra Part III.C; see also 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (affording a bankruptcy court
the power to effectuate the policies of the Code in an equitable manner).
575. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135 (discussing the
potential invocation of § 105 to enjoin enforcement against the springing guarantor by
reference to the policies underlying various sections of the Code); id. at 132.
(describing the conflict of interest such guaranties create for the guarantor in deciding
whether to authorize a bankruptcy filing).
576. Id. at 132.
577. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
578. See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
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guarantor to act in his or her own best interest rather than in the best
interest of the firm and its creditors.579 As a result, the guarantor seeks to
delay the impending filing, thereby costing the firm more money in the
process, rather than choosing the course of action most likely to yield
profits to the firm’s creditors—authorizing an immediate filing in
Chapter 11. 580 Therefore, bankruptcy courts should invoke their
equitable powers in furtherance of the primary goal of Chapter 11: to
facilitate the successful rehabilitation of a corporate debtor.581 If courts
continue to enforce these springing guaranties, lenders will continue to
include them in loan documents.582 As a result, corporate borrowers in a
position to gain by undergoing the Chapter 11 restructuring process will
fail altogether to file or fail to file in a timely manner and thus not
realize this potential gain.583

579. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 132 (describing how
the springing guaranty creates a conflict of interest between the guarantor’s personal
best interest and the guarantor’s fiduciary duty to the borrower’s creditors).
580. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
581. See supra Part III.C; 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
582. See Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, supra note 4, at 135 (noting that
“springing guaranties violate fundamental bankruptcy policies [including] preventing
firms that would benefit from reorganization from filing”).
583. Id.

(b)
Springing Guaranty
Judgment
Citation

Bank of Am., N.A. v.
Lightstone Holdings, LLC,
938 N.Y.S.2d 225 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2011)
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Cotta, No. 11-CV-410, 2012
WL 5335999 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 26, 2012)

Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l
Ass’n v. Singh, No. CIV.A.
H-12-0147, 2012 WL
3186036 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2,
2012)

(a)
Bankruptcy
Docket Citation

In re Extended
Stay, Inc., 1:09BK-13764

In re Cotta Prop.
Mgmt., LLC,
2:11-BK-20706

In re G. Singh
Enters., LLC,
4:11-BK-40889

Guarantor’s
Last Name

(1)
Lichtenstein

(2) Cotta

(3) Singh

Voluntary Petition, In re G. Singh
Enters., LLC, No. 11-40889 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2011)
Name of Debtor: G Singh Enterprises
LLC
Nature of Business: Other

Voluntary Petition, In re Cotta Prop.
Mgmt, LLC, No. 11-20706 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2011)
Name of Debtor: Cotta Property
Management, LLC
Nature of Business: Single Asset Real
Estate

Voluntary Petition, In re Extended
Stay, Inc., 1:09-bk-13764 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Jun. 15, 2009)
Name of Debtor: Extended Stay Inc.
Nature of Business: Other

(c)
Debtor’s Bankruptcy Petition
Citation

CASE STUDY

EXHIBIT 1

Summary of Schedules
at 18, In re G. Singh
Enters., LLC, No. 1140889 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Dec. 29, 2011)

19 DAYS

24 DAYS

1 DAY

Summary of Schedules,
In re Extended Stay Inc.
(listing ESI’s total
assets as
$12,904,854.76).
Summary of Schedules,
In re Cotta Prop.
Mgmt., LLC, No. 1120706 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Aug. 9, 2012).

(e)
Interim Time
Between
Petition and
Filing of
Springing
Guaranty Case

(d)
Summary of Schedules
filed in Debtor’s
Bankruptcy Case
Citation
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111 Debt Acquisition LLC
v. Six Ventures, Ltd., No.
C2-08-768, 2009 WL
414181 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 18,
2009) aff’d sub nom. 111
Debt Acquisition Holdings,
LLC v. Six Ventures Ltd.,
413 F. App’x 824 (6th Cir.
2011)

Bank of Am. v. Lahave, No.
B237360, 2013 WL
1208423 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 26, 2013), reh’g
denied (Apr. 16, 2013),
review denied, (June 12,
2013)

In re South Side
House, LLC, 1:09BK-43576

In re Six
Ventures, Ltd.,
2:08-BK-58468

In re Market Ctr.
East Retail Prop.,
Inc., 1:09-BK11696

(5) Perlmutter
and Stark

(6)
Rhodehamel,
Kahn, and
McMenamy,
Jr.

(7) Lahave

Wells Fargo Bank Minn.,
N.A. v. Kobernick, No.
C.A. 8-CV-1458, 2009 WL
7808949 (S.D. Tex. May 28,
2009) aff’d sub nom U.S.
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v.
Kobernick, 454 F. App’x
307 (5th Cir. 2011)
In re S. Side House, LLC,
470 B.R. 659 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2012)

In re
Communidad
Kensington Club
I, LLC, 4:08-BK32127

(4) Kobernick

Voluntary Petition, In re Market Ctr.
East Retail Prop., Inc., 1:09-bk-11696
(Bankr. D. New Mexico Apr. 22,
2009)
Name of Debtor: Market Center East
Retail Property, Inc.
Nature of Business: Single Asset Real
Estate

Voluntary Petition, In re Communidad
Kensington Club I, LLC, No. 0832127 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 27,
2008)
Name of Debtor: Comunidad
Kensington Club I, LLC
Nature of Business: Single Asset Real
Estate
Voluntary Petition, In re S. Side
House, LLC, No. 1-09-43576-ess
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2009)
Name of Debtor: South Side House
LLC
Nature of Business: Single Asset Real
Estate
Voluntary Petition, In re Six Ventures,
Ltd., No. 2:08-bk-58468 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio Sept. 3, 2008)
Name of Debtor: Six Ventures, Ltd.
Nature of Business: Other
SPRINGING
GUARANTY
CASE FILED on
the basis of a
different
triggering
condition in the
loan documents
PRIOR TO
DEBTOR’S
BANKRUPTCY
FILING
44 DAYS

Summary of Schedules,
In re Six Ventures, Ltd.,
No. 08-58468 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio Sept. 18,
2008)

Summary of Schedules,
In re Market Ctr. East
Retail Prop., Inc., No.
09-11696-nlj11 (Bankr.
D.N.M. May 6, 2009)

JUST OVER
TWO YEARS

39 DAYS

Summary of Schedules,
In re S. Side House,
LLC, No. 1-09-43576ess (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 30, 2009)

Summary of Schedules,
In re Communidad
Kensington Club I,
LLC, No. 08-32127
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. June
27, 2008)
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LBUBS 2004-C8 Derek
Drive, LLC v. Gerbino, No.
2:13-CV-2264, 2014 WL
2446362 (W.D. La. May 30,
2014)
Monroe Ctr. II Urban
Renewal Co. v. Strategic
Performance Fund-II, No.
C-52-08, 2010 WL
5343317, at *3 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Dec. 29,
2010)
GCCFC 2006-GG7
Westheimer Mall, LLC v.
Okun, No. 07 CIV. 10394
(NRB), 2008 WL 3891257
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008)
UBS Commercial Mort.
Trust 2007-FL1 v. Garrison
Special Opportunities Fund
L.P., 938 N.Y.S.2d 230
(Sup. Ct. 2011)
LBCMT 2007-C3 Seminole
Trail, LLC v. Sheppard, No.
3:12CV00025, 2013 WL
3009319 (W.D. Va. June 17,
2013)

In re Lake Charles
Retail Dev., LLC,
1:13-BK-44093

In re Monroe Ctr.
II Urban Renewal
Co., 2:08-BK32556

In re IPofA West
Oaks Mall, LP,,
3:07-BK-33649

In re Penzance
Cascades North,
LLC, 1:10-BK16643

In re WSG
Charlottesville,
LLC, 12-12785BFK

(8) Gerbino

(9) Hoda and
Saddel

(10) Okun

(11) Garrison

(12) Sheppard
and Wolman

Voluntary Petition, In re Lake Charles
Retail Dev., LLC, No. 1-13-44093nhl (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013)
Name of Debtor: Lake Charles Retail
Development LLC
Nature of Business: Single Asset Real
Estate
Voluntary Petition, In re Monroe Ctr.
II Urban Renewal Company, LLC,
No. 08-32556-DHS (Bankr. D.N.J.
Nov. 14, 2008)
Name of Debtor: Monroe Center II
Urban Renewal Company, LLC
Nature of Business: Other
Voluntary Petition, In re IPofA West
Oaks Mall, LP, No. 07-33649-KRH
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2007)
Name of Debtor: IPofA West Oaks
Mall, LP
Nature of Business: Single Asset Real
Estate
Voluntary Petition, In re Penzance
Cascades North, LLC, No. 10-16643reg (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2010)
Name of Debtor: Penzance Cascades
North, LLC
Nature of Business: Single Asset Real
Estate
Voluntary Petition, In re WSG
Charlottesville, LLC, No. 12-012785BFK (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 1, 2012)
Name of Debtor: WSG
Charlottesville, LLC
Nature of Business: Single Asset Real
Estate
14 DAYS

23 DAYS

Summary of Schedules,
In re Penzance
Cascades North, LLC,
et al., No. 10-16643
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb.
14, 2011)
Summary of Schedules,
In re WSG
Charlottesville, LLC,
No. 12-12785-BFK
(Bankr. E.D. Va. May
24, 2012)

45 DAYS

JUST OVER
TWO YEARS

Summary of Schedules,
In re Monroe Ctr. II
Urban Renewal Co.,
No. 08-32556-DHS
(Bankr. D.N.J. Dec. 1,
2008)
Summary of Schedules,
In re IPofA West Oaks
Mall, LP, No. 33649KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va.
Dec. 19, 2007)

14 DAYS

Summary of Schedules,
In re Lake Charles
Retail Dev., LLC, No.
1-13-44093-nhl (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013)
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Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes, the debtor in possession
continued to manage the affairs of
the debtor in the bankruptcy case
between the filing date (4/30/2009)
and January 15, 2014, when the
bankruptcy court appointed a trustee
in the case after Stark was murdered
a few days earlier.
Yes.

(2) Cotta

(3) Singh

(4) Kobernick

(5) Perlmutter
and Stark

Yes. David R. Rhodehamel signs the
petition.

Yes. Gurpreet Singh, the guarantor,
signs the petition.
Yes. Mitchell Kobernick, the
guarantor, signs the petition.
Yes. Both Israel Perlmutter and
Menarchem Stark sign the petition.

Yes.

(1) Lichtenstein

(6) Rhodehamel,
Kahn, and
McMenamy, Jr.

(b)
Is it the guarantor’s signature that
appears on the debtor’s Chapter
11 petition as the individual
authorized to file for bankruptcy?
No. It is the signature of the debtor’s
Secretary and General Counsel,
Joseph Teichman.
Yes. Frank Cotta signs the petition
as the debtor’s “authorized
individual.”

(a)
Did the guarantor(s) act as the
DIP in the debtor’s bankruptcy
case?

CASE NUMBER

David R. Rhodehamel is the President of Six Properties
Management, Inc., which is the 0.5% owner of a
membership interest in the Debtor, and Rhodehamel is the
Managing Member of Six Holdings, LLC, which is the
99.5% owner of a membership interest in the debtor.

Cotta is the Manager of Cotta Property Management, LLC,
and he and his wife Florence owned 76.7% of the
securities. Frank Cotta is also the debtor’s property owner
(see Doc. No. 80, US Trustee’s Motion to Convert).
Singh is the manager and 100% equity owner of the
company (see debtor’s Statement of Financial Affairs).
Kobernick was one of three people acting as the debtor’s
managers, directors, and 100% equity security holders.
Perlmutter and Stark were each 50% equity holders of the
debtor, South Side House, LLC. Perlmutter was the
President of another NY corporation that acted as the
Managing Member of the Debtor.

Lichtenstein was the president of the corporate debtor,
Extended Stay, Inc., and the 100% equity owner.

(c)
What role did the guarantor play in the debtor entity?
(e.g., whether the guarantor had an ownership interest
or held an officer position)

THE ABILITY OF GUARANTORS TO INFLUENCE DEBTORS

EXHIBIT 2
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No. Julian Weldon, the Secretary
and Vice President of the Debtor,
signs the petition as the authorized
individual.
Yes. Eric D. Sheppard signs.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

(11) Garrison

(12) Sheppard
and Wolman

(c)
Outcome
HELD: The court relied on the four
corners of the guaranty agreement to
hold the guarantors liable for “the
remaining principal amount due
[$6,143,156.43], plus interest

(b)
Federal Court
No. 2:13-CV-2264,
2014 WL 2446362, at
*2, *6 (W.D. La. May
30, 2014)

SURVEY OF SPRINGING GUARANTY CASES
(d)
Basis for
Jurisdiction
Diversity. No subject
matter jurisdiction
(“SMJ”) discussion
in the opinion.

(e)
Triggering
Condition(s)
lender’s collateral
becoming an asset in
borrower’s bankruptcy
case

Sheppard is the Executive Manager and Operating Manager
of Debtor and holds a 98% member interest, and Wolman
holds a 1% member interest.

Vito Gerbino is the sole manager/member of the debtor,
and the Gerbino Family—a Limited Partnership—is the
100% equity owner. As an aside, there are three separate
guarantors in this case who are all members of the Gerbino
family: Vito, Frances, and Vincent Gerbino.
Dilawez Hoda and Gerard Saddel are both members of the
debtor and 50% equity holders.
Okun is the Manager of the General Partner of the debtor,
IPofA WOM LeaseCo GP, LLC, which holds a 1% equity
interest in the debtor. IPofA WOM LeaseCo LP, LLC, a
limited partner, holds a 99% equity interest in the debtor.
The guarantor, Garrison Special Opportunities Fund LP
holds 61.16% of indirect ownership interests in the Debtor.

Danny Lahave is the President, Director, and 100% Owner
of the debtor’s holding company, Top Terraces, Inc.

FORDHAM JOURNAL
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(1) LBUBS 2004-C8
Derek Drive, LLC v.
Gerbino

(a)
State Court

Yes. Dil Hoda is the authorized
individual.
Yes. Edward H. Okun signs the
petition.

Yes.

(9) Hoda and
Saddel
(10) Okun

CASE NAME

Yes. Vito Gerbino signs the petition.

Yes.

(8) Gerbino

EXHIBIT 3

Yes. Vito Gerbino signs the petition

Yes.

(7) Lahave
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Diversity. No SMJ
discussion.

Diversity. No SMJ
discussion.

Diversity. No SMJ
discussion.

Diversity. No SMJ
discussion.

HELD: The court relied on the four
corners of the guaranty agreement to
hold the guarantors liable in the
amount of $3,444,770.54 plus
interest in the amount of $642.29 for
each day until the guarantor paid in
full.
HELD: The court relied on the four
corners of the guaranty agreement to
hold the guarantors liable for
$4,599,985.43 plus $849.49 interest
for each day until the guarantor paid
in full.
HELD: The court relied on the four
corners of the guaranty agreement to
hold the guarantor liable for “the
principal amount of $3,144,603.34,
plus pre-judgment interest in the
amount of $276,035.28, plus
attorneys fees and costs of
$21,833.18, plus post-judgment
interest at the prevailing rate.”
HELD: The court relied on the four
corners of the guaranty agreement to
hold the guarantor liable for
$1,114,650.52, the outstanding
amount due under the loan.

No. 3:12CV00025,
2013 WL 3009319, at
*9 (W.D. Va. June 17,
2013)

1:12-CV-470, 2013
WL 2151683, at *6
(E.D. Va. May 15,
2013)

No. 11-CV-410, 2012
WL 5335999, at *4
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 26,
2012)

No. H-12-0147, 2012
WL 3186036, at *3
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 2,
2012)

(2) LBCMT 2007C3 Seminole Trail,
LLC v. Sheppard

(3) LBCMT 2007C3 Sterling Retail,
LLC v. Sheppard

(4) U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n v. Cotta

(5) Wells Fargo
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v.
Singh

[$122,204.45], plus default interest
[$329,469.58], late fees
[$47,865.07], and attorney’s fees
[$70,584.36].”

Borrower’s bankruptcy
filing

Borrower’s bankruptcy
filing and the lender’s
property becoming an
asset in bankruptcy

lender’s collateral
becoming an asset in
borrower’s bankruptcy
case

lender’s collateral
becoming an asset in
borrower’s bankruptcy
case
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Diversity. No SMJ
discussion.

HELD: The court relied on the four
corners of the guaranty agreement to
hold the guarantor liable in the
amount of $103,501,565.22 plus
interest through March 6,2008

07 Civ. 10394 (NRB),
2008 WL 3891257, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,
2008)

(10) GCCFC 2006GG7 Westheimer
Mall, LLC v. Okun

Borrower’s bankruptcy
filing

lender’s collateral
becoming an asset in
borrower’s bankruptcy
case

Diversity. No SMJ
discussion.

HELD: Although there was a waiver
of the lender’s right to claim default
interest, the court still relied on the
four corners of the guaranty
agreement to hold the guarantor
liable for the original amount of the
loan, $7,150,000.

Borrower’s bankruptcy
filing

HELD: The court relied on the four
corners of the guaranty agreement to
hold the guarantors liable in the
amount of $23,369,195.55.

No. C-52-08,
2010 WL
5343317, at *2
(N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Dec.
29, 2010)

(8) Monroe Ctr. II
Urban Renewal Co.,
LLC v. Strategic
Performance FundII
C.A. 8-cv-1458, 2009
WL 7808949, at *1
(S.D. Tex. May 28,
2009), aff’d sub nom.,
U.S. Bank, Nat’l
Ass’n v. Kobernick,
454 F. App’x 307 (5th
Cir. 2011)

Borrower’s bankruptcy
filing

HELD: The court relied on the four
corners of the guaranty agreement to
hold the guarantor liable for up to
the $100 million liability cap in the
guaranty agreement.

938 N.Y.S.2d
225 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2011)

(7) Bank of Am.,
N.A. v. Lightstone
Holdings, LLC

(9) Wells Fargo
Bank Minnesota,
N.A. v. Kobernick

Borrower’s bankruptcy
filing

HELD: The court relied on the four
corners of the guaranty agreement to
hold the guarantor fund liable for
$111,514,324, the current principal
amount of the loan.

938 N.Y.S.2d
230, 230, n. 1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2011)

(6) UBS
Commercial Mortg.
Trust 2007-FL1 v.
Garrison Special
Opportunities Fund
L.P.
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Finding the
Bankruptcy Court to
have “related to”
jurisdiction over the
springing guaranty
proceeding
Diversity. No SMJ
discussion.

Diversity. No SMJ
discussion.

Diversity. No SMJ
discussion.

HELD: referred the decision on the
merits to the Bankruptcy Court

HELD: The guarantor is liable for “a
total of $307,173,991.57 in
damages, plus accrued interest, late
fees and other chargeable fees and
costs.”
HELD: The guarantors are liable for
the amount of the loan - $29,280,000
minus the amount paid by the lender
at the foreclosure sale of the
property - $20,000,000.

HELD: The guarantors are liable
pursuant to the guaranties, but the
lenders have still not offered
sufficient evidence as to their

CV-11-00017-TUCCKJ, 2013 WL
1340039, at *9 (D.
Ariz. Apr. 1, 2013)
11-12431, 2012 WL
683379 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 2, 2012)

722 F. Supp. 2d 837
(E.D. Mich. 2010)

(14) JPMCC 2007C1 Grasslawn
Lodging, LLC v.
Dix

(15) 8375 Honeytree
Blvd. Holdings,
LLC v. Starman

(16) Prestige Capital
Corp. v. Michigan
Gage & Mfg., LLC

Borrower’s default on
the loan and subsequent
bankruptcy filing

Borrower’s allowance
of a number of
construction liens to be
placed on the property
securing lender’s loan
and borrower’s
bankruptcy filing

Borrower’s bankruptcy
filing

The lender’s collateral
becoming the subject of
a foreclosure
proceeding

Borrower’s bankruptcy
filing

Borrower’s bankruptcy
filing

Diversity. No SMJ
discussion.

HELD: The guarantor is liable in the
amount of $10,275,707.73.

HELD: affirming the District
Court’s final judgment order holding
the guarantor liable in the amount of
$10,560,000

3:12-CV-1242-M,
2013 WL 230381
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 18,
2013)

Nos. C-110209,
C-110215, 2011
WL 6677982,
*4, (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 21,
2011)

413 F. App’x 824 (6th
Cir. 2011)

(13) LSREF2 Baron,
LLC v. Aguilar

(12) Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. v.
Daniels

(11) 111 Debt
Acquisition
Holdings LLC v. Six
Ventures, Ltd. et al.
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Borrower’s bankruptcy
filing

Borrower’s bankruptcy
filing and failure to
dismiss case within 90
days of that filing

Failure to pay rents
collected by the
borrower and
misappropriate of rents
in connection with
several single-purpose
entity lenders (SPEs)

Borrower’s bankruptcy
filing

Borrower’s bankruptcy
filing
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(21) Wells Fargo
Bank Minnesota,
N.A. v. Rouleau

HELD: The individual partners –
acting as the guarantors on a loan
granted to the general partnership –
were held personally liable for the
amount of the mortgage and any
deficiency upon the partnership’s
filing for bankruptcy.
HELD: The guarantor is liable on
the $2.15 million loan agreement.

Diversity. No SMJ
discussion.

HELD: The guarantors are liable
pursuant to the individual recourse
guaranty agreements for the
principal sum of $1,750,000 and
$4,160,000, respectively.

CIV. JKB-12-3056,
2014 WL 1388409 (D.
Md. Apr. 9, 2014)

(19) LBCMT 2007C3 Urbana Pike,
LLC v. Sheppard

637 N.Y.S.2d
418
(N.Y.App.Div.),
appeal
dismissed,
N.E.2d 1347
(N.Y. 1996)
2012 VT 19, 191
Vt. 302, 46 A.3d
905 (Vt. 2012)

Finding the
Bankruptcy Court to
have “related to”
jurisdiction over the
springing guaranty
proceeding

HELD: referred the decision on the
merits to the Bankruptcy Court

609-CV-281-ORL28DAB, 2009 WL
1659164 (M.D. Fla.
June 12, 2009)

(18) S1 Inv. US-Re
Holdings 2009-1,
Inc. v. Englett

(20) First
Nationwide Bank v.
Brookhaven Realty
Assocs.

Finding the
Bankruptcy Court to
have “related to”
jurisdiction over the
springing guaranty
proceeding

HELD: referred the decision on the
merits to the Bankruptcy Court

470 B.R. 659 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2012)

(17) In re S. Side
House, LLC

damages. The case is remanded on
the issue of damages.
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